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Summary of Thesis  i 
Summary of Thesis 
This thesis explores how American conservatives in the 1850s used centralization as a term 
and process to understand social change, sectional conflict, and political economy, but 
paradoxically used opposition to centralization tactically to expand economic networks, 
extend state capacity, and rein in the effects of Jacksonian democracy. 
Opposition to centralization might seem an inherently democratic language. But a 
diverse group of northerners sought to reclaim this language for their own purposes. 
Drawing from revolutionary warnings against democratic excess and contemporary fears of 
popular violence, they tried to redefine the people as the greatest centralizing threat. The 
transformation of France from democratic republic to authoritarian empire gave 
conservatives an opportunity to show that democracies inevitably allowed power to 
centralize. But centralization also had a geographic dimension, and conservatives in eastern 
metropolises often used the term to warn against the growing power of rival empire cities 
and long-distance trade. Anxieties about consolidating divided municipal governments and 
concentrating voting power in a majority northern electorate also found expression in 
critiques of centralization.   
Yet historians have also identified processes of centralization underway in the 
period, and conservatives engaged with these too. Reformers embraced stronger municipal 
governments, city boosters pushed to entrench their economic dominance over expanding 
hinterlands, and pro-compromise unionists urged the federal government to intervene in the 
sectional crisis. Conservatives often supported these changes, arguing centralization without 
further democratisation was a necessary step. When confronted with disunion, urban 
disorder, and economic growth, they often backed centring power both institutionally and 
geographically in response. Denouncing democracy and rival cities as centralizers only 
helped conservatives legitimise their own centralizing agenda.  
Exploring how conservatives used centralization therefore highlights a sometimes 
neglected conservative modernising agenda in the 1850s, one that used an Early Republican 
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Introduction  1 
‘Diffusion against Centralization’: 
Centralization and Its Discontents in 
America, 1848-1860 
Introduction 
On January 6 1852, members of the Rochester Athenæum and Mechanics’ Association 
gathered to hear Lewis Henry Morgan – a prominent anthropologist, railroad lawyer, and 
Republican legislator in upstate New York – lecture on ‘Diffusion against Centralization.’1 
Opening his lecture, he argued that a supposed centralization of knowledge, trade, and 
property reinforced the power of European monarchies, aristocracies, and imperial capitals.2 
But in addition to discussing politics, he also used centralization to describe global trade and 
domestic political economy. According to Morgan, universities ‘centralized’ knowledge in 
the hands of an ‘aristocracy’, where common schools, public lectures, and a free press 
diffused it among the masses.3 The ‘centralization’ of property in the hands of the few, 
meanwhile, left the labourer in a state of bondage; by ‘diffusion,’ though, all could rise to 
propertied independence, and conflict between capital and labour would be avoided. 4 
Showing the ambiguity in a term often used pejoratively, he boasted that New York would 
‘centralize the trade of the world’ at the expense of London.5 Centralization allowed Morgan 
to link together ideas and phenomena that historians usually treat separately. In a nation 
familiar with republican warnings about agglomerations of power, it allowed Americans to 
understand power relationships in ways that cut across historians’ subfields. A study of how 
conservatives engaged with debates over centralization – both as a term in political and 
economic debate and as a process in which power consolidated in institutions, individuals, 
and places – shows that they did more than just reproduce an American ‘republican’ 
tradition rooted in Renaissance Europe and the English commonwealth tradition. They also 
provide an insight into how conservatives approached modern nation- and state-building 
and grappled with democratic transformation.  
Centralization as an idea allowed Morgan to convey seemingly contradictory ideas 
about changing power relationships in the midcentury republic. Despite his criticism of the 
centralization of trade in London, Paris, St. Petersburg, and Vienna – the ‘great cities are the 
foci into which every thing tends and the centres from which all things irradiate’, he argued 
– Morgan enthusiastically embraced the ‘law of commerce’ that meant America ‘must 
centralize the trade and finance of the world.’6 Within the United States, canals, railroads, 
and waterways, would also bind the Union together and make secession impossible.7 But 
                                                     
1 Lewis H. Morgan, Diffusion against Centralization. A lecture Delivered before the Rochester Athenæum and Mechanics’ 
Association, on its Third Anniversary, January 6, 1852 (Rochester, 1852). 
2 Ibid., p. 53. 
3 Ibid., pp. 14-22. 
4 Ibid., pp. 22-37. 
5 Ibid., pp. 38-46. 
6 Ibid., p. 40. 
7 Ibid., pp. 42-43, 46. 
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Morgan’s claim that only decentralised federal government could make the New World safe 
for imperial trading cities – building, as he put it, an ‘empire without a magistrate’ – suggests 
he also saw a potential threat in allowing New York to become the commercial city of an 
expanding continental empire.8 Despite extolling the virtues of diffuse property ownership, 
his opposition to ‘agrarian’ redistributions of wealth, also hints about his doubts over how 
state power should respond to industrialisation concentrating wealth in the hands of new 
corporations, an emergent urban bourgeoisie, and southern planters.9 The temporality of 
centralization – which Morgan saw as an ongoing process rather than a fixed fact – therefore 
helped him think critically about change over time as the United States underwent political, 
economic, and social upheaval. Moving across different uses of the term ‘centralization’ 
between 1848 and 1860, this thesis will show how the idea helped to structure a conservative 
response to events at home and abroad, and suggest ways to link our understanding of 
debates over sectionalism, state power, democratic rights, and economic growth in that 
period.   
Centralization from Revolution to Midcentury 
Morgan was not the only American who used centralization – and its close cousin, 
‘consolidation’ – to think about power around midcentury. As Chart 1 and Chart 2 below 
show, in the 1850s these terms became widely used in American print culture. Americans 
often used the term as a political weapon against their partisan or sectional rivals. In this 
context, they defined centralization against the power relationships of Jacksonian 
democracy and states’ rights. However, the term had a long history in American political 
discourse. In the early republic and the Jacksonian era many Americans used centralization 
in a similar way. Others, though, used centralization to warn against perceived democratic 
excess as well as tyrannical government. These Americans instead used centralization to 
convey how both corrupt individuals or the democratic masses could overturn the intricate 
balances of republican government. Opposition to centralization, despite sounding 
democratic, was therefore an extremely malleable term that could be used to support or 
challenge the idea of majority rule. 
At midcentury Americans often used the term as a rhetorical weapon against their 
political opponents, whom, they suggested, wanted to create a large and undemocratic 
federal government that would dominate people and states. In such party battles, Whigs and 
Democrats used ‘centralization’ as a populist term to illustrate an inversion of the ideal 
power relationships of American democracy.10 The term was also useful for pro-slavery 
southerners who warned against the authority of the federal government. 11  Here 
centralization and its antonym of states’ rights conveyed southern warnings against the 
power of the federal government to intervene against slavery in the South and the West. The 
term centralization could therefore convey the concept of a powerful institution like a party 
or the federal government, making it a powerful rhetorical tool. 
                                                     
8 Ibid., pp. 46, 53. 
9 Ibid., p. 37. 
10 For example, see ‘A Last Word to our Weekly Readers’, Pittsburgh Gazette, November 1, 1848; ‘Principles not 
Men’, USDR 23 (1848), p. 4. 
11 ‘The Progress of Consolidation’, Semiweekly Camden Journal (June 17, 1851); ‘The Consolidation Candidate for 
Governor’, Semiweekly Camden Journal (June 17, 1851). 
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Chart 1: Frequency of Keywords Appearing in Google Books, 1845-1865  
 
Source: ‘Google Ngram Viewer’, Google Books Search, http://books.google.com/ngrams 
[Accessed November 23, 2014] 
Chart 2: 'Centralization' in the Chronicling America Newspaper Archive, 1845-1865 
 
Source: ‘Chronicling America’, The Library of Congress, http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov 












































































































































































































Others, like Morgan, also used centralization to describe power relationships over 
space, rather than power within institutions like parties, offices, and corporations. As 
railroads and telegraph lines remade economic geography, bringing remote parts of the 
Union into closer contact with financial and industrial centres, centralization became a 
useful tool to describe how one place could influence and control another. These geographic 
connotations of the term also fitted easily into the debates over slavery. Southern supporters 
of slavery cast social and economic challenges to planter power as consequences of 
centralization in remote cities, sections, or states.12 Centralization could therefore also refer 
to power relationships and dependency between places as well as the authority of powerful 
institutions.  
Opposition to centralization had a long career in American political discourse, 
having formed part of the political vocabulary of the revolutionary generation, and shaping 
their approach to constitution-making. During the revolution, many Americans also used 
centralization to warn against the power of an institution. In this case they defined 
centralization against the republican division of power among the multiple branches of a 
federal polity. Historians have rooted later fears of despotism in the ‘traditional American 
opposition to centralized power’ from the revolutionary era.13 James Madison himself in the 
Federalist Papers warned against the ‘accumulation of all powers’ in one man or set of men, 
and against ‘tyrannical concentration’ of government authority. 14  Anti-federalists like 
Jefferson, too, warned of power that ‘concentrating’ in ‘the same hands, is precisely the 
definition of despotic government’. 15  Centralization – and related keywords such as 
consolidation – helped justify the republican principle of divided power as a check on 
despotic government. 16 
                                                     
12 For example, see ‘The Union and the South’, Nashville Union and American (November 21, 1860); ‘Governor’s 
message’, Cooper’s Clarksburg Register (December 25, 1857). 
13 Thomas Brown and Richard Curry, ‘Introduction’, in Richard Curry and Thomas Brown (eds), Conspiracy: 
The Fear of Subversion in American History (London, 1972), pp. x-xi. 
14 James Madison, ‘The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its 
Different Parts’ in J. Miller (ed.), The Federalist Papers (Mineola, 2014), pp. 235-241; James Madison, ‘These 
Departments Should Not be So Far Separated as to have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other’ in J. 
Miller (ed.), The Federalist papers (Mineola, 2014), pp. 241-245. 
15 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (Boston, 1832), p. 123. 
16 The origins, definition, and the existence of republican ideology have generated an extensive body of historical 
scholarship. See: Joyce Appleby, ‘Republicanism and Ideology’, William and Mary Quarterly 37 (1985), pp. 461-
473; Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, 1967); Stanley Elkins and 
Robert McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788 - 1800 (Oxford, 1993); François 
Furstenberg, ‘Beyond Freedom and Slavery: Autonomy, Virtue, and Resistance in Early American Political 
Discourse’, Journal of American History 89 (20riot03), pp. 1295-1330; J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment 
(Princeton, 1975); Daniel Rodgers, ‘Republicanism: The Career of a Concept’, The Journal of American History 79 
(1992), pp. 11-38; Robert Shallope, ‘Towards a Republican Synthesis’, William and Mary Quarterly 29 (1972), pp. 
49-80; Robert Shallope ‘Republicanism and Early American Historiography’, William and Mary Quarterly 39 
(1982), pp. 334-356; Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: From Jefferson to Lincoln (London, 2005), pp. 
xvii-xviii; Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (London, 1993), pp. 3-45, 127-161; 
Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York, 1992). For specific work on the Madisonian 
System of divided government, see: Max Edling, A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the U.S. Constitution 
and the Making of the American State (Oxford, 2003); Christian Fritz, American Sovereigns: The People and America's 
Constitutional Tradition Before the Civil War (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 119-152; Jack Rakove, Original Meanings: 
Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution (New York, 1997); James Read, Power Versus Liberty: Madison, 
Hamilton, Wilson, and Jefferson (London, 2000). For references to the threat of cities in a republican polity see  
Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, 1980); Walter Johnson, 
River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom (London, 2013), pp. 3-5; Wood, Empire, pp. 42-43, 
45-46, 357; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., ‘The City in American History’, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 27 
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Revolutionary era opposition to centralization might seem like a democratic 
language. However, during this period, many sought to prevent the people from dominating 
republican government, just as they had used centralization to warn against a single 
officeholder from doing the same thing. The Founders’ generation warned against majority 
tyranny, where majorities disregarded minority rights, and a ‘pure’ or ‘unmixed’ democracy 
where the people themselves assumed violent power that rightfully belonged to the state. 
Events like Shays’ Rebellion, the Whiskey Rebellion, and the French Revolution proved to 
some that an overbearing democracy eventually turned into mob rule. The delegates who 
drafted the United States Constitution were aware of this democratic threat, and divided 
power to prevent it concentrating in the hands of the people as well as in the executive. They 
were therefore keen to ensure that the state, not an assemblage of the people themselves, 
held power and maintained a monopoly on legitimate force. And, moreover, they sought, 
to varying degrees, restrictions on the power of elected assemblies over the remainder of the 
state apparatus, often turning to bicameral legislatures of propertied elites, property 
qualifications for suffrage, indirect elections, and judicial review to limit majority rule.17 The 
keyword centralization did not necessarily convey support for mass suffrage, elective 
officeholders, and popular protest. Rather, it could potentially convey republican concerns 
that the people too were a danger to their ideal balanced government of learned elites. 
An antidemocratic rationale for opposition to centralization endured into the 
antebellum period. This reflects the changes in the Jacksonian era between 1828-1846, when 
the centralizing tendencies of majority rule seemed more apparent than ever. In the 
antebellum period, many American elites lost their grip on power, as professional politicians 
and mass-based party politics replaced deference to propertied leadership.18 Many propertied 
citizens regretted the decline in deference and disliked having to cater to, mix with, and 
solicit the votes of the lower classes.19 Contemporaries, including Alexis de Tocqueville, 
described the Jacksonian era as a contest for power between a small number of propertied 
elites and the democratic masses.20 Events like the Dorr War, where small-d democrats tried 
to overthrow Rhode Island’s deeply undemocratic state government, proved to some elites 
that the people still threatened to concentrate sovereignty that belonged in the balanced 
                                                     
(1940), pp. 44-45; Gordon Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815 (Oxford, 2009), pp. 
7-8. 
17 Bailyn, Origins, pp. 272-301; Rachel Hope Cleves, The Reign of Terror in America: Visions of Violence from Anti-
Jacobinism to Antislavery (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 20-57; Fritz, American Sovereigns; Sandra Gustafson, Imagining 
Deliberative Democracy in the Early American Republic (London, 2011), pp. 1-7; Alexander Keyssar, The Right to 
Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States (New York, 2000), pp. 3-26; Pauline Maier, ‘Popular 
Uprisings and Civil Authority in Eighteenth-Century America’, William and Mary Quarterly 27 (1970), pp. 3-35; 
Kimberly Smith, The Dominion of Voice: Riot Reason, & Romance in Antebellum Politics (Lawrence, 1999), pp. 45-
49; Wilentz, American Democracy, pp. 3-10, 13-39; Wood, Creation, pp. 18-28, 206, 197-256, 393-429; Wood, 
Liberty, pp. 110-111, 133-138, 147-148. James Madison also warned against a similar phenomenon when 
defending the United States Constitution. See also James Madison, ‘The Same Subject Continued’ in J. Miller 
(ed.), The Federalist Papers (Mineola, 2014), pp. 41-47; Rakove, Meanings, pp. 161-202. 
18 Elizabeth Geffen, ‘Industrial Development and Social Crisis: 1814-1854’ in R. Weigley (ed.) Philadelphia: A 
300-Year History (London, 1982), pp. 348-349. 
Amy Bridges, A City in the Republic: Antebellum New York and the Origins of Machine Politics (Cambridge, 2008). 
19 Daniel Walker Howe, The Political Culture of the American Whigs (London, 1980), pp. 210-237; Daniel Walker 
Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (Oxford, 2007), p. 238; Keyssar, Right 
to Vote, pp. 39-40; Harry Watson, Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America (New York, 1990), pp. 50-
51; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston, 1945), pp.  13-17, 267-268 
20 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. 1, trans. Henry Reeve (New York, 1899), pp. 174-179.   
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institutions of government.21 Whig criticism of Jacksonian Democracy also implied a subtle 
critique of overly democratic government. When Andrew Jackson claimed a popular 
mandate to veto legislation, overrule the supreme court, and make fiscal policy over and 
above the wishes of the other institutions of balanced government, opponents charged 
Jackson with ‘executive tyranny’ and having ‘converted the Government into an Elective 
Despotism’.22 Democracy, too, could centralize power. 
Centralization remained a keyword to convey these republican fears about the 
overbearing influence of the people in government. Alexis de Tocqueville in particular had 
used centralization to describe the transformation of an aristocratic republic to a mass 
democracy. In Democracy in America, he cautioned against weakening checks on popular 
power and creating an egalitarian ‘simple government, as satisfying democratic impulses 
could allow a potentially tyrannical majority to wield state power against a minority.23 ‘All 
democratic nations are instinctively led to the centralization of government’, he wrote, using 
the term to describe the accretion of state power in the hands of the electorate that once 
rested in aristocratic senates, life tenured courts, and unelected officeholders. 24 
‘Centralization’ allowed de Tocqueville to make sense of Jacksonian Democracy as a 
process, turning a single moment – such as the adoption of more democratic state 
constitution – into one episode in a narrative with a past, present, and future. It allowed him 
to describe the relationship between democracy and power as something progressed over 
time rather than remaining static between institutions. 
De Tocqueville’s conflation of centralization with democracy was nonetheless 
increasingly anachronistic in a period that seemed to accept the right of white men to rule. 
More radical democrats argued that the masses themselves were sovereign and held ultimate 
authority over the state.25 From the 1820s to the 1840s, most states abolished property and 
taxpaying requirements for voting and claimed, at least, that they had given power to the 
‘common man’. Jacksonian Democrats claimed that they were guaranteeing America’s 
democratic promise – to white men at least – against a small group of propertied 
‘aristocrats’. 26  The Whigs, heirs to a conservative political tradition more sceptical of 
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democracy, themselves embraced mass democracy when it became apparent they needed to 
do so to win office.27 Their candidates, like William Henry Harrison, instead argued that the 
threat of ‘consolidation’ lay not in the power of the federal government but the undivided 
executive power of the Oval Office.28 In an era of mass white male voting, many supporters 
of popular democracy defined centralization as the threat that an elitist government posed 
to the authority of a sovereign people. They might have agreed with de Tocqueville that 
centralization was a bad thing, but used it differently to warn against curbing the growing 
power of the people in government.  
Centralization also helped Jacksonians understand economic concepts, and again 
they posed centralization against democratic government. In the years after the American 
Revolution and the adoption of the constitution, the federal government adopted an 
interventionist economic policy, chartering turnpikes, canals, and banks, but this raised the 
prospect for anti-Federalists and later Jacksonians of a dangerous ‘consolidation’ of power.29 
When opposing internal improvements and central banking, Jackson himself warned against 
‘consolidating into one the General and State Governments, which were intended to be kept 
for ever distinct’, and he urged voters to reject ‘a practical consolidation, cemented by wide-
spread corruption’.30 Jackson and his followers turned to anti-statist rhetoric because they 
felt big government could only concentrate wealth and power in the hands of the few.31 
Centralization here helped illustrate the concept of economic ties between corporations, 
government, people, and places, and allowed Jacksonian democrats to warn against these 
supposed new economic threats to the people’s liberties. 
By 1848, the keyword centralization already had a long history in American public 
discourse, and helped to frame talk of political rights and economic power. The term fitted 
into the language of revolutionary republicanism and Jacksonian democracy just as easily 
as it fitted into the language of party conflict and the sectional crisis. As part of the vernacular 
of Jacksonian democracy and antebellum party conflict, it could be used to paint partisan or 
sectional opponents as potential tyrants and to laud the role of the people in checking a 
reversion to aristocratic rule.  But its meanings were far from stable. Small-r republicans 
continued to use centralization to advance their ideal government of balanced institutions 
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and divided power. To do so, they employed the term in opposition to both authoritarian 
government and democratic rule.  
Americans, this thesis argues, may have agreed that centralization was a pejorative 
term, as it conjured images of power and dependency. However, they had very different 
concepts of what constituted a centralized polity. To some, it was the power that government 
could hold over the people, but to others, it was the power that officeholders or voters could 
hold over republican government. 
Centralization, 1848-1860 
This thesis focuses on the role of centralization in American public discourse in the 
dozen years that preceded the Civil War. These years were dominated by growing divisions 
over slavery, but an emphasis on centralization can reveal how Americans often understood 
isolated phenomena – namely the sectional question, democratisation, and disorder at home 
and abroad – through reference to the same term.   
In 1848, crises in Europe and America forced Americans to think again about 
centralization. That year, French, Italian, German, and Hungarian revolutionaries 
attempted to either remove or reform the monarchical regimes that distinguished centralized 
states from more democratic republics. Their attempts were ultimately unsuccessful: Russia 
and Austria crushed a newly-independent Hungary; Louis-Napoleon overthrew the Second 
French Republic and restored the Pope in Italy; and Wilhelm IV of Prussia foiled attempts 
to build a constitutional monarchy in Germany.32 Despite this failure, the Revolutions of 
1848 thrust ‘centralization’ to the forefront of midcentury political dialogue on both sides of 
the Atlantic. Louis Kossuth, the exiled leader of the Hungarian revolution, gave speeches in 
the United States defending attempts to establish democratic republics in Europe and 
routinely cited the United States’ freedom from ‘centralization’ as the example Europeans 
should follow.33 Americans often defended the struggle against ‘centralization of power in 
the Crown’ in Europe, and saw the likes of Kossuth taking New World republicanism back 
to the Old.34 By supporting opposition to centralized regimes, these Americans thought they 
were defending the principle that power rested with the people in a true republican 
government both at home and abroad. 
National expansion also led citizens to rethink the distribution of power. The 
conclusion of the war with Mexico in 1848 allowed President James Polk to acquire 525,000 
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square miles of territory in the southwestern United States, but this further thrust the already 
tense issue of whether new territory should be free or slave into public debate.35 Many were 
confident that annexation did not require stronger government power. Polk’s Whig 
successor Zachary Taylor described an enlarged America as an ‘empire of freedmen’ while 
one Democratic paper called the annexation of Cuba part of an ‘Empire of Liberty’.36 They 
seemed confident that the USA could expand without creating consolidated centres of 
political authority. But when Americans discussed extending slavery to these territories, the 
contestants often used the vernacular of centralization to either warn of – or bring on – 
stronger federal intervention.37 Debates over slavery extension – and the place of the federal 
government in regulating the ‘peculiar institution’ were frequently interwoven with the 
question of centralized power. 
Both sides of the slavery debate, rather than just using centralization to describe the 
growing power of the national government, also used it to describe power concentrating in 
particular places and people. The Courier warned that ‘the most terrible of all tyranny is the 
tyranny of majorities separated and rendered unmistakeably distinct from the minority by 
sectional feelings and geographic lines’.38 Claims of a slave power conspiracy –a cabal of 
southern slaveholders seeking to use the federal government to spread slavery even to the 
North – spoke to similar concerns about a centralization of power instigated by leading 
planters.39 Contesting the definition of centralization helped Americans consider the growth 
of the people as a force in American politics, but it also helped them to think through where 
power centred in the free labour North and slaveholding South too.  
Contemporaries, too, could not help but ground the sectional crisis in wider 
questions of power and democracy. As immigration, industrialisation, and urban disorder 
made American cities seem increasingly European 40  and the slavery divide grew ever 
bitterer, it is perhaps unsurprising that some northerners – the subjects of the following 
chapters – returned to older concerns that democracy threatened good republican 
government. Michael Conlin has shown how northern conservatives attacked increasingly 
radical opposition to slavery as one of many ‘isms’ of northern social and political reform – 
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abolitionism, socialism, and free love, to name but a few – that amounted to an overarching 
conspiracy against the pillars of the American capitalist, Protestant, and constitutional social 
order. Indeed, they defined themselves as conservatives by their opposition to these allegedly 
foreign, ideologically-driven projects to perfect and liberate humanity over time. 41 
Antebellum  nativists shared some of these fears, blaming Catholic immigration for bringing 
not just crime and poverty, but also ideological challenges to the existing social order like 
‘red republicanism’, monarchism, feminism, and, of course, abolitionism.42 The growth of 
the slave controversy following 1848 only seemed to highlight, to some Americans in the 
North and South, that the growing legions of lower-class ‘agitators’ and political 
‘demagogues’ presented a wider challenge to the future of their republic. Rather than simply 
using centralization as just a cipher for proslavery or as a radical democratic critique of 
undemocratic government or remote institutions, some Americans used it to think through 
the political and economic power relationships that growing cities and their enfranchised 
populace brought to bear on the American republic. Together, the European Revolutions of 
1848, the sectional crisis at home, and perceived political radicalism demonstrated the 
fragility of their republic and its supposedly decentralized political settlement in the face of 
long-term processes of change underway in the nineteenth-century transatlantic world.   
Despite these connections, historians of the 1850s often explore the decade through 
slavery, sectionalism, and the emerging American Civil War.43 ‘Fundamentalist’ historians 
see the territorial conflict between free soilers and expansionist slaveholders as the driving 
force behind sectionalism. They take the acquisition of northern Mexico in 1848 as an 
important waymark in the chain of events that led to secession and a near inevitable battle 
between fundamentally antagonistic societies.44 Conversely, even revisionists who question 
the inevitability of the Civil War and emphasise how a ‘blundering generation’ of politicians 
turned slavery in western land into the defining issue in party competition, see conflict over 
slavery defining the years 1848-1860. 45 While these historians might disagree on the origins 
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of sectional realignment, they all agree that slavery defined the 1850s, and the decade set the 
stage for Civil War in 1861.  
But slavery and sectionalism raised questions that went beyond whether slavery 
should expand to western territories. The debate touched a wide variety of political, 
economic, and cultural issues, and catalysed regional differences on policy into a larger 
sectional conflict.46 This linked the sectional crisis to the kinds of debates that Americans 
often used slavery to contest. Scholars have shown how the unique commercial imperatives 
behind cash-crop slavery led southerners to embrace economic imperialism in Texas and 
Central America and ‘direct trade’ with European markets as an alternative to  the supposed 
centralization of the cotton trade in New York.47 Concerns about the viability and stability 
of slavery may too have influenced how northern capitalists chose to invest in free state 
Chicago over slave state St. Louis. 48  Slavery therefore also raised questions over the 
centralization of wealth into northern cities.  
The growing crisis over slavery was interwoven with other political transformations 
in the 1850s too. Following 1848, southerners and northerners appealed to European 
political thought and national state building.  In doing so, some northerners envisaged the 
whole nation-state coming together under a European-style central government. Conversely, 
the Revolutions of 1848 confirmed many southerners’ prejudice that only slave society and 
states’ rights protected propertyowners from radicalism. 49 Given slaveholders’ need for 
absolute personal authority in individual plantations, 50  it is perhaps unsurprising that 
Northerners and Southerners often had very different ideas about where political and 
economic power ought to lie.   
Decentralization was far from the only possible response to crisis. Some southern 
planters saw proslavery imperialism under the aegis of a powerful southern-dominated 
federal government as the only route for prosperity, while plenty of northerners, like the 
antislavery editor Horace Greeley embraced communitarian socialist experiments or state-
sanctioned distribution of western land.51  Ever more divisive debates over slavery may not 
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have crowded out the kinds of issues that Americans had previously used centralization to 
contest, but became entwined with long running debates over democracy, state-building, 
and political economy.   
Affairs in Europe continued to raise the issue of how democracy might centralize 
power. For some Americans, the French Revolution in 1848 showed the dangers of a 
democratic radicalism that stood at odds with – rather than a European adaptation of – the 
rule of law that supposedly characterised the political architecture of 1776-87.52The sense 
that the Paris crowd had consolidated power in 1848 animated American critics of the 
uprisings.53 ‘Leisler’ a nativist letter-writer writing in opposition to British royal authority54 
warned that the Revolution of 1848 and the new French republic had created an ‘empire’ in 
France out of once supposedly sovereign royal provinces.55 Napoleon III’s seizure of power 
proved to some that France had always been ‘a centralizing country’, even under the Second 
Republic – an assumption many Americans shared with de Tocqueville.56  
Such concerns about democratic consolidation – the concentration of power in the 
people – reverberated in the United States. Indeed, in 1852, the Camden Journal charged 
American opponents of European ‘centralization’ with neglecting the same threat at home, 
as no government, it argued, ‘is becoming central and consolidated faster than ours’.  57 As 
the following chapters show, conservative Americans here used centralization not to batter 
down entrenched interests but rather to question the legitimacy of majority rule. 
Americans in the 1850s continued to use centralization as a weapon to challenge 
economic power relationships between places too. The massive expansion of railroads 
before the Civil War cut local ties, connected distant communities, and laid bare the 
dependence of hitherto seemingly autonomous cities and regions on remote centres. 58 
Philadelphian political economist Henry Carey and southern proslavery advocate George 
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Fitzhugh, despite disagreeing on the morality of slavery, both wove midcentury debates over 
free trade and classical liberal economics into a global metanarrative in which cosmopolitan 
cities attempted to ‘centralize’ wealth at the expense of their surrounding areas. But despite 
cautioning against such urban centralization, Fitzhugh and Carey warned that ‘the world is 
too little governed’, and constructed an alternative vision of a stronger protectionist 
government growing or ‘concentrating’ American ‘centres of trade, thought, and fashion’ 
over time. 59  Both therefore idealised very different concentrations of power to the 
centralization supposedly produced by free trade and imperial expansion. Far from harking 
back to an agrarian economy or blithely accepting the transition to Gilded Age industrialism, 
conservative Americans across the political spectrum thought about power relationships 
between places and institutions when speculating about the open-ended modernisation of 
the midcentury United States. 
Midcentury Conservatism and Opposition to Centralization 
America’s conservatives – the principal subjects of this thesis – were one of the groups 
contesting the right to control these ongoing processes of centralization. However, what 
made a midcentury conservative is unclear in scholarship on the 1850s. In Stephen 
Spielberg’s Lincoln, Francis Blair, Sr. directs the official ‘conservative faction of Republicans’ 
with a gesture of his hand when watching the House of Representatives vote.60 However, 
the 1850s lacked a single conservative party, organisation, or institution. Indeed, 
‘conservatives of all parties’ attending a midcentury New York union meeting recognised 
that they had to put aside many partisan issues that divided them.61 This thesis will use a 
keyword analysis to suggest what fears, ideas, and vision drew such a diverse group of 
Americans together. 
Historians have often used defined conservatives in the 1850s by reference to the 
ongoing slavery crisis. White southern support for slavery has led scholars to describe the 
region as ‘conservative’, as the need to protect property in man led them to interpret any 
form of radical change North, South, or European, as a threat. Historians like Eugene 
Genovese, Michael O’Brien, and William Freehling have described either individual 
proslavery planters or the region as a whole as conservative because of the South’s ongoing 
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interest in slavery. Recognising the consequences that slavery had for society and politics in 
the region, scholars have often noted that southern ‘conservatives’ often insisted that 
protecting slavery meant suppressing democracy in order to preserve the ‘peculiar 
institution’.62  
Historians studying northern antebellum politics have also used the term as a catch-
all to define northerners who opposed more radical antislavery politics: the ‘Fillmore men’, 
‘Silver Grays’, ‘Hunkers’, Union movements, ‘moderates’, and ‘doughfaces’. For example, 
Michael Holt uses the term to define New York Whigs who supported the Compromise of 
1850 and opposed Senator William Seward’s antislavery activism within the party, and Eric 
Foner defies conservative Republicans as those who wanted to emphasise economic issues 
rather than antislavery in order to appeal to the lower North and border state unionists in 
the South.63 Others describe the forerunners of the ‘copperhead’ or ‘peace’ antiwar wing of 
the Democratic Party and proslavery northern Democrats as ‘conservative’ too.64 In such 
work, support for the Compromise of 1850, opposition to abolitionism, and unconditional 
support for the Union are markers of conservative alignment. However, there is evidence to 
suggest that defining conservatives simply as anti-abolitionists may oversimplify their core 
beliefs and values. Scholarship on American attitudes to revolution abroad can help identify 
Americans who held a conservative outlook. Looking at the politics of the Early National 
era, both Rachel Cleves and Daniel Walker Howe use the term to define Americans who 
were sceptical, and even afraid, of the violence that accompanied the French Revolution and 
used the terror that followed the revolution as a political weapon to attack their supposed 
‘radical’ Democratic-Republican opponents.65 Instead of looking to revolutionary France as 
a guide for democratic zeal, conservatives turned to Edmund Burke’s faith in hierarchy, 
tradition, and law.66 It was therefore not proslavery or anti-abolitionism that motivated these 
(often Federalist) voices, but fear of popular violence, scepticism of democratic excess, and 
preservation of social hierarchies and orders.  
Studies of the American response to 1848 have also defined those who turned away 
from revolutionary republicanism and tried to redefine democracy towards British-style 
representative government as ‘conservative’. Timothy Roberts, for example, argues that 
southern ‘conservatives’ were the first to turn against the Revolutions of 1848 once the 
French began to call for redistribution of property, democratic expansion, and, of course, 
the abolition of slavery in the French West Indies. However, Americans in the north also 
stridently opposed those who argued that a true democracy embraced French-style social 
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reform, and argued that democracy meant elections and the rule of law rather than the power 
of the people to act directly.67As with their predecessors in the Early Republic, historians 
have argued that opposition to much more than just antislavery motivated midcentury 
conservatives. Rather, conservatives used European upheaval to warn against democracy 
and highlight concerns that America would see similar violence unless the enfranchised 
masses deferred to the law, the established social order, and orthodox economics. 
Historians writing surveys of nineteenth-century American politics also use the term 
conservative to describe Americans interested in similar issues to those concerned with 
democracy and revolution in France. Scholars of the Whigs in particular use the term to 
describe those in the party who opposed the influence of those like William Seward and 
Horace Greeley who championed immigrants’ rights, black suffrage, and social reform, and 
much as they opposed slavery. Daniel Walker Howe, in his biography of the antebellum 
Whigs, identified an  anglophile Burkean trend best seen in the likes of Daniel Webster and 
Rufus Choate, who venerated Edmund Burke, the rule of law, and hierarchical authority 
over individualism. To reconcile white male suffrage with republican government, these 
Americans turned to proscription through oratory and the law to keep the masses in check.68 
Conversely, Michael Holt argues that Whig conservatives championed the unity of the Whig 
Party in both the North and the South; opposed abolitionism, black suffrage, and social 
reform; and supported Millard Fillmore’s presidency and failed candidacy in 1856 on a 
procompromise platform. These Whigs had no intention of allowing their party to become 
one of feminism, antislavery, and black suffrage over internal improvements, banking, and 
compromise.69  
Battles between reformist and conservative wings, however, were not unique to the 
mid-century Whigs. Historians have also described Democrats who held similar concerns as 
conservative too. For example, Sean Wilentz recognises that not all northern Democrats 
supported the Jacksonian revolution within the party. 70 Often, these Democrats opposed the 
partial democratisation of American politics under Jackson as much as they opposed radical 
reformers, and some, like their conservative Whig counterparts, even turned to the doctrines 
of Burke.71 This too strongly suggests that conservatism in midcentury America extended 
beyond concern for the Union and opposition to antislavery. These historians too used the 
term conservative to describe Americans opposed to democratic expansion, social reform, 
and excessive individualism.  
More recent scholarship has specifically focused on conservative political thought, 
and has sought to uncover a conservative ideology outside of the second party system. 
Again, these historians emphasise that conservatives were interested in more than just the 
                                                     
67 Curti, ‘Revolutions of 1848’, pp. 209-215; Fleche, 1861, pp. 1-37; Morrison, ‘American Reaction to European 
Revolutions’, pp. 111-133; Roberts, ‘Bloody Toy of the Multitude’, pp. 259-283; Roberts, Distant Revolutions, pp. 
10, 18, 29, 47, 77; Rohrs, ‘American Critics’, pp. 359-377; Adam Smith, ‘The Fortunate Banner: Languages of 
Democracy in the United States, c.1848’ in J. Innes and P. Phillip (eds) Re-Imagining Democracy in the Age of 
Revolutions: America, France, Britain Ireland, 1750-1850 (Oxford, 2013), pp. 28-39, pp. 28-39. 
68 Howe, American Whigs, pp. 210-237. 
69 Holt, American Whig Party, pp. 227, 239-241, 432, 491. 
70 Alexander, Political History, vol 2, p. 54; Holt, Whig Party, p. 87; Howe, Hath God Wrought, p. 506; Wilentz, 
American Democracy, pp. 443-445, 530-533. 
71 Baker, Affairs of Party, pp. 181-183; Jean Friedman and William Shade, ‘James M. Porter: A Conservative 




preservation of the Union and compromise with the South. In a study of the nativist 
movement in New York City, Bruce Levine argues that the members of these organisations 
wanted to build a new conservative alternative to the Whig and Democratic parties that 
would both support the Compromise of 1850 and curb democratic participation. Rather than 
believing a fundamental conflict between freedom and slavery led to sectionalism, they 
argued that the exigencies of democracy incentivised ‘agitation’ of the slavery issue. Saving 
the Union was therefore an opportunity to return to a government by propertied white 
Protestant men.72  
Michael Conlin has also argued that a conservative ideology rooted in opposition to 
so-called ‘ists’ and ‘isms’ which they believed were a coordinated threat to the status of 
propertied white men. Again, these conservatives believed that democracy incentivised 
professional agitators to import supposedly radical doctrines like feminism, abolitionism, 
and Mormonism from Europe. These Americans may have supported economic 
transformation, but opposed any new political movements arising from ongoing social 
change. 73  The connections that these historians have noticed between democracy and 
sectionalism in conservative thought strongly implies that there was a conservative political 
tradition in America that saw slavery and Union as only one part of a wider problem of 
democracy and power in the American republic. 
The conservatives and conservatism explored in this scholarship challenge the 
assumption that the North had embraced democracy by the 1850s. The emergence of 
universal white male suffrage in most states, the Jacksonian revolution in the Democratic 
Party, the collapse of the aristocratic Federalist Party, and the Whigs’ embrace of populism 
in the 1840 presidential election all suggest that Americans accepted popular government. 
Having accepted that the people should, it only required the ongoing expansion of the 
suffrage to all the people. This thesis will argue, however, that democracy was far from 
universally accepted even in the northern states, and that antidemocratic thought had an 
influential audience in the period. These antidemocratic ideas helped unite a conservative 
movement that nonetheless divided on other political issues of the day like free trade, 
internal improvements, and even the morality of slavery. Moreover, their antidemocratic 
reading of political events strongly informed how they would come to conceptualise and 
respond to the sectional crisis during the passage of the Compromise of 1850 and as America 
edged closer to civil war in 1860.    
Americans who identified as conservative often recognised their shared values 
despite never working within a single national organisation.74 However, in places, they could 
unite through local and state networks. This included organisation within the Whig and 
Democratic parties. 75  In New York City, lawyers Charles O’Conor, a Democrat, and 
William Evarts, a Whig, began a career in conservative politics in the 1850s that spanned 
from the antebellum era to the Gilded Age. Both shared platforms at Union Meetings in the 
1850s, attacking abolitionism and supposed northern sectionalism.76 After the Civil War, 
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they again shared a platform at public meetings; this time they both defended the elitist anti-
Tweed movement, advocated lower taxes, and pushed for a government of the ‘best men’. 
Their antidemocratic agitation culminated in the Tilden Commission – which Evarts sat on 
– recommending in 1877 that the state silence the voice of the unpropertied in city 
government. Despite their conservative backgrounds and their cooperation in lobbying for a 
taxpayers-only democracy, they never shared a party; Evarts and O’Conor represented 
Republican Rutherford Hayes and Democrat Samuel Tilden respectively before the 
commission to resolve the disputed 1876 Presidential Election.77 
The single issue movements of the midcentury United States also speak to the 
existence of a conservative impulse that existed beyond the second party system. Instead of 
organising as a political party, conservatives mobilised politically around matters that 
allowed them to promote aims like unionism, law and order, and improvements to their 
property. In 1850, conservatives in northern cities, and New York City in particular, formed 
bipartisan Union committees and parties to defend the Compromise of 1850, and then 
turned to similar tactics a decade later. 78  Locally, conservatives had more success at 
organising into movements that crossed party lines. The ‘Silver Gray’ faction of New York 
Whigs split from the main party after years of opposition to Whig-backed reforms, including 
black suffrage, Catholic schooling, and the reform of quasi-feudal land tenures in upstate 
New York. 79  In Massachusetts, Boston’s ‘conservative Federalist-Whigs’ defeated the 
constitution of 1853, which proposed similar changes to the measures Silver Grays had 
opposed in the Empire State. 80  Foreshadowing the bourgeois movements of the 1870s, 
conservatives in New York, Philadelphia, and other cities in the 1850s organised into reform 
leagues and metropolitan consolidation movements. 81  Yet they were not an exception: 
James Gerard, a minor Democratic activist, moved among New York’s Union Party and 
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police reform circles in the early 1850s, before turning against the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 
1854. 82   Despite the absence of a national organisation, there was a coherence to 
conservatives’ participation in antebellum civic life, and they were able to claim some 
considerable successes from some of their lobbying efforts. Conservatives found a way to 
participate politically without having to organise as a single political party on the national 
stage. 
More informally still,  urban upper class print, social, and associational networks 
helped shape a conservative perspective. In Philadelphia, for example, the North American 
catered to the upper-class conservative elite, with editor Morton McMichael a stalwart of 
bourgeois associations.83 Indeed conservatives often united through upper class institutions 
like clubs, trade associations, and social groups. McMichael and his Burkean friend Sidney 
George Fisher both belonged to the Philadelphia Farmer’s Club, an upper class gentleman’s 
club.84 During the Civil War, bipartisan (but pro-war) Union League Clubs in New York 
and Philadelphia – with the likes of Evart and McMichael in prominent roles85 – combined 
upper-class socialisation with political advocacy. Members of these self-proclaimed 
‘respectable’ organisations were able to mobilise on the home front from opulent clubhouses 
in prime downtown locations.86 After the war, both the Philadelphia and New York leagues 
involved themselves in curbing the supposed democratic excesses of the Gilded Age party 
system, particularly at the local level. Morton McMichael would himself come to campaign 
for a new constitutional convention, in his words, ‘under the leadership of the propertied 
and conservative class’. 87  Conservative members of the northern elite had independent 
institutions within which they could organise and engage politically without necessarily 
having to play party politics. 
Two Philadelphians who appear over the following chapters – the aristocratic diarist 
Sidney George Fisher and the political economist Henry Carey – show how conservatives 
networked through the urban upper class. Fisher despised democracy and its symbol 
Andrew Jackson – the ‘chieftain of the lower orders’ – while seeing mob violence in 
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Philadelphia as the natural product of a riotous democracy and the progeny of anarchy and 
despotism.88 He left a record of these observations in his diary, published pamphlets in his 
own name, and wrote for McMichael’s paper. 89  Carey, who intellectually validated 
protective tariffs, also moved in these circles. He joined the Philadelphia Union League, 
penned articles for his friend McMichael, and published books, pamphlets, and articles on 
protectionism. He followed Philadelphia Whigs into the Republican Party, but associated 
himself with a conservative faction of ex-Whigs, who supported pro-compromise 
‘moderates’ in 1856. Carey’s support for the same Union Party projects that O’Conor and 
Evarts backed, and his association with compromise over antislavery, suggests a 
conservative outlook. 90  McMichael, Fisher, and Carey formed a coterie of upper-class 
conservatives in antebellum Philadelphia interested in economic modernisation, 
maintaining law and order, and policing the boundaries of political participation.  
Conservatism, though, could be national as well as local in reach. Conservative 
unionist organisations like the Georgia Union Party, the Union Committee of Safety in New 
York, and Union movement in Massachusetts offered fraternal support, even if they were 
never able to form a single national party.91 Northerners also read and used South Carolina-
based political scientist Francis Lieber’s research on republican government and used it to 
further their own understanding of the trajectory of democracy and republics; some 
published for southern journals.92 Fisher, despite claiming to dislike slavery, defended the 
southern landowning planter class as a necessary aristocratic counterbalance to the universal 
white male suffrage he blamed for just about every problem in United States politics – 
including making his servants unruly. 93  He too had family and friendship ties to 
slaveholders.94 Newspapers in the North also reprinted articles from the southern press 
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which gave airing to antidemocratic views. 95 Such northerners did not exclude the South 
from a prospective national conservative coalition, despite their substantial differences on 
slavery. Northern conservatives, rightly or wrongly, identified with many elite southerners 
as people like themselves, forming an important political tie between North and South.  
Questions about the nature of midcentury conservatism therefore remain 
unanswered. It is clear that conservatives wanted to preserve the Union, it is less certain 
what kind of Union they wanted to preserve. Existing scholarship documents what liberal 
and democratic movements conservatives opposed, but with the exception of material 
prosperity, is less clear about what conservatives supported and what policy objectives they 
wished to achieve. Given that these men were all interested in questions of power and power 
relationships, it is instead worth considering what power relationships between government, 
people, and places they wanted to build. This can help broaden our understanding of 
conservatives and conservative political thought in the period. Moreover, by situating 
conservative responses to the sectional crisis and support for the Compromise of 1850 in 
their responses to the political problems of the 1850s, we can perhaps also obtain an 
understanding of how and why they responded to sectionalism in the way that they did.  
Conservative Print Culture and Keyword Analysis 
A study of how conservatives and the conservative press used the term centralization can 
help answer questions about the kind of republic midcentury conservatives wanted to build 
and defend in the 1850s, and the extent to which their ideas penetrated the northern public 
sphere and defined the political climate of the 1850s.  
Keyword analysis borrows from an earlier body of intellectual history focused on the 
history of concepts. Intellectual historians have long used the history of words, ideas, and 
concepts as tools to help reconstruct political thought in the European and American past, 
even if there are sharp methodological differences between (often) Anglo-American and 
European historians. Historians following the begriffsgeschichte or conceptual history model 
associated with Reinhart Koselleck emphasise the need to study how key concepts are 
constructed and how the components of these concepts change over time. Koselleck’s 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, an encyclopedia of some of the important concepts he identified, 
defines how the meaning of words and associated concepts and how these changed over 
time.96 Conversely, historians following the Cambridge school model developed by Quentin 
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Skinner emphasise studying the context of a word, concept, or idea in a particular moment 
in time. Rather than defining how a single term or concept changes over time, these 
historians argue that studies of how thinkers and writers use or contextualise a term or idea 
give a greater insight into political thought.97 Despite their methodological differences, these 
schools for studying the history of ideas and concepts show the possibility of uncovering 
political thought in written primary texts.  
Historians, particularly Daniel Rodgers and more recently Elizabeth Varon have 
used keyword studies as a tool to uncover political thought in the American past.98 Their 
approaches recognise that words do not have fixed ideological meanings. John Adams’s 
observation that ‘There is not a more unintelligible word in the English language than 
republicanism’ attests to just how malleable the meaning of words in a common political 
lexicon could seem.99 Rather than looking at keywords themselves, historians have therefore 
studied how these words were used and why rather than focusing the words themselves. 
Picking up on such insights, they have studied how Americans used keywords tactically to 
advance their own agendas and beliefs. Daniel Rodgers, for example, has suggested how 
antebellum conservatives began to talk about ‘government’ and ‘the state’ rather than 
‘natural rights’ as safeguards of republican liberty, a subtle linguistic shift that allowed them 
to articulate an elite-led republic rather than a more expansive popular democracy.100 More 
recent research has suggested that supporters of democratic reform and opponents of popular 
government contested the definition of democracy to legitimise and delegitimise different 
visions of government based on either civic engagement or deference to elites.101 Studies of 
how Americans used keywords and the context within they used them can therefore help 
uncover political thought in the period and the political agendas that they used keywords 
tactically to advance. 
Elizabeth Varon’s Disunion is one of the most recent and accomplished keyword 
studies, in which she uses the term to consider how midcentury Americans understood 
national unity and the strength or fragility of the Union, and how this changed over time 
and made southern withdrawal seem more possible over time. The multiple meanings of the 
term, she argues, can help clarify questions of the causes of the American Civil War.102 In 
her introduction, she argues that Americans used the keyword ‘disunion’ both as a political 
weapon against their opponents and as a description of a process. As a political weapon, 
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they used it as a prophecy of what might happen in the future should America fail to heal its 
sectional divide, as a southern threat against northern abolitionists, and an accusation to 
delegitimise southern states’ rights activists. But as a process, they also used it to 
conceptualise how southern states would secede and to describe the political programme or 
set of policies that secessionists advocated.103 In other words, the keyword disunion could be 
a political weapon one could use to delegitimise one’s political opponents or their agendas, 
both proslavery and antislavery, by tarnishing them with a pejorative term. However, it 
could also help conceptualise an ongoing process or political agenda unfolding over time. 
This thesis will consider centralization in a similar fashion, looking at what political agendas 
conservatives tried to advance when using it as a political weapon and what processes they 
used centralization to describe. 
As well as being first a pejorative political weapon and second a term to 
conceptualise change over time, centralization has also been a category with which 
historians can understand the American past. For these historians, centralization was not 
just a keyword but a process pre-empted by the Civil War as the pressures of combat forced 
the federal government to consolidate power over states and citizens. The federal 
government emerged from the Civil War and Reconstruction with a far larger administrative 
scope and capacity.104 Political scientist Stephen Skowronek, for instance, described the 
Gilded Age United States as a ‘state of courts and parties’, which slowly gave way to a strong 
central government Gary Gerstle, Brian Balogh and William Novak have shown how late 
nineteenth-century government grew in strength, even if state builders often turned to private 
organisations, local administration, or divided power to do so.105 Scholars influenced by 
modernization theory, meanwhile, have conceptualised the Gilded Age as a period in which 
professional middle-class elites integrated a so-called ‘distended society’ via new corporate, 
bureaucratic, and administrative means. 106  The simultaneous emergence of large 
corporations, with power to dictate prices and wages from remote offices, employ mass wage 
labour, and exist seemingly independent of any one individual, speaks to a similar idea of 
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individuals coming together under the aegis of new centres of power. 107  Like their 
counterparts in Europe, Americans often defined their era as one of a balance between 
competing forces of integration and differentiation, believing that social disorder appeared 
when the forces of differentiation overtook the necessary drive to integration. 108  These 
historians therefore use centralization to conceptualise the process of strengthening 
government during and after the American Civil War. 
Historians have also used centralization to conceptualise the politics of democratic 
retrenchment around midcentury too. The Civil War is often seen today as a pivotal moment 
in this turn to centralization. Studies of northern conservatives have suggested that many 
saw the conflict as an opportunity to build ‘a commitment to national or centralized 
authority’.109 They believed that the egalitarian and individualistic politics and culture of the 
antebellum period, characterized by movements like transcendentalism, challenged their 
vision of social order. Only state and institutional authority would establish control and 
safeguard patriotism; democracy and individualism were the casualties. 110  This thesis, 
however, dates backing for centralizing projects earlier. Americans in the 1850s rarely spoke 
of centralization in positive terms but conservatives often supported an ongoing process of 
creating and strengthening sources of political and economic authority over time. In an essay 
published in the 1960s, historian John Higham charts the Civil War turn away from 
antebellum individualism, democracy, and egalitarianism back into the 1850s. A generation 
of administrative rationalisers – men like Henry Carey in Philadelphia and Frederick Law 
Olmsted in New York – looked to new forms of social control in the period. Reforms like 
city planning, uniformed policing, and the professionalization of institutions could seem like 
tools to impose social order on American individualism. Even antislavery took a more 
conservative turn as the reform movements of the 1840s gave way to the process of 
conservative ‘consolidation’ via well-drilled parties and movements.111 Other historians have 
described midcentury efforts to reform growing cities as an example of ‘centralization’ too.112 
These historians too use centralization to describe the process of creating and strengthening 
governments as well as concentrating political authority in fewer hands at the expense of the 
enfranchised masses. 
Historians have also used centralization as a tool to analyse changing economic 
power relationships over geography. Many historians have suggested how America might 
have undergone a ‘market revolution’ in the antebellum period, as subsistence farmers and 
independent artisans came to produce for consumers or work for wages under the direction 
of a growing middle and upper class, and on terms mediated through the impersonal laws 
                                                     
107 Heather Cox Richardson, West from Appomattox: The Reconstruction of America after the Civil War (London, 
2008); Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age (New York, 1982). 
108 Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York, 1984). 
109 Frederickson, Inner Civil War (1993 edition), p. ix. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Higham, Boundlessness to Consolidation, pp. 15-28. 
112 Burrows and Wallace, Gotham, p. 832; Leonard Curry, The Corporate City: The American City as a Political Entity, 
1800-1850 (London, 1997), pp. 1-32, 86-138; Einhorn, Property, pp. 148-149, 170; Johnson, Policing, pp. 3-11, 12-
15; 38-40; 90-121; David Scobey, Empire City: The Making and Meaning of the New York City Landscape 
(Philadelphia, 2002), pp. 43-52, 199-204, 204-209; James Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve 
the Human Condition Have Failed (London, 1998), pp. 9-180; Edward Spann, The New Metropolis: New York City, 
1840-1857 (Guildford, 1981), pp. 364-400. 
 
24 Introduction 
of the free market.113 Major cities benefited from this growing mercantile and financial sector 
built around shipping and the transportation of agricultural merchandise from the West and 
South. Thanks to federal support for steamship lines to Europe, close connections to the 
West, and longstanding links to southern cotton planters, New York City cemented its 
position as America’s commercial capital. Projects like Robert Fulton’s steamship 
monopoly, the Erie Railroad, and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad received support from 
urban mercantile elites as they expected they would benefit from this reordering of economic 
space. In New York and elsewhere, though, this led to a geographic division of labour 
between a metropolis that increasingly accumulated capital in the hands of its growing upper 
class and a hinterland dependant on the city as a source of credit, market, and transportation 
of staple crops. Historians observing this growing geographic division of labour have 
described it as an ongoing process of centralization as capital concentrated in the core rather 
than the surrounding hinterland. 114  Southerners recognised this phemonemon: recent 
scholarship has shown a southern ‘shift in the focus of a pro-slavery critique from imports 
and merchants as such to imports and merchants from the North – from the terms of commerce 
and chicanery to those of geography and politics.’115 Just as centralization could describe a 
process of strengthening government power in institutions, it could also be used to indicate 
the process of building new power relationships between places too. 
This thesis will draw from these three meanings of centralization – as a political 
weapon, as a process, and as a category of historical analysis – to help further understand 
conservative political thought at midcentury. Considering what causes, agendas, and groups 
conservatives chose to warn against by delegitimising them using the pejorative term 
centralization can show what policies, movements, and issues particularly motivated 
conservative thinkers and writers. Moreover, comparing how conservatives used this 
rhetorical weapon in a number of areas like international politics, political economy, and 
city reform will give a broader understanding of conservatives areas of concern than just 
focusing on opposition to abolitionism and support for the Compromise of 1850. 
Conservatives may have shared a common language of opposition to centralization with 
other Americans, but this by no means implies a political consensus on what the greatest 
supposedly centralizing threat might be. It was how, why, and to what ends that 
conservatives used the term that illustrates some of their political agenda and distinguishes 
it from the agendas of other Americans who used the same term. 
Second, this thesis will also consider what processes conservatives themselves 
conceptualised as a centralization.  As well as being a pejorative political weapon, the idea 
of centralization without its negative connotations could help understand changing power 
relationships over time. Conservatives used the term to describe the process of creating or 
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strengthening sources of political authority and economic wealth. Here it helped them 
conceptualise expanding or strengthening power relationships between one person, city, or 
political institution, and wider people or territory. Moreover, in addition to using the term 
to describe processes of centralization, conservatives also often visually described these 
changing bonds of dependency using graphic or emotive language. Considering how 
conservatives used the language and imagery of centralization to understand processes can 
therefore help historians understand both who held power in midcentury America and how 
they believed power changing over time. In other words, it can answer how conservatives 
interpreted the power relationships of the world around them and uncover some of their 
assumptions about how politics and economics were structured.  
Finally, this thesis will consider conservative support for processes that historians 
and contemporaries conceptualised as centralization. As well as considering what 
conservatives chose to delegitimise using the rhetoric of centralization, looking at the 
processes that historians and contemporaries recognised as centralizations but conservatives 
chose not to label as dangerous centralizations can give further insight into their political 
thought. Where delegitimising a person, policy, or place as centralization could delegitimise 
it, not labelling an alternative centralizing process the same way could implicitly legitimise 
it. They could instead choose to label such processes using less preoperative language – city 
consolidation, enforcement of the laws, or creating a tributary hinterland – that did not imply 
the same dangerous power relationship that centralization did. Considering how 
conservatives used and refrained from using the language of centralization tactically can 
therefore show the kinds of power relationships conservatives wanted to create in 
midcentury politics and economics.  This can, in turn, illustrate where conservatives believed 
power should lie, in contrast to those who they used centralization as a rhetorical tactic to 
warn against, and demonstrate how conservatives used this common language to promote 
their own agenda.  
The published and unpublished works of individuals are one of the places where 
conservatives used centralization to contest who and where power should hold power in the 
United States. Sidney George Fisher, for example, recorded his critical observations of 
domestic and international political developments in his diary, giving particular attention to 
the French Second Republic and the politics of sectionalism and compromise. Both 
handwritten and transcribed versions of his diaries are available at the Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania. 116  References to the keyword and processes of centralization in Fisher’s 
private diaries can therefore give an insight into how men like him conceptualised the power 
relationships of the midcentury United States.  
However, most discussions of centralization took place in the world of print culture, 
and this thesis will use conservatives’ articles, pamphlets, and books as primary sources. 
Conservatives had a history of printing publicly. However, as part of the movement to 
consolidate government authority as part of the Civil War mobilisation effort, conservative 
organisations like the Loyal Publication Society, a body associated with the Philadelphia 
Union League, organised to propagandise on the home front. Their propaganda urged 
northerners to curb political enthusiasm and perceived radicalism in favour of deference to 
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the limits of legitimate political behaviour set by the political establishment.117 Henry Carey 
was one of the most prolific publicists, and beginning with the publication of his book The 
Past, the Present, and the Future in 1848 he began to frequently employ the term centralization 
in his work. Indeed, he even titled one of his chapters ‘Concentration and Centralization’.118 
Records of Carey’s work have been digitised and made available online – which radically 
simplifies keyword analysis – and undigitised work is also freely available at the Library of 
Congress in Washington, DC. 
Conservatives were out of office most of the time and so usually did not have the 
benefit of formal state authority to propagate their views or write their projects into law, but 
they were still able to participate in and engage with formal political institutions, especially 
at the state and local level. When New York State placed a call for a constitution convention 
on the ballot in 1848, Maurice Richter, a conservative Democrat from Brooklyn, published 
a 300-page tract demanding reform of ‘legislative encroachments upon the simplest, clearest, 
and most sacred municipal rights of towns’, ‘public debt, taxes, crime and mobism’, and, 
above all else, the ‘elective judiciary’.119 When Massachusetts did the same thing in 1853, 
records of opposition to the radical document that the convention drafted are found in the 
official journal of its proceedings.120 Organisations like the Union Committee of Safety in 
New York and opponents of the radical 1853 Massachusetts Constitutional Convention also 
published pamphlets of their debates and proceedings to mould public opinion.121 Many of 
these documents are also available on digital archives like Archive.org and search engines 
like Hathitrust, making them easily accessible for research. The figures who wrote these 
documents may not have always been in positions of power or necessarily even saw 
themselves as accountable to a capricious electorate, but they organised privately as people 
interested in politics who made their views public.  
Tracking the use of centralization in these primary sources can help give an insight 
into what a number of conservative private individuals and public officeholders thought 
about political and economic power in mid-century America. Most of these men might have 
been out of national political office, and so they are much less visible in the political history 
of the second party system. However, their position in local and single issue political 
movements meant that this small number of people could influence policy in a number of 
areas, making their political thought nonetheless worthy of scholarly attention. A study of 
centralization will help show which people and places they believed had benefited from 
industrialisation and the emergence of Jacksonian democracy and how they thought that 
this small network of elites should respond. This will deepen our understanding of 
midcentury conservatism, giving a particular insight into the power strictures that they 
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wanted to build rather as well as the changes that they opposed. Moreover, understanding 
how they thought about power in midcentury America can in turn help historians better 
understand how they responded to the sectional crisis itself and the extent that they saw 
rebuilding the Union as an opportunity to rebuild power relations within the North itself. 
However, these conservatives’ efforts were limited in comparison to the wider 
conservative press. In Philadelphia, McMichael’s North American and United States Gazette 
had established itself as the voice of Philadelphia’s conservatives. McMichael’s passionate 
pursuit of consolidation in 1854, opposition to abolitionism, and defence of the city’s 
business interests led one contemporary to describe it as ‘antediluvian’, though McMichael 
himself embraced what he saw as modernizing forces like government and industry. 122 
Similarly, in New York, James Watson Webb’s mercantile Courier and Enquirer accused the 
rival Whig New York Times and the Tribune with dangerous radicalism.123 However, Whig 
newspapers did not have a monopoly on conservatism: James Gordon Bennett published 
the Democratic – but populist – New York Herald, and claimed to speak for the ‘conservative 
masses’. By this, he meant opposition to any ‘ism’ he deemed a threat to existing social 
relations and hierarchies, and the Union. Like many other conservatives, Bennett wove 
everything from abolitionism and feminism to free love and socialism into a single threat to 
the Union, a single subversive mindset from which radical would establish anarchy and a 
'reign of terror'.124 Editorials of the Baltimore Sun and the Brooklyn Eagle, like the Herald, took 
direct issue with northern social reform as well as southern secession, as the sectional crisis 
placed slavery higher on the political agenda.125 In their pages, they suggested how American 
conservatives also tried to appropriate the language of opposition to centralization to 
challenge the evolving power relationships of the midcentury United States. 
Where the publications of a small number individuals can help demonstrate 
conservative thought among a small number of propertied elites, these newspapers can help 
show how these ideas circulated in the public sphere and had mass appeal. Thanks in part 
to a generally literate enfranchised citizenry, the American newspaper industry had 
proliferated since the 1820s. And this industry was more than happy to cater to its readers’ 
appetite for political discussion, and so debates in Congress, the Supreme Court, and general 
elections extended well into the editorial rivalries between major American newspapers. 
Newspapers’ growing financial independence from party patronage in the Jacksonian era 
gave their editors substantial editorial freedom, even if they generally aligned with one of 
the two parties of the second party system. Moreover, both contemporaries and historians 
recognise the importance of the press to the antebellum urban public sphere. In their pages 
and columns, newspapers carried, contested, and settled the political debates that animated 
the American electorate.126 A study of how these conservative newspapers and journals used 
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centralization to delegitimise their opposition and rationalise the processes unfolding around 
them can therefore  reflect wider concerns over power and economics among northern 
voters. In other words, it can help show how the ideas of a small number of conservative 
elites were also shared among the northern population and helped shape the political culture 
of the period.  
Within these diaries, newspapers, and publications, conservatives challenged new 
institutional and geographic sources of authority as centralizations of power and described 
their political opponents as dangerous centralizers. Conservatives did not have a monopoly 
on claiming opposition to centralization; almost all Americans found it a useful language to 
legitimise their political agenda. A keyword search through digital archives will show how 
and where conservatives chose to use this term to conceptualise the changes taking place 
around them. However, as other keyword studies suggest, Americans often used words 
tactically to advance a particular agenda. This thesis will therefore identify who and what 
conservatives chose to delegitimise in the public sphere by labelling them as dangerous 
centralizers. Rather than focusing on the definition of the term, it will therefore explore how 
conservatives contested this term, tried to redefine what constituted centralization, and who 
exactly provided the greatest centralizing threat. Unlike many other Americans, who used 
it to attack corporate monopoly and undemocratic regimes, this diverse group of people from 
wide variety of partisan, regional and religious backgrounds used a similar language of 
opposition to centralization for very different purposes. This study of how conservatives 
deployed the term centralization will therefore help highlight a hitherto hidden political 
divide within the second party system and in the years of realignment that followed its 
collapse. Focusing on how conservatives used a political language (rather than looking at 
the term centralization itself) can therefore help reveal some of their political thought and 
agenda. 
As well as being a useful political weapon for contemporaries, historians studying 
the social and political changes of the mid-nineteenth century and studies of keyword 
analyses have also identified and described the transformations of midcentury America as 
centralizations too. This thesis will therefore consider how conservatives advanced their 
particular political agenda by labelling one process of centralization as a dangerous 
centralization of power in order to distract from or legitimise other changes that they hoped 
to benefit from. These processes included the creation of stronger governments with greater 
interventionist potential, handing decision-making authority into a smaller group of people, 
as well as the emergence of cities with infrastructure to dominate surrounding areas’ 
economies.  By choosing not to label these processes pejoratively as a centralization, 
conservatives implicitly legitimised their own centralizing processes. As well as looking at 
the processes conservatives chose to delegitimise as dangerous centralizations of power, this 
thesis will also consider the processes they left unchallenged – and even embraced – that 
historians and contemporaries have described as centralization. Studying which processes 
conservatives chose to support – or at least leave unchallenged – can therefore help deepen 
our understanding of a conservative political agenda by looking not just at political rhetoric 
but how they believed power should be exercised, where its sources should lie, and how to 
build a more modern government and economy. 
The objectives of this study are threefold. First, it will build on recent historiography 
to show that conservatism in the 1850s was more nuanced and expansive than simply 
support for compromise with the South and opposition to abolition. A study of how 
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conservatives defined centralization and used it as a political weapon against their opponents 
can highlight how they believed that the greatest political divide in America was not between 
proslavery and antislavery, Whigs and Democrats, or bankers and the people, but between 
supposed radical centralizers and conservatives. Second, it will highlight a conservative 
programme of modernisation. Despite using a language of opposition to change, this thesis 
will seek to show how conservatives also embraced various processes that historians and 
contemporaries have described as centralization. It will suggest that conservatives may often 
have been divided on many issues like free trade, the morality of slavery, and immigration, 
but they often came together in support of state-strengthening, democratic retrenchment, 
and special protection and privileges for private property. Finally, it will seek to 
contextualise the conservative response to the sectional crisis within their reading of 
American politics as a divide between democratic centralization and conservative state-
building. Conservative opponents of disunion and abolition often conceptualised revolution 
abroad, urban and economic growth, and riot and popular disorder in American cities in 
similar terms to the slavery crisis.  In doing so, it argues that historians studying usually 
discrete phenomena in the antebellum era can use centralization to understand connections 
between political and economic thought and practice, and the wider sectional crisis. 
Thesis Outline 
Between 1848 and 1852, American conservatives observed the transformation of France’s 
July Monarchy to the Second Republic and Louis-Napoleon’s Second Empire, and like 
almost Americans, they criticised his coup d’état as a dangerous centralization of state power 
in a single individual. The first chapter explores how conservatives, especially Sidney 
George Fisher and conservative journals in New York and Philadelphia, used France as a 
laboratory to explore the trajectory of republican government under democratic rule. Despite 
using the same language of centralization to describe France’s fate as American small-d 
democrats, conservatives distinguished themselves by describing democratisation as the 
‘centralization’ of political authority responsible for Louis-Napoleon’s authoritarian regime. 
These Americans therefore redefined centralization as a concentration of power in the 
people, which in turn allowed them to present undemocratic government as sharing power 
between balanced institutions and propertied officeholders. France enabled them to 
speculate about their own possible futures of a (desirable) republican polity with power 
centred in the state and a (dangerous) democratic anarchy with power centred directly in the 
hands of the Paris mob. Their comparisons between the French and American electorate 
allowed American conservatives to define legitimate republican citizenship at home. 
Othering France and the French as a nation that supposedly centralized all power in the 
state, then, provided conservatives with an argument for their own model for centralization, 
which involved strengthening the bonds of dependency between the people and a state over 
which they had only limited control. In other words, Louis-Napoleon’s France and 
centralization helped conservatives address nation-building at home. 
The Americans who criticised French democracy as a process of centralization in 
the Paris mob also tried to understand the geographic aspect of centralization. As well as 
describing power relationships between a small institution and the masses, it could also 
describe power relationships over space, such as the ties between French provinces and the 
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national capital.127 The second chapter therefore explores how centralization could describe 
changing power between a city and a surrounding hinterland as much as the ties between 
the people and an institution. Nowhere was this more obvious than in the competition 
between conservatives themselves for control over the transformation of the antebellum 
American economy. Henry Carey and his supporters in some of the conservative 
protectionist press used the idea of geographic centralization in an empire city to warn 
against the consequences of free trade. At a local level, citizens of Northeastern cities, 
including conservatives at Massachusetts’s constitutional convention and McMichael’s 
North American too warned against New York’s triumphant commercial expansion as a 
dangerous process of centralization over space. Yet these urban elites expected the ongoing 
processes of urbanisation, industrialisation, and capitalism to continue to give them 
prosperity far into the future. Defining centralization as a process which led to geographic 
dependency on a remote city allowed conservatives to legitimise their own smaller-scale 
centralizations of power over their own cities and hinterlands. Centralization therefore gave 
conservatives the opportunity– and political weapon – to explore how state building and 
economic development could help them secure political power and economic prosperity in 
their own metropolitan locales. 
Cities, then, featured heavily in the processes that conservatives used centralization 
to describe over time. After all, urban centres contained most of ‘the people’ who threatened 
to centralize state authority in themselves – Paris proved an alarming example – and were 
‘naturally’ centralizers of economic wealth too. 128  The third chapter therefore explores how 
the problems of democratic and economic centralization existed within cities as well as 
around them. Looking to Paris as a warning, conservatives in New York, Brooklyn, and 
Philadelphia, among others, warned that collective violence threatened ‘centralization’ in 
their own cities. Drawing in part from a belief that too much democracy meant mob rule, 
reformers sought to reassert the power of the local government over the people. Again, 
defining the people as the greatest centralizing threat allowed them to present state-building 
at a local level as sharing power. Consolidation, police reform, and charter reform offered, 
at a local level, the opportunity to experiment with ways to strengthen city government, both 
remapping it across space away from disorderly suburban neighbourhoods and centring 
power in city government and institutions over a more deferent populace. Designs for local 
centralization of power allowed conservatives to develop alternative models of state building 
to the democratic teleologies of perceived radicals and the stagnant despotisms of the Old 
World, and posited the 1850s city as a microcosm for the nation as a whole. 
Municipal politics, though, did not exist in a vacuum. Many conservatives saw the 
parallels between the processes of municipal consolidation and their long-term project to 
uphold the Union against the growing threat of northern abolition and southern disunion.129 
The fourth chapter explores how conservatives applied similar solutions they had pursued 
within cities on a national scale, defining illegitimate centralizations in order to legitimise 
their own concentrations of power. In the face of national disunion, local state building 
                                                     
127 Ironically, Louis Napoleon’s government in practice drew support from country France and found resistance 
in Paris, but this did not prevent most conservatives from assuming a priori that the Second Empire was a 
metropolitan imposition. 
128 For example, see David Schley, ‘Tracks in the Streets’, The Journal of Urban History 39 (2003), pp. 1062-1084. 
129 City-dwellers in Philadelphia, Chicago, and New York drew parallels between political economy, order, and 
culture within their city and refashioning the nation as a whole at a larger scale in their own image. See Einhorn, 
Property Rules, pp. 20-26, 70-74; Heath, ‘In Union There is Strength’, pp. 101-124; Scobey, Empire, pp. 15-54. 
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could also create a precedent for a national basis for strong government. Conservatives 
unsurprisingly rallied to the cause of the Union when slavery threatened to pull it apart 
following the conclusion of the Mexican American War in 1848 and the election of 
Abraham Lincoln in 1860. Northeastern conservatives’ ties to the South, though, went well 
beyond cotton, credit, and steamships. Just as Northeastern conservatives identified 
themselves as the victims of a centralizing democracy in their own cities, they identified with 
southern slaveholders as ‘victims’ of the logic of majority rule, seeing in the concentration 
of state power in the hands of northern urban voters as a challenge to a bisectional federal 
government. In this context, building support for compromise can be read as part of a process 
of national consolidation, one that stood as an alternative to the anarchy of disunion. 
Conservatives who took part in bisectional Union Parties, the Constitutional Union Party, 
and even some conservative Whigs and Republicans took the opportunity to chart a new 
trajectory for the United States: one that avoided the centralizing teleology of democracy 
that led to French-style urban disorder and national revolution. Northern conservatives, 
then, used ‘centralization’ in Europe, political economy, and cities to think about the future 
of their own republic in an era where the triumph of liberal republican democracy seemed 
neither inevitable – nor desirable.  
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Chapter 1: Centralization Abroad: Conservatives 
Confront the Second Republic and the Second Empire 
in France 
Introduction 
Dramatic political upheavals in Paris in 1848 and 1851-52 gave Americans the opportunity 
to explore the definition and responsibility for the ‘centralization’ of political authority in 
France and the United States. Conservatives used the term like many other Americans did: 
to describe how Louis-Napoleon had monopolised political decision making in France and 
could wield violent authority over the entire country. But unlike other Americans, they 
warned that the French people had started this process themselves in 1848. Conservatives 
therefore used France to define the pejorative term ‘centralization’ as the threat they believed 
the people posed to government. This made France a useful political weapon with which 
they could cast domestic radicals, subversives, and democrats as dangerous French-style 
centralizers. But having defined centralization as a perceived radical democracy, 
conservatives used France as an opportunity to put forth their own ideal government, one 
that centred power in propertied elites with a clear monopoly on legitimate force. France 
therefore shows how conservatives redefined and used centralization tactically to legitimise 
monopolising power in their own hands, using a seemingly radical and democratic language 
to far more proscriptive ends. 
Once the February 1848 French general election campaign descended into violence 
on the streets of Paris, King Louis Philippe fled the capital and republicans proclaimed the 
Second French Republic under a democratic constitution. However, by June, confrontations 
between socialists who supported national labour reform and conservative and liberal 
supporters of ‘order’ led to a second violent uprising. The government brutally broke 
workers’ barricades, killing 5,000 workers in the process.1 In this political tumult, Louis-
Napoleon Bonaparte, the nephew of the first French Emperor, named himself a candidate 
for the elections scheduled for December 1848, and won by a landslide. Not content with 
being a mere president of a democratic republic, Louis-Napoleon organised a coup d’état in 
1851 and established a dictatorship. One year later, he swept away the Second Republic and, 
in a rigged referendum, inaugurated the Second French Empire. Despite blatant fraud, the 
transformation from republic to empire had substantial support from the French 
countryside.2 This left Louis-Napoleon’s empire as an authoritarian state that relied on both 
demagogy and political repression to rule – even if it was forced to concede democratic rights 
by the time it fell in 1870.3   
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Napoleon the Little (Boston, 1900); Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, trans. Daniel de Leon 
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Louis-Napoleon’s power-grab gave Americans a window on to the transformation 
of a democratic republic into an authoritarian monarchy. American newspapers and 
journals eagerly reported developments in Paris, ambassadors Richard Rush and William 
Rives documented the revolutions while fulfilling their ministerial duties, and diarists like 
Sidney George Fisher and George Templeton Strong recorded their views on the upheavals. 
Unsurprisingly, most American observers welcomed the overthrow of Louis Philippe 1848. 
As king, he had promised to follow a middle-class course between extremes of democracy 
and absolutism, and his administration used tax and property qualifications to limit suffrage 
to one voter for every 170 citizens. 4  This contrasted sharply with most American state 
governments, which by the mid-1830s had enfranchised almost all white men. Scholarship 
on the American reaction to Revolutions of 1848 often suggests that most U.S. observers 
supported replacing an undemocratic monarchy with a democratic republic, which 
resembled the one they had established in 1776, and dismissed the small minority who 
questioned the French capacity for republican citizenship as unpatriotic. This historiography 
suggests that most Americans supported French democracy, believing that the French were 
establishing a similar republic to their own. Only when the red flag of socialism appeared in 
Paris in June 1848 did many Americans bitterly turn against French republicanism.5 
But when looking to explain the origins of Louis-Napoleon’s Empire, some 
Americans turned to criticisms of the Revolutions of 1848 themselves. Rather than seeing 
1848 as a re-enactment of 1776, they argued that the violence of 1848 and descent into 
Empire gave them a glimpse into their own possible future under industrialisation, 
immigration, and urbanisation. By mid-century, rioting and violence – much of it with 
political aims – had become a pressing issue in most major American cities.6 Collusion 
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monarch Charles X. This new government claimed to follow a moderate policy, rejecting the conservatism of 
traditional Bourbon governments, the violence of republicanism, and the upheavals associated with the 
Bonapartes. It also claimed to enshrine the values of the middle class and the growing urban bourgeoisie, 
pursuing a policy of ‘moderate liberalism’, emphasising a capitalist economy and constitutional government. But 
in practice, this meant excluding from public political debate those who the Orleanists believed were 
unreasonable and threatened the newly established order with mass passions and disorder. For a brief 
background on the July Monarchy, see Hugh Collingham, The July Monarchy: A Political History of France, 1830-
1848 (London, 1988), pp. 70-83; Davies, Europe, p. 803; Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: Europe, 1789-1848 
(London, 1962), pp. 146-147; Roger Magraw, France 1815-1914: The Bourgeois Century (Oxford, 1983), pp. 51-88. 
5 An emerging literature is considering how Americans understood major events in nineteenth-century European 
social and political history, such as the Revolutions of 1848 and the Paris Commune. See Beckert, Metropolis, p. 
63; Casper, American Attitudes; Cleves, Terror in America; Curti, ‘Impact of the Revolutions’; Enrico Del Lago, 
‘"We Cherished the Same Hostility to Every Form of Tyranny": Transatlantic Parallels and Contacts between 
William Lloyd Garrison and Guiseppe Mazzini, 1846-1872’, American Nineteenth-Century History 13 (2012), pp. 
293-320; Fleche, 1861; Paola Gemme, Domesticating Foreign Struggles (Athens, Ga., 2005); Katz, Appomattox to 
Montmartre; Morrison, ‘American Reaction’; Frank Prochaska, The Eagle and the Crown: Americans and the British 
Monarchy (London, 2008); Philip Roberts, ‘"All Americans are hero-worshippers": American Observations on 
the First U.S. Visit by a Reigning Monarch, 1876’, Journal of the Gilded Age & Progressive Era 7 (2008), pp. 453-
477; Roberts, ‘Bloody Toy of the Multitude’; Roberts, Distant Revolutions; Timothy Roberts, ‘The European 
Revolutions of 1848 and Antebellum Violence in Kansas’, Journal of the West 44 (2006), pp. 58-68; Smith, 
‘Savannah to Vienna’, pp. 27-51; Elisa Tamarkin, Anglophilia: Deference, Devotion, and Antebellum America 
(London, 2007). The exception was the more radical New York Tribune, which supported the Revolutions 
throughout. Tuchinsky, Greeley’s, pp. 84-88. 
6 Burrows and Wallace, Gotham, pp. 135-841; Michael Feldberg, The Philadelphia Riots of 1844: A Study of Ethnic 
Conflict (London, 1975); Michael Feldberg, The Turbulent Era: Riot & Disorder in Jacksonian America (Oxford, 
1980); Geffen, ‘Industrial Development’, pp. 307-362; Paul Gilje, The Road to Mobocracy: Popular Disorder in New 
York City, 1763-1834 (London, 1987); David Grimstead, American Mobbing, 1828-1861 (Oxford, 1998); Howe, Hath 
God Wrought, pp. 432-434; Lisa Keller, The Triumph of Order: Democracy & Public Space in New York and London 
(Chichester, 2009), pp. 149-214; Carl Prince, ‘The Great "Riot Year": Jacksonian Democracy and Patterns of 
 
34 Chapter 1: Centralization Abroad: Conservatives Confront the Second Republic and the Second Empire in France 
between local politicians and gangs led to the manipulation of the electoral process, and the 
immigrant proletarian electorate looked very different to the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ artisans and 
farmers enfranchised in the 1820s and 1830s. Urban disorder and demographic change gave 
city-dwellers in the United States a sense of profound political upheaval, which anti-
immigrant nativist politicians harnessed in the mid-1850s to seize power in several major 
metropolitan centres.7 The failure of city governments to restrain urban violence pushed 
urban elites to rethink power relationships in a republic, and they used a language of 
opposition to centralization to do so. Citizens in the antebellum metropolis experimented 
with some less then democratic alternatives to restore law and order, including police and 
charter reform, takeovers by so-called ‘vigilance committees,’ and occasionally 
disenfranchisement. 8  Research on the extent of government authority too suggests that 
many Americans were comfortable with extensive law-enforcing authority and a powerful 
state, even if their methods of doing so – ranging from private authority, strong local 
government, and strong political parties – did not always resemble a modern European 
nation-state.9 Rather than seeing the 1848 Revolutions as the Old World catching up with 
the New and Louis-Napoleon’s 1851-52 power grab as a regressive reaction against this 
democratic promise, conservatives sometimes saw France as rehearsing the kind of fate that 
America might experience if they failed to prevent government weakness against popular 
violence. 
The parallels between the democratic Second Republic and the partial 
democratisation of the United States in the Age of Jackson therefore gave some 
conservatives the opportunity to reflect on the limits of American democracy. The 
historiography of American republicanism shows how conservatives in the Revolutionary 
and Early National eras feared a democracy where the people as a mob, assembly, or crowd 
directly wielded violent authority as much as they opposed the concentration of power in an 
absolute monarch or despot. They used tools like mixing appointive and elective positions, 
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limiting the size of the electorate, and placing restrictions on who could hold office to prevent 
the people assuming control over the country.10 A conservative reading of events like the 
Whiskey Rebellion and Shays’ Rebellion – where impoverished westerners violently 
challenged the right of state governments to tax them – suggested that the people, not the 
state, could still threaten liberty.11 In the Jacksonian period, states opened more offices 
opened to popular vote and repealed most property qualifications for voting and holding 
office. The Democratic Party in particular had claimed the mantle of popular sovereignty, 
struggling against aristocratic and monarchical influence in government; their success forced 
their reluctant Whig opponents to follow them. 12  Against this backdrop of partial 
democratisation, however, fears of popular authority still endured in responses to the Dorr 
War in Rhode Island against an undemocratic state government, urban rioting, and Whig 
critiques of Andrew Jackson’s claim of a popular mandate to overrule Congress and the 
Supreme Court.13 Louis-Napoleon’s accession therefore came just as Americans themselves 
felt a profound change in their own republic as it had emerged as a white male democracy. 
Americans opposed to universal white male suffrage used the riotous democracy of France 
and Louis-Napoleon’s transformation from President to Emperor to help consider the limits 
of democracy at home. These contests over democratic radicalism and law and order 
appeared in how conservatives used centralization.  
Writers, politicians, and intellectuals across the political spectrum often used 
‘centralization’ repeatedly to describe France between 1848 and 1852, as Louis-Napoleon 
assumed control of all the national and local institutions of the French government, and, 
from Paris, used the force of the state to impose his will over the whole country. But despite 
using the term to describe a similar process of power concentrating in the hands of a single 
officeholder, they used this term as a political weapon to suit very different agendas. For 
example, the Democratic Review – the voice of the 1848-inspired Young America wing of the 
Democratic Party 1848 – wove together European revolutionary republicanism, opposition 
to Louis-Napoleon’s coup, and the ongoing struggle for ‘free trade and free government’ in 
America. The need to ‘get rid of centralization’ on both sides of the Atlantic implied an 
ongoing process of devolving power to the masses that had begun, but had not been 
completed, in 1776.14 The American Whig Review, the official journal of New York City’s 
conservative Whigs, retorted that France had ‘centralized herself’, blaming the French 
people for a coup that ‘taught the world that suffrage is not liberty’. Here, the people too 
posed a centralizing threat as much as any tyrannical emperor, as power centred in the hands 
of the mob.15 Despite common agreement on the definition of centralization as a process, 
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conservatives could use this seemingly democratic language to caution against democratic 
expansion. 
France offered conservatives confirmation of a prejudice that a democracy 
unrestrained by institutions was as much a danger as centralization of power in one man. 
Their use of centralization to define both a democratic republic and an authoritarian empire 
belied the appearance of consensus that the French left in June 1848 and the French right in 
December 1851 had betrayed the principles of 1776. They argued that the same 
‘centralization’ that distinguished the Second Empire existed under the Second Republic 
and had doomed the project from the very beginning, and explained Louis-Napoleon’s coup 
d’état as an inevitable end point to a process that led from an overbearing democracy to an 
authoritarian tyranny. Contesting the responsibility for centralization in France helped 
conservatives warn against democratic expansion. Moreover, the context of urban disorder, 
further calls for democratic rights in the United States, and their own comparisons between 
France and America suggest that these criticisms of French voters and democracy were 
made with American popular government in mind. And while they seemed more 
comfortable with white male majority rule at home, they compared unfit voters in France to 
perceived radicals at home to set limits on acceptable political debate. This conservative 
redefinition of centralization as a popular threat to republican institutions allowed them to 
legitimise a process of centralization on their own terms, one that prioritised the growth of 
state power and propertied rule to cope with an increasingly urban, disorderly, and industrial 
society.  
 Rather than seeking to return to an imagined Early National idyll of small 
government, rural society, and deferential patrician rule, conservatives were already aware 
they were looking for a government suitable for the world of 1848, and sought a conservative 
alternative to the democratic Revolutions of 1848. The observations and assumptions they 
made about France suggest that they welcomed the opportunity to overturn the principle 
that the people, however narrowly or widely defined, should naturally claim more and more 
control over the government of the republic over time.  
Centralization and Louis-Napoleon’s Coup d’état, 1851-1852 
When Louis-Napoleon laid the foundations of the Second Empire between 1851 and 1852, 
many American found centralization a useful way to understand the changing government 
of France. As Alexis de Tocqueville put it when writing about Jacksonian America, ‘The 
government centralizes its agency whilst it increases its prerogative — hence a twofold 
increase of strength’.16 Similarly, liberals and conservatives both used ‘centralization’ to 
describe two processes: first the process of concentrating political decision-making power 
inwards into the hands of fewer institutions, officeholders, or people, and second the process 
of strengthening government power to enforce its will efficiently outwards over the French 
people and provinces from the imperial office in Paris. Centralization therefore helped 
Americans understand changing political power relationships between Emperor, state, and 
people. However, using Louis-Napoleon’s centralization as a political weapon against 
domestic political opponents and contesting the responsibility for this centralization revealed 
a deep divide behind this seeming consensus on the dangers of centralization. Conservative 
comparisons of French centralizers to abolitionists and warnings that Louis-Napoleon had 
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usurped powers that belonged to republican government rather than the people suggests that 
these Americans used French centralization to warn against democratic radicalism.    
Louis-Napoleon’s personal authority concerned Americans from many political 
backgrounds. Between the coup d’état in late 1851 and the proclamation of the Second 
Empire a year later, France remained a titular republic, albeit with a constitution that 
sanctioned a legal dictatorship. 17  A whole host of liberal, conservative, Whig, and 
Democratic newspapers joined political scientist Francis Lieber in labelling Louis-
Napoleon’s authoritarian republic as a ‘mockery of’ or a ‘libel on the name of’ a republic. 
Instead, they argued, it resembled an elective despotism’, a ‘burlesque of representative 
government’.18 The extent of the President’s executive authority particularly concerned these 
observers. They compared Louis-Napoleon to the monarchs who had rejected 
democratisation in 1848 and had no popular or legal restrains on their executive authority. 
Indeed, writers across the political spectrum in America’s major metropolises described the 
French President after his 1851 coup as a ‘prince’, a ‘king’ or even a ‘demigod’ similar to the 
Russian Czar, a Habsburg monarch, or the Pope. 19  The idea of a monarchy within a 
republican constitution allowed American observers to conceptualise how Louis-Napoleon 
had control over the law-making and law-enforcing purposes of government. Despite both 
America and France being republics between 1851 and 1852, they recognised that France’s 
strong executive made France a very different republic to the USA. 
Republican anxieties over concentrations of power made monarchy a useful political 
weapon for partisans who used it as a political weapon to attack their opponents. Many 
Americans assumed that republics were fragile and that without careful vigilance individuals 
could usurp power that belonged to the people and the institutions of government.  These 
fears often manifested in depictions of republican presidents as European-style monarchs, 
suggesting that political opponents were a part of this tendency of power to concentrate over 
time.20 Whig depictions of Andrew Jackson as a king after he unilaterally vetoed the charter 
of America’s central bank (see Illustration 1 below) and Democratic portrayals of William 
Seward offering Whig candidate Zachary Taylor the imperial crown (see Illustration 2 
below) illustrate how propagandists already used a polemical tradition of presenting overly-
active Presidents as monarchical. Even if it is unlikely that anyone genuinely expected 
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Taylor or Jackson to proclaim a monarchy, propagandists played on perceptions that their 
political opponents would claim further power if the people did not check it. Depictions of 
Louis-Napoleon as a monarch, like cartoons of Andrew Jackson, spoke to similar fears that 
republics were vulnerable, and could easily fall victim to corrupt individuals. These fears 
were still relevant in 1850s America. The idea that power relationships in a republic could 
change not just as a revolutionary moment but as part of a long-term process, like a 
President’s term of office, gave the charge that policies and politicians posed a centralizing 
threat to the republic its potency. 
Conservative writers in particular backed up this assertion by describing 
constitutional changes in France as a process of centralizing control over the state apparatus 
into Louis-Napoleon’s own hands. The small legislature, appointed officeholders, and long 
terms of office – common in America before the Jacksonian era – made institutions the mere 
‘instruments of the will of M. Bonaparte’ and reduced the legislature to the role of ‘mutes’ 
stripped of all independent control over state power.21 Moreover, according to both Whig 
and Democratic conservatives, his control of the law enforcing apparatus of the state, like 
the Army, legislature, and bureaucracy, proved the Louis-Napoleon had ‘an uncontrolled 
and apparently irresistible power over all the interests and institutions of the country’.22 
Rather than functioning independently as part of a system of divided power, it seemed that 
Louis-Napoleon had turned the French state into a rubber-stamp for his own political 
decision-making. Centralization had a place in American political science to describe how 
the French leader built ties of dependency from his office in Paris over the institutions and 
offices that exercised power on the streets, towns, and cities of France. Far from being just 
journalistic hyperbole or a partisan insult, the term reflected how even minor constitutional 
changes could create or strengthen power relationships between one man or institution and 
the entire machinery of the state. Conservatives would themselves come to use many of these 
techniques themselves when looking to build more centralised regimes at home. 
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Illustration 1: King Andrew the First.  
Caricature of Democratic president Andrew 
Jackson as a monarch published in 1833, one year 
after Jackson was re-elected after vetoing the 
charter of the Second Bank of the United States. 
This image speaks to republican assumptions that 
monarchs were able to exercise substantial 
amounts of discretionary power in contrast to a 
restrained constitutional American president.  
Source: ‘King Andrew the First’, Prints & 
Photographs Online Catalog, The Library of 
Congress, 
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2008661753/ 
[Accessed January 21, 2013]. 
Illustration 2: A Magnificent Offer to a Magnificent Officer. 
 
This democratic cartoon shows abolitionist Whig politicians offering presidential candidate 
Winfield Scott an Imperial crown in 1852, while the Second Republic was being remodelled as the 
Second Empire. This cartoon too draws from an assumption that ambitious monarchs held 
substantial discretionary power, as it tried to link the power to enforce abolition to the kind of power 
that European monarchs held over their own nations. 
Source: ‘A Magnificent Offer to a Magnificent Officer’, Prints & Photographs Online Catalog, The 
Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2008661557/ [Accessed September 06, 
2013]. 
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Centralizing inwards all the branches, institutions, and offices of government into 
the hands of one man seemed to create another centralization, strengthening the government 
and its ability to enforce its will over the entire nation. When explaining how Louis-
Napoleon could create a police state in France, the Washington National Intelligencer referred 
to his domination of the French National Assembly.23 In other words, the centralization of 
political decision-making inwards from the institutions if the French government to Louis-
Napoleon’s office seemed to increase or intensify the extent that the French state could 
exercise power outwards over its subjects. American observers criticised the methods of law 
enforcement that the dictator used to keep citizens in line. Newspapers and writers noted his 
large standing army, described his government as a ‘military despotism’ or ‘military 
absolutism’ supported by a ‘centralized civil force of office-holders’, and warned about his 
readiness to use railways as agents of ‘centralization’ over the rest of the country.24 These 
tools showed how Louis-Napoleon could from the capital use the coercive power of the state 
upon entire nation. The Boston Courier counselled that as a result ‘There is no government at 
France but the bayonets of Louis-Napoleon’.25 These descriptions of state violence speak to 
fear that streamlining and simplifying the decision-making apparatus of the state allowed 
officeholders to use the ability of government to wield executive power over the people. 
Midcentury conservatives used centralization in this regard to understand not just the 
process of concentrating decision-making authority inwards from one institution from many 
but also the process of strengthening the state and its ability to enforce the law. This 
assumption – that centralizing decision-making power of multiple institutions into a single 
officeholder led to a stronger government – would become a vital party of state-building 
measures in the 1850s as conservatives dealt with the threat of urban rioting and the 
dissolution of the union. 
The association of Louis-Napoleon with centralization meant that many Americans 
used him to attack their partisan political opponents. For example, the premier journals of 
the Whig and Democratic parties in New York City used Louis-Napoleon to delegitimize 
their opponents. The Democratic Review suggested that the 1848 and 1852 Whig presidential 
candidates Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor both plotted to bring chaos to the republic by 
provoking civil war or building a militaristic popular following in order to emerge as a Louis-
Napoleon-style strongman.26 The Whig Review claimed in response that unfit French voters 
had established centralization – a common conservative response to the crisis – and that 
strong leaders were therefore not the greatest centralizing threat to the republic.27 Similar 
comparisons appeared elsewhere as the campaign for 1852 heated up.28 The Whig Review 
and the Democratic Review’s comparisons indicated a veiled contest over whether 
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officeholders or the people posed the greater danger of precipitating a slide towards 
centralization. While Americans might seem to have agreed that this process of 
centralization posed a threat to liberty and republican government, the Whig Review 
dissented from the democratic narrative that popular government best prevented the creation 
of dangerous centres of government authority. Despite agreeing on the dangers of 
centralization and exploiting this in their party propaganda, not all Americans agreed on 
how this fitted into processes of political and social change, like industrialisation, 
urbanisation, and democratisation. 
Many observers, like the Democratic Review, agreed that popular vigilance prevented 
the process of centralization of power in a single officeholder. The march of democracy 
seemed like progress to a republican future. Small-d democrats fitted Louis-Napoleon’s coup 
d’état into a wider narrative of counter-revolutionary reversals that temporarily arrested 
moves towards a democratic millennium. Newspapers like William Cullen Bryant’s New 
York Evening Post Louis-Napoleon had ‘subverted’ their progressive vision for a ‘grand 
republic’ and instead returned France to ‘ancient absolutism’. 29  By sweeping away 
democracy, the Emperor had acted against the progressive ideal that power should diffuse 
among the people over time. Instead, champions of democracy saw Louis-Napoleon as 
putting power back in the hands of the small cabal of European autocrats that had ruled 
Europe for generations. Indeed, they assumed that Louis-Napoleon had acted in concert 
with ‘the allied despots of Europe’ in Austria, Russia and Prussia – countries that had 
rejected democratisation in 1848 – as part of a ‘European army for subjugating liberty’.30 
Recollections of Louis-Napoleon’s backing for the Pope against the insurgent Roman 
Republic in 1849 appeared to sustain the assertion that leaders sought to reverse democratic 
gains.31 To these small-d democrats, Louis-Napoleon’s abandonment of the democratic 
Second Republic seemed like a betrayal of America’s democratic promise.32 
Conservatives, in contrast, did not always dismiss Louis-Napoleon’s coup d’état as 
a challenge to democratic progress. When news of Louis-Napoleon’s coup d’état reached 
Washington, the Whig National Intelligencer and the Courier and Enquirer recognised that not 
all Americans would dismiss the abolition of the Second French Republic as a setback.33 
Until news of the bloodshed that accompanied the coup reached New York, even the 
Democratic New York Herald defended the early stages of Louis-Napoleon’s dictatorship as 
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a suitable government for France.34 Conservatives often abandoned Louis-Napoleon once 
they saw his programme of ‘centralization’, but even these criticisms were focused more on 
the accumulation of power in the executive at the expense of balanced government rather 
than accumulation of power in the imperial regime at the expense of the masses. Some 
criticised Louis-Napoleon’s 1852 constitution for making the independent institutions of 
republican government an extension of his ‘will’ and officials ‘auxiliaries to his thought’. 
‘[T]he whole and sole government is concentrated in his person’ or ‘will’, they argued, when 
it ought to reside in legal institutions.35 These conservatives implied that Louis-Napoleon 
had subordinated the entire state to private desires and emotions – a critique conservative 
newspapers could easily apply to the French people too. Conservative newspapers cast the 
coup d’état as a battle between the French legislative and executive branches of government 
suggested that it was a struggle between the institutions of government rather than a struggle 
between the French people and an authoritarian regime.36 They might have agreed that 
Louis-Napoleon demonstrated the dangers of allowing power to accumulate in a single 
figure, but did not quite define centralization in opposition to a master narrative of the rise 
of democratic republics. So while Americans might have agreed that Louis-Napoleon’s 
empire was centralized, different groups could deploy this example of centralization 
potentially to advance very different agendas.  
Describing Louis-Napoleon as a monarch allowed Americans to plot the changing 
power relationships as France moved from republic to empire. The idea of a process of 
centralization allowed Americans to conceptualise how Louis-Napoleon had reconstructed 
the relationship between the institutions of the state and the relationship between the state 
and the people. They vividly described control over state power moving from the people and 
multiple state institutions inwards into the hands of the President turned Emperor, allowing 
him to wield power from the centre over the enite nation. This idea of a process of political 
centralization therefore helped citizens to understand how one institution or officeholder 
could control the whole machinery of the state and how much executive authority the 
government could impose on the country. However, while Americans seemed to agree that 
the coup was a centralizing moment, agreement on opposition to the centralized power 
structure of absolute monarchy neither resolved the question of how to decentralize power 
nor assigned responsibility for the centralization of power over time. Despite seeming like a 
fixed and precise term to describe simple constitutional changes abroad, the ambiguities of 
the term in fact made it a potent political weapon. American conservatives found a way to 
use this seemingly liberal language of opposition to an authoritarian government to consider 
the limits of democracy and alternatives to popular government. 
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Centralization and the Paris Mob, 1848-1852 
Conservatives might have agreed with other Americans that supposedly centralized 
government posed a danger to people’s liberties. But when looking to explain the origins of 
the Second Empire, conservatives often turned to criticism of the democratic Second 
Republic and its supposed democratic excesses.. Champions of the Second Republic like 
Horace Greeley’s New York Tribune and the Young America-inspired Democratic Review saw 
the coup as a reactionary betrayal of American-style democratic progress. Conservatives 
dailies like the New York Herald, National Intelligencer, and Philadelphia North American instead 
emphasised that the centralization already existed when Louis-Napoleon became president 
in 1848 and proclaimed the Second Empire in 1852. They used centralization to describe 
how the French people in the guise of the Paris mob had seemingly monopolised violent 
power, just as Louis-Napoleon appeared to have done, and too exercised violent tyranny 
over the entire country. Rather than using the threat of political centralization to warn 
against the power of despots and dictators, that Americans seemed predisposed to use it to 
warn that the people could usurp power and assume for themselves the violent power that 
belonged to the government. American conservatives in a country beset by social and 
political change therefore seemed predisposed to perceive the excesses of a democracy that 
allowed the people to assume too much power without the watchful power of the state. 
In America in 1848 many read the European revolutions against these kinds of 
monarchical governments as evidence that the Old World was catching up with the spirit of 
the New.37 Horace Greeley saw his paper and European democratic republics as part of a 
common movement, and the Tribune even carried the correspondence of Karl Marx on 
events in Germany. 38  Transatlantic republicanism also fitted into Democratic political 
culture. The Young America faction of the Democratic Party argued that aggressive 
expansion of the American republic and the defence of republicanism in Europe were both 
part of America’s ‘manifest destiny’.39 The editor of the main Young America journal, the 
United States Democratic Review, gave Irish immigrant and republican firebrand Thomas 
Francis Meagher the first thirty-three pages of the July 1852 issue, where he condemned 
both British and American bankers as part of a ‘moneyed power’ and ‘moneyed interest’ 
conspiring to undermine democracy.40 However, these were by no means the only journals 
to argue that true Americans would support liberty at home as much as abroad. 41 For 
American supporters of transatlantic democracy, support for the Second French Republic 
symbolised commitment to domestic democratisation. Failure to challenge the 
centralisation of power abroad would set a dangerous precedent for banks, slavery, or anti-
suffragists to do the same in the United States. 
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Others, though, used Louis-Napoleon’ coup to distinguish French democracy from 
American republicanism. New York’s wealthy diarist George Templeton Strong claimed the 
violent success of Louis-Napoleon’s coup d’état proved France incapable of self-government 
and the fragility of the Second Republic demonstrated there was no likeness between violent 
French democracy and American ‘constitutional republicanism’.42 The Boston Courier too 
feared that the coup d’état showed that there was no hope for ‘real republicanism’ in 
France.43 These Americans took Louis-Napoleon’s coup as an opportunity to distinguish 
their vision of government from the republics of 1848 and redefine centralization to embrace 
a democracy where the people appeared to have claimed too much authority over the their 
government – and the elites who were best placed to fill government offices. 
When trying to explain the coup, conservatives often assumed that centralization 
existed under the Second Republic, albeit under different hands, concurring with Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s observation that France had always experienced centralization regardless of 
its professed form of government.44 For example, they described the supposed violence of 
1848 and the instability of the Second Republic in terms similar to the coup itself. Both the 
conservative Democratic-leaning New York Herald and Washington Irving described Louis-
Napoleon’s takeover as one of many ‘spasms’ and ‘convulsions’ that had engulfed France 
since 1848 – similar to the pathological terms of emotions and wills that others had used to 
describe France under Louis-Napoleon. These constant violent episodes seemed to show 
that Louis-Napoleon’s violence only continued a pattern that existed under democratic 
government.45 Moreover, the French people were themselves responsible for these violent 
episodes as much as the French emperor. Philadelphia diarist Sidney George Fisher agreed 
with the Herald and the Courier and Enquirer in New York that the French people were 
‘incapable of voluntary submission to the law’ and needed restraining to prevent violence 
throughout all of France.46 The self-styled ‘Berkeley Men’, in their favourable biography of 
Louis-Napoleon published following the coup d’état, also described the political history of 
France following the 1789 revolution in lurid terms of ‘anarchy’ and ‘blood’ at the hands of 
the Paris mob.47 Even under democracy, France had always experienced the violence that 
distinguished centralized regimes. Conservatives therefore argued that the symptoms of 
centralization proceeded alongside French democratisation before 1852. This reasoning – 
that rule by the people caused rather than checked centralization – provided an underpinning 
for antidemocratic politics in the midcentury United States.  
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The uprisings of 1848 and Louis-Napoleon’s subsequent ascent came just as many 
urban conservatives felt a perception of loss of political authority in public space. Urban 
violence had become common in most northeastern cities, as fire companies, local gangs, 
and striking workers often fought on the streets among themselves and against what passed 
for municipal policing. Riots against abolitionists in 1842 and Catholics in 1844 in 
Philadelphia were some of the largest insurrections in the United States until the Civil War.48 
However, such violence was a common part of the urban experience throughout the United 
States between the 1830s and 1850s, and the fact that such a state of affairs had occurred 
almost simultaneously with the triumph of popular sovereignty left some citizens wondering 
whether democracy meant discord. Sidney George Fisher, for example, struggled to 
distinguish between riots and elections, seeing universal suffrage as a prelude to universal 
disorder.49 Many American conservatives felt that mob violence demonstrated the dangers 
of democracy, as it weakened government and handed the state monopoly on violence to 
the hands of the people directly, rather than simply open offices to popular input.50 This 
assumption that the mob had centralized coercive power that rightfully belonged to the state 
itself would strongly influence how conservatives approached the likes of municipal reform 
and enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act. 
The assumption that the crowd directly held state power appears in conservatives’ 
depictions of the Second Republic as an institutional veneer for a violent anarchy. The 
strength of popular protest and power in France seemed to suggest to conservatives that the 
Paris mob controlled violent power in place of government itself. As such, according to the 
Courier and Enquirer and the pro-Bonapartist Berkeley Men, the Second Republic was a 
façade, behind which ‘a deadly mass black with ignorance, sweltering with fanaticism and 
festering with vice’ threatened to overturn all order and government. 51  French politics, 
conservatives claimed, was not an orderly expression of the people’s will, but damning 
evidence that the French were ‘a turbulent, unsettled and self-despising population,’ who 
were ‘transient’, ‘fickle’, and possessing ‘no stability’. Such a population, lacking ‘self-
restraint, and ‘subject to impulse’, preferred rule by revolt rather than law.52 Like Louis-
Napoleon, the French people had made the public functions of government subject to the 
private will of their own emotions. This inverted the ideal top down relationship between 
the government and the people. As the Philadelphia North American put it ‘Sovereigns are 
made and unmade there [in France] with equal facility’.53 Francis Lieber codified these fears 
that the people seemed to have already centralized legislative authority in their own hands 
when he insisted that ‘what the French republicans demand in the name of democracy, kings 
insist upon in the name of divine right’ – and explicitly stated that democracy did not 
preclude centralization.54 These conservatives’ depictions of France as a dictatorship of the 
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mob spoke to an assumption that often appeared in their depictions of democracy both at 
home and abroad: that within the people lay the potential for violence and political 
extremism. France, it seemed, demonstrated the dangers of allowing the people to seize all 
government authority. 
Just as political decision-making centralized in the hands of the Emperor led to 
oppressively strong government on the streets of France, the French people’s 
monopolisation of legislative authority explained mob violence and democratic tyranny. In 
conservative descriptions of France, the Paris mob – not the French state – subjected the rest 
of the country to brutal executive power. Sidney George Fisher graphically described how 
the ‘blasts of the first revolution’ had easily overpowered the ancien régime to highlight how 
the weak Second Republic had fallen to the violence of the Paris mob.55 The people, not the 
state, held the state monopoly on violence in France. Conservatives did not see public 
violence as a rightful expression of the people’s democratic will; instead, it demonstrated the 
excesses of powerful government. Both Fisher and Washington Irving argued that French 
political ‘factions’ were ‘eager to make a revolution to attain’ their ‘ends’ and that ‘every 
political change is a military convulsion’.56 Their stress on military violence demonstrates 
how they cast the people as users and abusers of the state monopoly on legitimate violence. 
After all, the military was one of the law enforcing agents of the state. Just as Louis-
Napoleon’s concentration of decision-making power allowed him to wield despotic state 
power over France, conservatives were predisposed to see the people as just as dangerous if 
given too much authority over the institutions of the republic. 
Especially after it fell to Louis-Napoleon, the Second Republic seemed to 
conservatives less like a reproduction of the American government in Europe and more a 
violent episode akin to the Dorr War or Shays’ Rebellion. Their criticisms of the Second 
French Republic echoed concerns from the Early Republic that giving the people too much 
authority over the government would fundamentally weaken its ability to maintain law and 
order, leading to anarchy and disorder. After all, followers of Daniel Shays, Thomas Dorr, 
and participants in the Whiskey Rebellion had all claimed a popular mandate to overturn 
the decisions of legal government using violent means.57 Conservatives’ view that the people 
were often responsible for centralization rather than a vigilant check upon it may not have 
been predominant in the midcentury United States, but it would come to inform a wide 
variety of proposals to reform government and strengthen the state in response to perceived 
domestic harbingers of democratic centralization. The Second Republic here provided as 
much of a warning as the Second Empire. 
For American conservatives, the true meaning of Louis-Napoleon’s empire lay back 
in the Revolutions of 1848 themselves. Both republican political science and conservatives’ 
own experience of urban rioting and disorder – which would spark local state-building 
movements – confirmed long-standing conservative fears that the people as a single entity 
could establish the same processes of centralization they had described under Louis 
Napoleon. The Paris mob, they argued, had assumed control over political decision-making, 
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leading to the people usurping the state’s monopoly on legitimate use of force to compel 
citizens to its will. In doing so, they drew on Jacksonian-era fears that the people tended to 
participate in politics not through peaceful elections, deliberative assemblies, and the rule of 
law but through mob violence and urban rioting. The agency and authority that public 
violence gave the mob, they argued, made them a state within a state, a dangerous source of 
power that in practice ruled the streets of large cities and even laid siege to the national 
political institutions that made big cities their home. These conservatives therefore tried to 
reclaim and appropriate the idea of centralization to apply to mass democracy as well as 
imperial tyranny. This allowed them to contest the desirability of mass political 
participation, contextualising the power relationships of centralization as a problem of the 
rise of a democratic challenge to state authority, rather than as a reversal of a natural trend 
towards liberal democratic republics. 
Centralization and the Second Empire, 1851-1852 
Having defined the French people as the progenitors of centralization in France, 
conservatives made clear that the French were unfit voters incapable of maintaining a 
republic themselves. For conservatives, the transformation from Second Republic to Second 
Empire did not mark as radical a change as it might appear. Indeed, they did not even 
describe it as an ambitious individual betraying and usurping a democracy, albeit a flawed 
one given French instability. Instead, conservatives retold Louis-Napoleon’s coup d’état as 
a continuation of the same kind of democratic centralization in action. They assumed first 
that the French people had democratically elected Louis-Napoleon, giving him unrestricted 
control over the institutions of the government. Second, the French supposedly submitted to 
his authoritarian rule, continually allowing him to use government authority to compel 
France to his will. Conservatives therefore extrapolated their assumption that the people 
bore responsibility for centralization in France to make critical value judgements about 
French voters. France therefore helped conservatives discuss whether all men were fit voters 
and suitable for suffrage in an era when most had seemingly accepted popular government 
by white men.  
Conservatives typically assumed that the French people were responsible for the 
Emperor’s centralized command over the institutions and offices of the French state. They 
did so by emphasising that Louis-Napoleon’s coronation reflected the will of the French 
electorate. The Second Republic’s American supporters had been quick to denounce Louis-
Napoleon’s elections and plebiscites as a ‘sham’, unwilling to suggest that the French people 
had chosen despotism, and predicted that the French would soon overthrow the usurper.58 
Indeed, William Cullen Bryant’s Evening Post was so enamoured with the idea of an 
imminent revolution in France that that it dismissed their own Paris correspondent’s reports 
of Louis-Napoleon’s popularity and assumed France would soon revolt in defence of the 
republic.59 The Boston Courier, though, was by no means the only conservative paper to 
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presume that Louis-Napoleon’s coup d’état, elections, and plebiscites fairly reflected French 
public opinion, even when they suspected substantial vote-rigging.60 Instead of seeing an 
example of how ambitious individuals could monopolise state power, they took Louis-
Napoleon’s election as an example of how easily a demagogue could persuade the people to 
surrender their own monopoly on sovereignty.  Francis Lieber compared Louis-Napoleon 
to Julius Caesar as examples of ‘imperatorial sovereignty’ because both had made 
themselves ‘the sole ruler by the popular element, against the institutions of the country’. 
The French Emperor’s apparent eagerness to satisfy his people’s desire for military glory in 
return for absolute power made his dictatorship an informal democracy dependant on the 
Paris mob. 61 Lieber, though, was by no means the only American observer to conclude that 
France proved how overzealous democracies, where power concentrated in the people, 
created despotic dictators, with power centralized in one officeholder. 62 In conservative 
circles there remained a fear that a demagogue could harness the power centralized in the 
crowd to establish despotism with popular support. Their understanding of the emergence 
of Second Empire France fitted into this prejudice that the people were a threat to – rather 
than a part of – their ideal model of republican government as they supposedly gravitated 
towards concentrations of political authority.  
French voters seemed poorly placed to check the tendency of power to concentrate 
if given the opportunity.  Accusations that the Louis-Napoleon could easily ‘dazzle’ the 
French people with parades and public works, as Francis Lieber and Washington Irving 
claimed, implied that the French had little agency.63 The New York Herald too felt that Louis-
Napoleon had ‘sway’ over the ‘minds’ of the French people as well as undisputed mastery 
over the country.64 This strongly contrasted with the republican ideal of a people vigilantly 
defending their liberty that champions of democracy had expected to pan out in France. The 
centralization of decision-making power there confirmed conservatives’ predisposition to 
see the masses as unable to prevent dangerous concentrations of authority. 
As a result, some conservatives made deeply critical value judgements about French 
voters and their fitness for the elective franchise. In conservatives’ imagination, the French 
allowed Louis-Napoleon to wield centralized executive power just as they had allowed it 
under the democratic government of 1848. For example, the North American saw the success 
of Louis-Napoleon as a test of European fitness for liberty, which the Old World had 
unreservedly failed. 65  Describing the French people as submissive made them seem 
responsible for the violence that they believed had come out of Paris in 1848 and 1852. The 
Courier and Enquirer and a correspondent for the National Intelligencer both described the 
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French people’s election of Louis-Napoleon as a ‘submission’. 66  Conservatives also 
sometimes compared French dictatorship to American slavery to illustrate French 
responsibility for their experience of centralized state power. In the antebellum period, some 
Americans defended slavery on the basis that whites had proven themselves capable of 
resisting tyranny, while African-American slaves had not. Blacks own continued 
enslavement therefore ‘proved’ – in a tautological sense – their unfitness for freedom and 
citizenship.67 Conservatives used similar reasoning to argue that only the French people 
were responsible for their subjugation at the hands of a centralized government. The 
American Whig Review argued that the apparent willingness of the French to consent to Louis-
Napoleon, despite his violent exercise of state power, made them ‘slaves’, while other writers 
frequently referred to Louis-Napoleon as being a ‘master’ that the French people had 
expressly desired. 68 The New York Herald too claimed that ‘the slave makes the tyrant’, 
shifting responsibility for the ongoing centralization in France to a degraded electorate.69 
These observers were keen to point out that not all people could resist such power and 
preventing a republic from degenerating into a centralized monarchy. Comparing French 
centralization to slavery therefore helped conservatives link it to a wider debate about who 
should participate in government – a connection that would help them use France to 
challenge democracy in the United States. 
Louis-Napoleon’s successful coup therefore offered American conservatives the 
opportunity to critique not just overbearing mobs and violent democracies but also the 
people, voters, and universal white male suffrage itself. To these Americans, the Second 
Empire was a continuation of the centralization of the Second Republic rather than a radical 
break with an emerging republic. They assumed that his accession reflected the will of the 
French people, often refused to disregard his elections and plebiscites as rigged and 
unrepresentative, and presumed that Louis-Napoleon would have won any free election in 
France. The very success of the coup proved that the French were not fit to maintain a 
republic in the first place. As well as blaming the Paris mob for centralizing power as Louis-
Napoleon had done, conservatives extended their negative value judgements to the entire 
body of French voters and people. Their interpretation of events in France therefore suggests 
a conservative desire to reinterpret world events to fit a critique of voters and to confirm a 
wider critique of voters who supported democratic radicalism. 
Centralization and American Democracy 
Conservatives did not limit these criticisms just to the French. They also used the French 
people’s supposed centralization of power in France as a political weapon against their 
domestic political opponents, particularly abolitionists but sometimes the entire American 
voting population. Some, like Sidney George Fisher, were happy to compare American to 
French voters as equal threats who might centralize government power, unleash 1848-style 
violence, and create an American Napoleon III. Few conservatives, though, were as overtly 
contemptuous of democracy as Fisher. More commonly, conservatives simply contrasted fit 
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American citizens to unfit French voters and American abolitionists, radicals, and 
reformers. But far from accepting American popular rule, proclaiming American 
exceptionalism in this way helped caution voters to defer to conservative elites and lead them 
away from claiming more democratic authority than conservatives were prepared to 
concede. In other words, fitness to vote was conditional on avoiding what conservatives had 
defined as a dangerous process of popular centralization. As industrialisation and 
immigration combined with democratisation to make America seem more like revolutionary 
Europe, 1848 gave conservatives the opportunity to think about the prospects of American 
democracy too. In the context of urban disorder, mass voting, and support for radical social 
and economic reform, distinguishing French from American citizenship in this way helped 
conservatives define a ‘true’ American political culture based on deference and restraint in 
contrast to revolutionary movements at home and abroad. 
American supporters of European democracy used France to demonstrate the 
danger that despotic aristocrats posed to the people’s liberties, seeing European and 
American republicanism as a single movement towards freedom. They blamed a lineup of 
historical French despots for enforcing centralization on the French people, but argued that 
any people could face despotism if the people did not remain vigilant. 70 These small-d 
democrats used France in this way to warn that the American democratic project was also 
under pressure. The Democratic Review compared the democratic aspirations of European 
republicans to Jacksonian universal white male suffrage and even women’s suffrage in the 
American west, while warning that any attempt to restrict universal suffrage in the United 
States would lead to American despotism too.71 In several articles repeating their assertions 
that the French were resisting Louis-Napoleon’s agglomeration of power, the Whig Tribune 
and others argued that this was only the beginning of a pan-European revolt in favour of 
republics and against centralized monarchical regimes.72 Liberals suggested that the coup 
d’état was only a temporary reversal of a global trend towards democracy in both the Old 
World and the New, and tried to defend mass political participation at home. Notably, one 
of the letters defending European fitness for citizenship came from an author writing under 
an Irish pseudonym, possibly in defiance of nativist opposition to immigrant suffrage.73 In 
New York, there were renewed calls for extending African American suffrage, something 
that Greeley’s Tribune supported with the same vigour that it opposed Louis-Napoleon.74 
Predicting the imminent overthrow of European centralized monarchy allowed these 
Americans to defend mass political participation not just in Europe, but also the United 
States. American small-d democrats therefore used the centralization of 1852 to defend 
embracing popular government and warn against retreating from democratisation. 
Conservatives were also aware that Europe could illustrate the future of the United 
States. 75  After all, the population of major American seaboard cities like New York, 
Philadelphia, and Boston mushroomed in the antebellum period, fuelled by increasing 
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immigration from the Old World, even if they had yet to reach the size of London and 
Paris.76 (See also Chart 3 and Chart 4 below) Rather than believing Europe would come to 
resemble America, it seemed to some conservatives that social changes might make the USA 
look more European. In the 1870s, upper and middle class Americans would often come to 
use the Paris Commune as an example of what America might expect if strikes and labour 
unrest were allowed to spiral out of control. These Americans seemed far less comfortable 
about the future of American exceptionalism, and used this to warn against indulging labour 
reform and redistribution of property.77 Conservatives therefore used comparisons between 
America and Europe and warnings that the people could centralize power not to highlight 
Americans’ exceptional fitness for democratic rule but as a political weapon to undermine 
the principle of democratisation in the United States as well.  
A small number of conservatives more sceptical of popular rule described the 
centralizing tendencies of democracy in universal terms could apply to America as much as 
they applied to France and Rome. The transformation of Rome from Republic to Empire 
fascinated writers and artists in the antebellum era; it proved to these conservatives that the 
centralized power relationships of democratic rule always became the centralized power 
relationships of despotism. Francis Lieber compared Louis-Napoleon’s coup d’état to 
Rome’s descent into empire, arguing each served as examples of a ‘wide-spread 
centralization of power’.78 Fisher too described the coup d’état as ‘the old story’, a repetition 
of the law that universal suffrage created a president for life and a dependant legislature.79 
As a universal law that applied to the modern and ancient world, the descent of democracies 
into dictatorships seemed applicable to the New Would as well as the Old. Indeed, Fisher 
would later claim that ‘democracy has ever had and must ever have from its nature but one 
course and termination – popular violence – anarchy and military despotism’ and ‘wherever 
it has been tried it has wholly and signally failed’, including the United States.80 Both Lieber 
and Fisher seemed open to the possibility that the American people could too become a 
centralizing threat if they seemed to emulate the challenges that the French people posed to 
the supremacy of national government. 
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Chart 3: Population Growth of Major American Cites, 1830-1860 
 
In this period, America experienced rapid population growth, which fuelled the anxieties many 
American had about the growth of the American electorate. 
Source: ‘Population of The 100 Largest Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States: 1790 
to 1990’, United States Census Bureau, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/twps0027.html [Accessed 
June 18, 2016]; ‘New York County-Level Results’, University of Virginia Library Historical Census 
Browser, http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu/index.html [Accessed June 18, 2016]. 
Chart 4: Immigration at Major Northeastern Ports, 1830-1850 
 
In this period the number of immigrants also fulled concerns about the enfranchised population 
and challenged American exceptionalist assumptions that the United States would not follow the 
same historial path outlined by European states like France.   
Source: William Jeremy Bromwell, History of Immigration to the United States, Exhibiting the Number, 
Sex, Age, Occupation, and Country of Birth, of Passengers Arriving ... By Sea from Foreign Countries, from 
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Most conservatives were less overtly antidemocratic. Conservative Whigs like Fisher 
tended to put more emphasis on law and order than Democrats, who sometimes defended 
popular agitation in defiance of law, as shown by their support of the popular Dorr 
revolution in Rhode Island or their appearance at the head of crowds in cities. 81  It is 
therefore perhaps unsurprising that Fisher and the Whig Review tended to fear more than 
most that popular government threatened a process of centralization of legislative authority 
in city mobs or authoritarian dictators. Many conservatives, often of a more Democratic 
heritage, used American exceptionalism to claim that American voters were worthier than 
the French for citizenship. Contemporaries often divided Protestant English Anglo-Saxon 
whites from Catholic European ‘Celts’ and claimed that the Irish were racially predisposed 
to violence, crime, and disorder.82 These conservatives drew from this assumption to explain 
Americans’ relative resistance to centralizing power. Writers across the partisan described 
the French (another ‘Celtic’ people in mid-century racial science) as a ‘volatile race’ with 
‘unreflecting’, ‘erratic’ and ‘ignorant’ traits, which left them ‘in sum possessing a 
‘temperament, altogether too changeable and fervid for dwelling in peace and harmony 
under a republican government’.83 Even Francis Lieber, despite his German background, 
agreed with the Herald that a history of ‘centralization’ had degraded the French, leaving 
them dependant, irrational and incapable of submitting to the rule of law and the power of 
republican institutions. 84  Outwardly, conservatives who used nineteenth-century racial 
science to differentiate American from French voters seemed happy to accept that 
Americans were worthy voters – even if it left the fitness of immigrant voters unresolved.   
Turning to American exceptionalism, though, warned American voters themselves 
that they had to avoid the perception of a French-style democracy in order to remain 
legitimate American voters. Criticising the Revolutions of 1848, one correspondent to the 
National Intelligencer claimed ‘no assassinations, no house-burnings, no gratuitous 
destruction of their adversaries' property disgraced their [Americans’] struggle for liberty’. 85 
In other words, American exceptionalism was conditional upon American voters deferring 
to the law and legal institution and avoiding a conservative perception of centralizing power 
into their own hands, as the French seemed to have done in 1848. This made American 
exceptionalism a useful political weapon to caution American voters from embracing radical 
reform at home. In America, as in France, it seemed that the people needed to be prevented 
from the kind of democracy conservatives had used centralization to warn against. 
Conservatives were therefore not complacent about the potential for American 
voters to stray beyond the legitimate boundaries of political behaviour as the French had 
done in 1848. Just as a lack of French restraint led to the centralization of power in the Paris 
mob, a national debate over slavery threatened explicitly ‘centralized’ rule at the hands of a 
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northern democracy. The amount of state power needed to abolish slavery in the South, 
Richter and others argued, meant that an unchecked northern electorate would need their 
own Louis-Napoleon to bring about emancipation.86 This reasoning – that political abolition 
would come through a democratically anointed dictator – informed conservative union 
movements’ attempts to wrest lawmaking authority over slavery away from the democratic 
sphere and its northern antislavery majority. Such conservatives may not have believed in 
disenfranchisement, but they were happy to define a portion of the American electorate as 
the centralizing threat to the American republic, akin to the Paris mob and French voters. 
Moreover, defining their political opponents as French-style centralizers implicitly defined 
legitimate American citizenship in opposition to conservatives’ understanding of 
unrestrained democracy. Defining abolition as a similar democratic centralization of power 
to the Second Republic allowed conservatives to imply that abolitionists, too, were unworthy 
citizens. They might have disagreed with Fisher on the proportion of voters that, in their 
opinion, threatened centralization. But these conservatives all agreed that a popular threat 
to conservative rule existed and used the threat of centralization as a political weapon to 
caution the people to warn the people from overstepping the political boundaries 
conservatives had set for them. Universal white male suffrage did not mean the people 
should stop deferring to propertied elites and political institutions. Warning against 
concentration of power might seem like a democratic language, but based on the assumption 
that the people posed the greatest centralizing threat, conservatives could use it to proscribe 
their political opponents and set boundaries on political debate. 
Conservative fears of an out of control democracy in France therefore spoke to fears 
of urban disorder and disunion in the mid-century United States. Sidney George Fisher and 
Francis Lieber identified ‘the question of order in large cities’ and ‘popular tyranny’ as a 
challenge to republican government in America, suggesting that they saw in America’s own 
popular disorder the potential for a democracy to centralize power in the mob rather than 
the state. Both Fisher and Lieber to different degrees read this as evidence of unfitness for 
republican citizenship. 87  Other conservatives in both parties compared Garrisonian 
abolitionists, corrupt politicians and radical young America Democrats to French 
democrats, claiming they threatened to reduce republican ‘liberty’ to violent democracy.88 
Compared to disenfranchisement, strengthening the independence of state institutions 
offered a subtler form of democratic proscription, but these conservatives still sought to limit 
the independent decision-making power of the American people. They encouraged 
Americans to see popular political mobilisation – whether in abolitionist meetings or urban 
riots – as threats to the republic. Issues like the nullification of the Fugitive Slave Act, 
secessionism, and maintenance of the compromise of 1850 loomed in the background of 
conservative desires to maintain public institutions’ authority over the people. Conservatives 
believed America too needed to find forms of government that prevented the centralization 
of power in voters unable to resist the temptations of centralized power. Encouraging the 
people to blacklist those who appeared to challenge the authority of America’s public 
institutions was another way to ensure democratic outsiders could not take power from the 
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American state. In America, just as in France, conservatives saw the need for a state-building 
programme that protected the state – and conservative hegemony with it – from an 
encroaching people. 
Conservative comparisons between French centralizers and American voters 
resemble how nativists used nationality and xenophobia to delegitimise domestic political 
opponents, albeit using a more obviously proscriptive language. The nativist movement that 
rose to prominence in the antebellum era may also have helped some conservatives rein in 
popular threats to the what they believed was a genuine republican government. 
Investigations of the nativist movement in New York City and the South suggests that 
nativism may have offered conservatives a way to discuss disenfranchisement in a polity that 
already allowed almost all white men to vote and appeared to have accepted mass suffrage. 
Northern and southern conservatives dismissed socialism, democracy, and abolitionism as 
a single foreign influence that threatened self-government in the United States, and used this 
to challenge the legitimacy of reformers at home. Some even suggested that allowing 
impoverished immigrants to vote was responsible for threats of an 1848-style uprising in the 
United States.89 Warning that these radical reform movements were a foreign threat to the 
republic resembles how other conservatives used the possibility of democratic centralization 
as a political weapon to challenge these movements too. Even a conservative Democratic-
leaning paper like the New York Herald compared Irish American voters to the French to 
emphasise they were potentially unfit voters who strayed beyond the boundaries of 
acceptable American political behaviour thanks to violent street politics.90 Nativism also 
helped highlight the possibility that subversives threatened on American soil the same 
centralization they saw in the second Republic and Second Empire – and use it as a political 
weapon set the boundaries of legitimate political debate and limit the role of the people in 
the political decision-making process. 
Having defined centralization as a popular threat to government, conservatives 
could now use this term against their domestic political opponents who challenged the 
political and social order. Defenders of democracy like the Tribune and the Democratic Review 
– not to mention abolitionists, labour reformers, and feminists – hardly conceived of popular 
rule as mob law. But to some citizens it seemed like America placed too much faith in the 
popular will – even if they divided on just how well the people were fulfilling their political 
role. Conservatives more supportive of a broad American suffrage like the Herald may have 
disagreed with the likes of Fisher, who was less optimistic about American voters. But they 
nonetheless agreed a portion of the United States electorate threatened the kind of 
democratic activism they had conceptualised in France as a popular centralization of power. 
Some, like Fisher, might have seen France as evidence of the need for disenfranchisement. 
Others, though, used American exceptionalism to narrow the boundaries of legitimate 
political debate by associating with French centralization groups that might centre more 
political and economic authority in the hands of workers, African-Americans, and women. 
Opposition to centralization and affirming the differences between unfit French and worthy 
American citizens were therefore democratic-sounding languages – at least as far as 
American voters might be concerned. In practice, though, conservatives used opposition to 
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centralization to warn that the greatest threat to the republic came not from the banks, 
officeholders, or corporations, but from the people themselves.  
State-Building and Conservative Centralization 
Given these conservative critiques of popular government both at home and abroad, it is 
unsurprising that they looked for alternative forms of government to European 
republicanism and American democracy.  Defining French (and American) democracy as a 
centralizing threat allowed conservatives to explore alternatives to popular government and 
present them as an alternative to democratic despotism. For the Herald, the North American, 
and many other conservative writers, the July Monarchy, the Madisonian system of divided 
government, and sometimes even the Second Empire itself served as examples of 
governments that could restore to government the powers that the Paris mob had allegedly 
usurped. And as keen observers of the democracy, urban violence, and conflict at home, 
they were keen to apply these lessons to American government too. Ironically, defining the 
people as a centralizing threat allowed them to deflect from their own programme of 
centralization both abroad and at home. Despite not using this pejorative term, they 
proposed to redistribute power from the people and keep it in the hands of the best men. 
France therefore gave conservatives the chance to think about governance –how they could 
strengthen government and insulate power at home – and use warnings against 
centralization to promote a centralization of their own.  
Instead of seeing the French Second Republic from the outset as a partner in the 
pursuit of universal liberty, some conservatives turned instead to European constitutional 
monarchy. A few even upheld Louis Philippe – the monarch France deposed in the 1848 
Revolution – as an example of how less democratic forms of government were a legitimate 
weapon in the conservative arsenal against the centralizing tendencies of majority rule. 
Louis Philippe’s embrace of constitutional government but a limited electorate seemed to 
many conservatives an attractive option for a people too predisposed to centralizing power. 
The San Francisco Alta California, which came to regret the downfall of the July monarchy, 
claimed that American supporters of the Second Republic ‘admit of no middle ground – no 
medium between the absolute and unmitigated sway of tyrants and the universal, 
instantaneous prevalence of perfectly matured republicanism’. 91 As French democracy 
descended into dictatorship, conservative politicians and newspapers revised their 
estimation of the late constitutional monarchy, seeing it as a judicious enforcer of law and 
order. 92   Fisher, for example, supported ‘an hereditary monarchy with constitutional 
limitations and a representation of the better classes’, as did McMichael’s North American.93 
Democracy and republicanism therefore here did not necessarily seem more progressive 
than hereditary states built on narrow voting rights. Constitutional monarchy and even 
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limited suffrage, as a middle ground between the extremes of democracy and dictatorship, 
appeared a better foundation for a republic free of the radicalism that they used 
centralization to undermine. 
Louis-Napoleon’s American apologists also presented the Second Empire as a 
necessary balance between direct democracy and strong government in place of the radical 
centralization of anarchic republicanism. The authors of The Napoleon Dynasty noted Louis-
Napoleon’s interest in electromagnetism on a previous visit to the United States and his 
decision to create prizes for discoveries in this field upon becoming Emperor, presenting him 
as a modernising and progressive leader.94 They, too, were keen to see Louis-Napoleon as a 
man in keeping with the spirit of the times, but one resistant to democratic centralization 
and popular disorder. Labelling him as the ‘Emperor of the French Republic’, they claimed 
that ‘The Napoleon Dynasty was, and will be for some time to come, an inevitable 
government in France-it is the only possible compromise between Bourbonism, or the past, 
and Republicanism, or the future’.95 Louis-Napoleon, in the eyes of his American admirers, 
showed how successful governments avoided the dangerous excesses of centralization of 
power in both mobs and monarchs. Like more mainstream conservatives who turned to 
Louis Philippe as an example of a modernizing government, they believed progress and 
modernisation were possible under a less democratic form of government.  
A surprising number of conservatives, despite often criticising Louis-Napoleon, 
defended the Second Empire as a government that maintained authority against the 
centralizing tendencies of the masses. When forced to choose between the centralization of 
law-enforcing authority in the Paris mob or the French emperor, they were often happy to 
choose Louis-Napoleon as, at the very least, the lesser of two evils. Two Ohio Whig papers, 
for instance, accepted that France had a choice only between democracy and barricades or 
the Empire and peace, and wisely opted for the latter. 96 But other conservative voices, 
including the New York Herald, contrasted the French people’s assumed predisposition 
towards violence with Louis-Napoleon’s supposed statesmanship, and argued that the latter 
could hold together a frail government in a turbulent society. 97  Given the people’s 
demonstrable unfitness to rule, the imperial regime’s ability to enforce its will over France 
from the capital seemed like its greatest asset. In this light, the Emperor’s military rule was 
merely a ‘vindication of the authority’ of the state; the restoration of, a ‘firm government’ 
prevented ‘chaos’, ‘anarchy’ and ‘an explosion’ of violence.98 He would lead a ‘triumphant 
vindication of the authority of the government’ and a ‘vigorous execution of law’, and 
demonstrate that the French people were ‘safe and tranquil only under the reign of strong 
government’.99 Conservatives’ fear of centralizing power in the people led them to look 
sympathetically on strong government shielded from direct democratic control.  The power 
relationships that they pejoratively described as a centralization of state power in one man 
could, when necessary conditions dictated, seem like a necessary concentration of law-
enforcing power in the state. As much as they decried Louis-Napoleon’s centralization of 
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control over the apparatus of the government, these criticisms sometimes melted away when 
the alternative seemed like a centralization of power in the hands of a violent overbearing 
democracy that they associated with threats to conservative rule at home.   
These conservatives therefore supported a process of centralization, albeit a different 
one to that which they claimed to oppose in Paris. For all their talk of decentralization, many 
in practice seemed comfortable with concentrating authority in the hands of propertied 
elites. Despite editor James Gordon Bennett’s rabid Anglophobia, the Herald, like other 
conservative voices, used the British government and the July Monarchy as examples of how 
dividing control over state power could allow a strong government to avoid a dangerous 
centralization of power. Favourable comparisons to British ‘parliamentary constitutional 
liberty’ and the idea of a ‘legitimate monarchy with liberal institutions’ suggested that, in 
contrast to the Second Empire and Second Republic, the July Monarchy institutionalised 
control over state power into independent constitutional monarchs, heredity legislatures, 
and limited electorates.100 Even politicians who faulted Louis Philippe for not extending the 
right to vote defended his regime as ‘a triumph of republican principles’ because he had 
granted a constitution that restricted monarchical power and created a deliberative 
legislature.101 Instead of having control over state power vested in one man or the unchecked 
will of the people, conservatives supported institutionalising power in a system of supposedly 
balanced institutions that might ensure that a newly centralized state would not use 
centralized power to despotic ends. Constitutional monarchy and property qualifications for 
suffrage showed to conservatives that it was possible to have a strong central government 
capable of enforcing its will on wayward states, cities, and citizens. Where most Americans 
had celebrated the overthrow of the monarchy as a triumph of republicanism, these 
conservatives argued that Louis Philippe was the true republican, defending the French state 
against the centralizing tendencies of unrestrained democracy.  
Monarchy appealed to these Americans because they hoped to centralize power in 
legal institutions. The Philadelphia North American, which only supported French 
republicanism when it looked like the republic they wanted to build in America, rejected 
popular violence even as a counterrevolution against Louis-Napoleon’s coup d’état, and 
instead praised judges who symbolically impeached Louis-Napoleon – even though their 
actions had no writ on the streets that the dictator’s soldiers patrolled. 102 The similarly 
conservative Courier and Enquirer in New York urged the French to reject Louis-Napoleon’s 
dictatorship not at the barricades but instead through abstaining from the referenda and 
elections that he used to legitimise his rule. 103 Even in opposition to Louis-Napoleon’s 
centralization of control over the French government, conservatives expected the people to 
avoid direct action themselves to defend the republic, and to allow political elites to 
symbolically resist centralization in the legal institutions of government. In their search for 
order they questioned the Lockean right to revolt against tyranny to prevent centralizations 
of power. Even to defend their own liberties, conservatives believed that the people had no 
legitimate power independent of their government.  
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Conservatives instead defined decentralization as sharing power in institutions 
rather than her people. The New York Herald’s criticism of the local officeholders who 
personally swore allegiance to Louis-Napoleon reflects this conservative understanding that 
republican institutions rather than the people were the rightful guardians against 
centralization.104 Local government was, after all, very important to Americans, who saw it 
as a foundation of freedom.105 An enduring assumption that propertied great men in legal 
institutions were the best trustees of government authority perhaps explains why 
conservatives defended and obsessed over the actions of elite statesmen in France. Many 
writers defended republicans like Louis Cavaignac, the dictator who suppressed the socialist 
uprising in June 1848 and then relinquished his power.106 Supporters argued that there was 
a ‘moderate republicanism’ in France represented by ‘leading men’ and ‘influential men’ of 
his following. This ‘conservatism’ would ‘save that interesting country, from the encroaches 
of despotism, or the deluge of Anarchy.’107 Describing Louis Philippe as a ‘man of peace’ 
too gave the King of the French the appearance of a legitimate leader who had resisted using 
centralized violent power. 108  Building a genuine republic meant embracing the guiding 
vision of elites who were eager to restrain centralizing tendencies. Conversely, the officials 
and bureaucrats of the Second Empire had ‘little weight of personal character’, as they had 
failed to check the power of the French Emperor.109 Contrasting republican statesmen to 
apologists for ‘despotism’ and ‘anarchy’ endowed them with legitimacy. American 
commentators created an image of reasonable, rational elite men who exercised state power 
without allowing the people or one man from becoming a single centralized source of state 
power over the entire republic. Unsurprisingly conservative elites believed that only they 
were fit to hold power in a republic and prevent democracy and dictatorship – and this 
assumption would come to influence state building within a United States that had its own 
problems with order. 
Closely linked to reasserting the leading role of political institutions over the will of 
the people was restoring government by the best men. Criticism of Louis-Napoleon’s 
supposed attacks on French elites speaks to this conservative assumption that elites, rather 
than the people, were bet placed to hold power without centralization. As the Whig Review 
put it, ‘the seizure and imprisonment of the statesmen and great lawyers of France’, and not 
the suppression of the popular voice, allowed Louis-Napoleon to monopolise power, as they 
were ‘the sole obstacles in the way of despotism, the only voices and arms able to disturb 
and disconcert it’. 110 However, they were by no means the only newspaper to believe that 
the arrest of France’s ‘gentlemen’, ‘public men’, and ‘most respectable citizens’ of Paris and 
the rest of France allowed Louis-Napoleon to maintain power. 111  Belief that a smaller 
number of propertied, educated, and officeholding citizens also appeared in the Philadelphia 
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North American, when it pointed to the censorship of French academics as an important part 
of Louis-Napoleon’s dictatorship.112 It seemed far more important to American conservative 
journals that French elites had been deprived of power than that the people no longer had a 
leading role in the in the government of the republic and empire. Paradoxically, they could 
use the same reasoning to defend the Second Empire too. According to the New York Herald, 
‘the men of commerce and trade, who care nothing for political theories and religious 
opinions’ would ‘unite, and support the military government’ in place of the ‘violent’ French 
republicans. 113  Ultimately, such conservatives suggested that limits on the political 
autonomy of the people were less troubling than the limited power of institutions and elites. 
The fact that conservatives had redefined unfit voters as the progenitors of 
centralization allowed them to present their own process of centralization as sharing power. 
For example, the American Whig Review and Sidney George Fisher both extolled the value of 
dividing power among France’s nobility as a way to avoid the supposed centralization of 
power in the people at Paris. As the Whig Review put it, ‘If France were divided into many 
sovereignties, as in feudal times, and these sovereignties represented as peers in a house of 
assembly, authority might remain in the people of the provinces’.114 Such a proposal, which 
resembled the design for an upper class, indirectly elected Senate, might have guaranteed 
that no individual had access to the entire state apparatus and that the propertyless urban 
electorate did not have a monopoly on power. However, despite clothing this proposal in 
the language of sharing power by suggesting that they were avoiding a geographic 
concentration of power in Paris, they nonetheless centralized power as they hoped to hand 
control over the state to a small number of landed elites – the same people who stood to lose 
the most should the people gained control of powerful government conservatives desired to 
keep order on the streets of large cities. Conservatives, then, were more than capable of using 
a seemingly democratic language of modernisation, strong government, and opposition to 
centralization for rather more proscriptive ends.  
Louis-Napoleon’s few American apologists used this contest between popular and 
elite centralization of control over state power to suggest that the Second Empire could too 
serve as an example of republican government in comparison to the centralization of 
government in one man or one mob. Where the Second French Republic relied on ‘the prop 
of one hundred thousand bayonets’ to maintain support, an enthusiastic correspondent to 
the National Intelligencer claimed, Louis-Napoleon governed through normal republican 
statesmanship and a restraining system of public institutions. 115 Similarly, in contrast to 
absolute monarchs who ‘blotted out’ and ‘crushed’ popular rights, defenders gave the 
impression that Louis-Napoleon, by comparison, looked like a legitimate constitutional 
monarch. By reading his rule as a mere ‘execution of law’ designed to suppress public 
violence, conservatives sometimes implied that Louis-Napoleon supported, rather than 
subverted, legal institutions.116  
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Debating centralizing political power in a smaller number of political institutions 
and propertied elites in France also left conservatives considering the need for such a 
centralization at home. When arguing against American support for European 
republicanism, some conservatives recognised that supporting what appeared to them as 
dangerous radical democracies abroad could set a dangerous precedent for a centralization 
of power in the people at home. In cautioning against embracing the cause of the Second 
Republic or Kossuth in Hungary, Francis Lieber, John Bell117 and the National Intelligencer 
claimed a responsible course of action at home would be for the Union to remain an example 
of a polity that divided sovereignty among legal institutions and avoided the concentration 
of political authority in the masses.118 Using the same language they would later use to argue 
that abolitionists threatened the integrity of government the Boston Courier warned that the 
‘agitator’ Kossuth would bring the same chaos to the United States as Louis-Napoleon and 
the Paris Mob had brought to France.119 The threats that conservatives used centralization 
to delegitimise existed on both sides of the Atlantic, and that the USA too needed a 
conservative programme of centralization too. Lieber himself quoted heavily from Daniel 
Webster on the importance of separation of powers among state institutions, warning that a 
‘wide-based’ democracy could lead to a despotic ‘unity of power’ in the United States.120 
Both John Bell and The National Intelligencer argued that the French did not subscribe to 
genuine American republicanism based on ‘the schools of antiquity’, and followed instead 
this dangerous path of an ‘overzealous democracy’.121 The Union should not be diverted 
from the course conservatives had defined for it. 
Louis-Napoleon’s supposed ability to ensure that political authority rested in public 
institutions and great statesmen rather than city mobs and demagogues who courted them 
offered conservatives timely lessons for the United States. Even passing sympathy for Louis-
Napoleon suggested the antidemocratic tendencies of some conservatives. The Herald, for 
example, regretted that the Union had no Louis-Napoleon to abolish the ‘agitating’ 
proslavery Senators who were already threatening the truce established by the Compromise 
of 1850.122 Its wish for imperial intervention was almost certainly a rhetorical exaggeration, 
but it indicated conservative fears that political debate challenged the power of America’s 
public institution to hold the Union together. In opposing northern abolitionists and 
southern disunionists in 1850 and 1860, supporters of Union and Constitutional Union 
parties would draw on these ideas to justify strengthening the power of the federal 
government and shielding its independence from popular politics. Other commentators that 
worried about the debilitating impact of democracy on federal power, like conservative 
Whig journals the North American and the Courier and Enquirer, suggested that America could 
learn from Louis-Napoleon’s ‘firm’ style of ‘strong government’ as it showed how a 
government unburdened with electoral concerns was free to invest in infrastructure and 
commercial growth. This seemed a stark contrast to Jacksonian Democracy, which to them 
had stalled internal improvements and debased public life. 123 It is improbable that such 
voices wanted a real Emperor for the United States. However, Louis-Napoleon’s 
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government did give conservatives the opportunity to think through their own desire for 
stronger government at home – and they saw a real opportunity to reorient power away from 
the people and back towards a government less concerned with popular opinion.  
Claiming that the people were unfit to hold power without centralization also 
allowed them to argue instead that propertied citizens were better placed to hold power. By 
no means all Americans accepted the quasi-democratic polity they had inherited from 
Jackson, let alone the expectation that the American government should naturally 
democratise over time to prevent the country from falling into the hands of despotism. Both 
the Whig Review and Sidney George Fisher openly admitted that they believed that 
propertied citizens – the sort who would be most likely and able to participate in the 
institutions and offices they believed should hold sovereignty in a republic – were best placed 
to resist the centralization of political authority into dictators and demagogues. Propertied 
elites were the only ‘individuals capable of understanding and foreseeing danger and of using 
proper means to meet it’ as land gave ‘valor’ and ‘influence’.124 In other words, rather than 
seeing the capacity to participate as citizens as something inherent to white men – let alone 
African-Americans and women – these conservatives believed property gave the individual 
agency to participate in political life. Fisher in particular yearned for an aristocracy in the 
United States, proudly boasting the Philadelphia had what he thought of as a true aristocracy 
that gave the city far more prestige and influence than the democracy of New York City.125 
He placed the availability of land and property in the West and South alongside the 
‘traditions’ of England as ‘defences as yet to retard the course of democracy,’ but worried 
that before long, the U.S. too would succumb to the fate of prior republics and descend into 
the tyranny of either the mob and an American Bonaparte.126 The aim of mixed government 
was to keep power in the hands of those with the supposed power to resist democratic and 
authoritarian centralization – an American aristocracy of propertied elites and establishment 
political insiders. Alongside their plan to build a stronger, more centralised state capable of 
maintaining law and order, they imagined a process of centralization of political authority 
in fewer and fewer hands. 
Many conservatives still believed that property ownership was the best benchmark 
to prove voters’ fitness to hold power in their republic. Assumptions that men had to hold 
property to be good citizens had a long pedigree in the United States.  The eighteenth-century 
political thinkers from whom many Americans claimed to draw inspiration had often 
claimed that only property gave individuals the necessary independence to vote freely. This 
was, after all, an era without a secret ballot. From the Revolution onwards, fears persisted 
that enfranchising unpropertied citizens would lead to their votes becoming under the 
control of devious employers, artful demagogues, or militaristic officeholders. 127 In the age 
of the second party system, some conservative Whigs still believed that unelected and 
undemocratic political bodies gave landed property the opportunity to steer the polity 
between anarchy and despotism – and veto any burgeoning democratic radicalism and 
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attacks on property. 128  However, even Jacksonian Democrats had claimed that Whig 
support for banks and paper money undermined a working-class ownership society 
necessary to maintain a broad-based republican government. They, too, believed the 
political power would follow the distribution of property among white male citizens. 129 
Conservative support for government by the propertied fitted into this assumption that 
landed wealth, ranging from large estates to smaller independent farms, enabled citizenship 
in a republican polity. 
For all their warnings against centralization, conservatives were in practice avid 
centralizers. France gave them the opportunity to think about the tools they could use to 
reinforce the power of government over the people and put government back into fewer 
hands. In the context of their own experiences of urban disorder and challenges to the 
integrity of the union, conservatives lauded those – including Louis-Napoleon – who they 
believed could reassert the power of the government over the multitude. In addition to 
centralizing violent authority in the state at the expense of the people, they often supported 
centralizing control over state institutions from the people to a smaller group of propertied 
elites. Comparisons between France and the United States further suggested that when 
conservatives discussed France, they were thinking of state-building in the United States too. 
In America as much as France, conservatives seemed happy to embrace less democratic 
models of government to centre power in their own hands. Conservatives therefore warned 
against allowing the people to centralize power not because they opposed strong, decisive, 
or powerful government, but simply because they opposed giving the people too much 
control over government power. Rather than looking back to an imagined stateless agrarian 
past, conservatives seemed to believe that progress meant developing a stronger government 
to combat the threat of disorder that grew as their economy industrialised and urbanised. 
1848 might have proven to conservatives the dangers of continually allowing the people in 
a democracy to claim more power over government, but, in the context of class conflict, 
sectional divides, and urban violence, it also gave timely lessons in how they could meet this 
growing popular challenge. 
Conclusion 
The transformation from the Second Republic to the Second Empire gave Whig and 
Democratic conservatives the opportunity to think about the long-term evolution of 
government in the New World as well as in Europe. Almost all Americans saw Louis-
Napoleon’s regime as an example of a dangerous centralization of power, for they assumed 
he had absolute control over all the institutions of government and, could apply authority 
from his office in Paris over the entire empire. A number of observers, though, ranging from 
the New York Herald and Maurice Richter in the Democratic Party to the Whig Philadelphia 
North American, National Intelligencer, and diarist Sidney George Fisher, used France to warn 
that the people at the barricades and at the ballot box could be the progenitors of dangerous 
centralization. They employed Louis-Napoleon’s accession to show how democratisation 
and the growth of an unfit, unpropertied, and often immigrant electorate threatened to 
weaken republican government and challenge elites’ hold on political authority. Defining 
the people as the greatest centralizing threat in Europe and even America allowed them to 
justify a centralizing programme of their own, intended in part to prevent the consequences 
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of the democratisation they opposed. France gave them an experiment from abroad of how 
a republican polity could enforce order. These conservatives, although they were sometimes 
influenced by the likes of Edmund Burke, had no intention of returning to an imagined 
eighteenth-century agrarian republic, and instead sought their own modernisation suitable 
for the challenges of the nineteenth century. The 1848 Revolutions and the reaction that 
followed therefore happened at a pivotal moment, as American conservatives weighed up 
warnings from the revolutionary past against the need for state strengthening to meet the 
challenges posed by social and sectional conflict. Napoleon III presented a conflicting figure 
as someone who could be condemned for destroying a republic, assailed as the head of a 
mob, yet sometimes admired by conservatives for his apparent improvements to an unstable 
French state.  
Like most Americans, conservatives tended to see Louis-Napoleon’s authoritarian 
republic between 1851 and 1852 as the antithesis of republican government. While 
centralization was a useful piece of political propaganda to tarnish opponents with, 
American citizens also used it to describe changing power relationships, with a particular 
emphasis on the decline and fall of republics. This idea of a process of political centralization 
over time – of power’s tendency to consolidate without checks – was an important part of 
American political science in the period. They described two aspects of his government as 
‘centralized’ to justify describing him as a monarch, usurper, or traitor to the Second French 
Republic. First, they argued that he had monopolised control over state authority, as he 
appeared to have unlimited and unchecked control over the state apparatus. He had 
‘centralized’ decision-making power inwards from the people and institutions of the French 
government to his own office. Second, the French government in Paris, which Louis-
Napoleon had complete control over, could wield vast and violent power from Paris over 
the rest of the country. France was also ‘centralized’ in the sense that a single source could 
compel the republic to obey its decrees. These two forms of centralization – the first 
institutional, the second, geographic – appeared regularly in conservative thought in the 
1850s, where they informed responses to economic development, urban government, and 
the sectional crisis. 
Louis-Napoleon’s demonstration of the dangers of centralized government was 
important to conservatives, but it was far less important to them than the circumstances in 
which he was able to assume centralized power. Conservatives situated Louis-Napoleon’s 
centralization in France within a wider problem of democratisation. When doing so, they 
borrowed from an older republican fear that mob violence better defined democracy than 
free elections held in a society that respected human rights. And just as a dictator like the 
French emperor could control the political institutions of the republic and enforce his will 
upon all of France, the Paris Mob too could become a democratic source of centralized 
power in a republic. The Second Republic, conservatives argued, had failed because the 
French people had embraced the same centralization as their imperial successor. In 
comparison to an idealised American tradition of respect for the rule of law and protection 
from majority tyranny, the Parisian crowd had supposedly usurped power that rightfully 
belonged to the French state and made themselves a centralized source of power within the 
republic. These conservatives therefore used the descent from republic to empire to define 
the process of power concentrating in the people as a grave centralizing threat. This 
redefinition of a pejorative term was vital to how conservatives sought to restore deference 
at home and legitimise a centralization of their own. Defining centralized forms of 
government in France allowed conservatives to experiment with new – and older – ways to 
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limit democracy and build a strong government capable of withstanding the pressures of the 
mid-nineteenth century. 
French centralization concerned these American conservatives because they tied it 
to urban disorder and political radicalism at home. The Second Republic and Second Empire 
came at a point when conservatives themselves felt an acute loss of political authority. Urban 
rioting, challenges from northern abolitionists and southern slaveholders to the integrity of 
the Union, and the influence of Jacksonian democracy, suggested to conservatives that 
America also faced the threat of a centralization of power in the people. Rather than seeing 
these issues as isolated phenomena, conservatives related them back to the underlying issue 
of the power relationships between the people and the state. The claims of these seemingly 
unrelated movements that challenged existing legal authority suggested to these 
conservatives that democracy, such as it existed in midcentury America, might allow the 
people to claim far more control than conservatives were prepared to allocate to them. After 
all, some of these movements themselves openly claimed inspiration from the Revolutions 
of 1848 in Europe.130 Contrasting French democratic centralization to federated American 
republicanism allowed conservative sceptics of democracy to promote a different political 
culture at home. American citizens, they argued, ought to defer to the decision-making 
power of legitimate institutions and refrain from asserting authority in public space. 
To avoid the threat of democratic centralization, conservatives planned a 
centralization of their own, as they sought to keep political decision-making in the hands of 
fewer institutions and men of property independent of the popular will. Far from believing 
that they needed to look backwards to the agrarian early republic, conservatives often argued 
that their government needed to consolidate powers over time to maintain its authority over 
a growing empire. France allowed them to think about tools that they might use to 
concentrate the power in an elite-directed state rather than the people themselves. Rather 
than seeing monarchy, hereditary aristocracy, and restricted suffrage as relics of the past, 
some conservatives found these useful ways to consider what a centralization of power might 
look like on conservative terms. Rejecting the idea that progress meant democratisation, 
conservatives did not always see these forms of government as inherently regressive, but 
rather argued they offered a closer model for a republic to follow than direct popular control.  
While the ideal of a separation of powers, a staple of republican theory, might seem like a 
democratic language of power-sharing, in the hands of conservatives it often meant dividing 
power among elites, officeholders, and institutions. It is improbable that many of these 
figures wanted a European-style aristocracy in America or a constitutional monarchy – the 
few who did, like the Philadelphian Sidney George Fisher, were an exception – but their 
critiques of American voters suggested that they were far more comfortable with the idea of 
limiting government to men of property. Where democracy weakened government, invited 
mob violence, and ultimately led to the rise of demagogic leaders like Louis-Napoleon, a 
more insulated government would have the necessary strength and legitimacy to command 
respect for the law. 
Conservatives were therefore not just anachronistically opposing the social and 
political changes of the nineteenth century in nostalgic terms. Like their liberal opponents, 
they believed that government needed to change over time, only they did not believe that 
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this required democratisation. It was not opposition to growing concentrations of state 
power over time or a desire to return to the agrarian polity of the eighteenth century that 
made many conservatives wary of the Second Republic and Jacksonian democracy; instead 
it was a belief that centralization should take place on their terms. Conservatives, then, used 
France to think about a conservative path to modernity. 
The conservative reaction to Louis-Napoleon’s coup d’état shows how Americans 
used events in Europe to contest the nature of the post-Jackson polity. The midcentury 
United States, as historians writing in the transnational tradition have shown, was not 
simply an inward-looking nation comfortable that republicanism had set it apart from 
reactionary Europe, and more interested in its own domestic conflicts than foreign affairs. 
Despite their domestic problems, Americans still found time to think about government and 
politics in Europe. Situating themselves in a transatlantic context alongside European 
revolutionary republicans, constitutional monarchs, and absolutist empires helped 
conservatives find new ways to think about domestic politics. That would have implications 
for their approach to economic transformation, urban disorder, and sectional politics. 
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Chapter 2: Centralization and Geography: Railroads, 
Tariffs, and Cities  
Introduction 
Conservatives who used ‘centralization’ to understand power relationships between the 
people and institutions also used the term to describe power relationships between places. 
Conservative critiques of the Second Republic and Second Empire often hinted at opposition 
to the concentration of economic and political authority inwards from the nation to the 
capital, and of Paris’s ability to project power outwards over France. As the New York Herald 
put it, 
 
In France, the learning, the genius, the intellect, and the power, if not the 
wealth, are concentrated in Paris; and hence, whatever may be the change 
or modification of government, it originated, carried out, and centralized in 
the capital. In other words, Paris rules France, and France yields willing 
obedience.1  
 
Such centralization had mixed results. On one hand, the Herald noted, railroads, 
improvements, and capital allowed New York to rival the great imperial cities of the Old 
World. But it also issued a sobering warning: that this centralization could lead to ‘insanity’, 
‘disgust’, and ‘gambling’.2  
As well as referring to power relationships between the people and institutions, 
centralization had a geographic meaning, and could refer to power relationships between 
places too. Conservatives, like many other Americans, believed that industrialisation, 
commercial growth, and transportation created and altered power relationships between 
cities and surrounding country. Centralization as a process helped them conceptualise these 
changing power relationships as the American economy grew. Using centralization as a 
political weapon helped conservatives in different cities delegitimise these changes when 
they benefited their commercial rivals. But the same conservatives who warned against 
centralization in New York or London were no less keen to embrace this process for 
themselves. They shared an assumption that centralization brought prosperity, but rather 
than referring to their ambitions using this preoperative term, they tried to justify it as a 
defensive response to their neighbours’ hostile intentions. Moreover, centralized economic 
geography had political consequences, and conservatives engaged in a variety of state-
building responses to give themselves the authority to ensure that economic geography 
served their own interests. Responding to hostile centralizations therefore served as a pretext 
to strengthen government, assert the political preeminence of their own city, and, drawing 
on similar arguments to those used against France, set limits to popular government. 
The geographic connotations of centralization – of one nation, region, or city 
concentrating power at the expense of an increasingly dependent periphery – were 
particularly useful for conservatives when describing the changing shape of a U.S. economy 
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in the process of being remoulded by railroads and steamships. Conservatives employed 
centralization to resist the consolidating tendencies of the era. Philadelphians, for example, 
warned against ‘centralization’ in New York yet desired it for themselves.3 Baltimoreans 
talked about a ‘Trade League of the Chesapeake’ to combat the centralizing tendencies of 
New York, the ‘monopolist of all commerce’.4 Conservative Bostonians hoped that railroads 
would redirect trade tor Boston that the Erie Canal had made ‘tributary’ to Manhattan.5 
Political economist Henry Carey – a key figure in this chapter – constantly warned against 
‘centralization’ in his battles against railroad monopolies and international free trade, which 
he called a ‘commercial centralization‘ that amounted to ‘the worst of all the forms of 
tyranny that the ingenuity of man has ever yet devised’.6 Just as they did in France, these 
conservatives also used an anti-monopoly language to defend their own interest in 
centralization. 
These examples also suggest that conservatives warned against rival centralizations 
to legitimise their own alternative programme of modernisation and state-building against 
those of mercantile rivals in other cities and workers and artisans in their own cities. In 
response to the supposed threat of centralization in imperial cities, they pushed to centralize 
power in their own locales, albeit on a smaller scale they could package as sharing power. 
To realise these ambitions, conservatives needed the likes of charters, regulations, and 
subsidies, which in turn required political sanction. Centralization was therefore an 
important tool for conservatives who believed that their own prosperity required 
redistributing political and economic power away from popular control or remote 
metropolises. Centralization was therefore useful to conservatives because it allowed them 
to legitimise their own attempts to establish economic power over hinterland trade and urban 
workers. Warning against the supposedly centralizing tendencies of other cities allowed 
them to justify strengthening their control over their city’s surrounding territory as a 
defensive move. Criticising centralization at the hands of another city therefore had much 
to do with building power relationships outwards over their own surrounding suburbs, 
counties, and states.  
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Industrialisation and new corporate forms of business organisation also served 
conservatives who wanted to shield property and power from democratic control.7 As well 
as helping build power relationships outwards, warning against centralization similarly 
helped conservatives impose power within their own metropolises too. American cities 
experienced internal conflicts between artisans, workers, employers, and propertyowners.8 
Conservatives used centralization to define these conflicts in geographic terms, claiming that 
the most dangerous centralizing threat came not from corporations, interests, and 
institutions within their own city, but from centralizing imperial metropolises. In addition 
to allowing them to impose power over surrounding territory, warning against remote 
centralizations helped conservatives legitimise property relationships and wage labour 
within their own cities. Criticising centralization elsewhere therefore gave these 
conservatives the opportunity to preserve property and impose power closer to home. 
Conservatives’ use of centralization in this way reflected attempts to deflect social 
conflict in their own cities to avoid the kind of battles that became common in the Gilded 
Age.9 Pennsylvanians’ criticism of the supposedly centralizing tendencies of free trade, for 
example, well suited Pennsylvania iron and coal industries vulnerable to international 
competition and Manhattan’s growing mercantile supremacy. Claims that protection 
harmonised tensions between classes could be read as a carefully-constructed marketing tool 
to make industrialisation palatable.10 Conservatives’ arguments that a horizontal process of 
geographic centralization could explain rising inequality helped them deflect attention from 
the vertical redistribution of power taking place in their factories and workshops. Concerns 
about centralization of power in remote cities thus had much to do with managing political 
and economic challenges in their own urban centres, by showing, in their opinion, that real 
threats to prosperity lay far away, rather than close at hand. 
Although this chapter emphasises the modernising vision of conservatives, they did 
not necessarily want to create the national market, hierarchical class structure, and corporate 
capitalism we associate with the Gilded Age. The antebellum era was one of 
experimentation in political economy and forms of state authority. Horace Greeley, editor 
of the Tribune in New York, flirted with socialism.11 Some urban workers challenged the 
slow substitution of wage labour – and the dependence it engendered – for artisanal 
autonomy or craft unionism.12 Slaveholders and abolitionists clashed on the merits of free 
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labor and slavery as economic systems and their ability to satisfy commercial growth.13 
Conservatives were also experimenting in political economy. They used a language of 
opposition to centralization – and their own local centralizing schemes – to promote their 
own vision of modernisation, one that accepted industrialisation, urbanisation, and new 
technology, but also reflected their concerns about the division of property, the impact of 
democratisation over time, and the consolidation of a national market. Seeing centralization 
as a geographic process that created core and dependent regions allowed conservatives to 
articulate a modernising vision and advocate their own economic interests within a 
republican political economy seemingly hostile to concentrations of economic power. 
The Process of Economic Centralization in Midcentury America 
Conservatives, like many other Americans, used centralization to describe economic 
changes underway in midcentury United States. The period saw substantial technological 
and economic expansion in terms of infrastructure, trade, and capital. This meant that more 
people over wider territory came under the influence of institutions like markets, railroads, 
and banks that made cities their seat. Both contemporaries and historians described and 
understood these changes as a centralization as ties of economic dependency between cities 
and surrounding territory both strengthened and traversed greater distances. And for many 
Americans, this could pose a threat just as much as it could offer prosperity. These changing 
economic power relationships formed a part of conservatives’ agenda as much as political 
authority, and centralization also helped them vie for control over them. 
In the 1850s, the ties of capital and infrastructure between cities and their 
surrounding territories grew substantially. As Chart 5 below shows, the railroad mileage in 
eastern states grew substantially during this period, with New York, Baltimore, and 
Philadelphia developing in particular as major railroad hubs. New York’s access to the west 
through the Hudson and Mohawk river valleys gave it a particular advantage over other 
seaboard cities in accessing western trade.14 Citizens in all these cities, though, hoped that 
their railroads would monopolise trade, carry raw materials from western farms, mines, and 
lumber yards inwards to their eastern city, and create wealth. They envisaged new 
infrastructure carving out a division of labour between a mercantile or manufacturing city 
and a dependant producer hinterland: railroads encouraged the inward concentration (or 
centralization) of labour and capital in growing cities.15  
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On an international scale, British free trade policy in the period helped London 
become the centre of a global trade network.16 New York became a major part of this system, 
as Congress in 1849 subsidised a Liverpool-Manhattan steamship mail route that, in 
practice, strengthened its merchants’ advantage over rivals in other eastern cities.17 New 
York became increasingly important as a centre of trade and banking, with only Boston 
coming close in terms of invested capital and foreign commerce.18 (see also Chart 6 and 
Chart 7 below). This process too came to be called a ‘centralization’, not just by rural 
agrarians, but also by conservatives in other Northeastern cities who saw in this 
transformation a direct challenge to their own prosperity rather than the emergence of a 
modern integrated economy. 
Historians have long conceptualised this period of economic expansion as a 
centralization. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. observed how eastern cities used turnpikes, canals, and 
railroads, to subordinate surrounding territory as far as the South and the West. Economic 
life in far flung corners of the Union came to hinge on remote stock exchanges, commodity 
markets, and private corporations. Capitalists and politicians in different cities therefore 
employed new infrastructure to monopolise the material wealth of surrounding territory, 
expanding their spheres of influence outwards and centralizing inwards the material wealth 
of their surrounding hinterlands.19  More recent scholarship has suggested how antebellum 
corporations, cities, and states competed to expand their colonial spheres of influence. Such 
competition meant that the commercial growth of major cities did not necessarily result in 
the creation of an integrated national market. On a local and international level, internal 
improvements and trade policy had a protectionist or mercantilist element, as local elites 
attempted to prevent other cities from accessing their own claimed geographic markets.20 
Centralization has therefore helped historians describe how midcentury cities came to 
dominate American economic geography both on a local and a national scale, as trade and 
railroad networks fanning out from growing metropolitan cores divided the eastern United 
States into (sometimes overlapping) economic empires, each characterised by a major city 
and a tributary hinterland.  
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Chart 5: Growth of Railroad Networks in Selected Northeastern States, 1845-1859. 
 
Source: Henry V. Poor, History of the Railroads and Canals of the United States, vol. 1 (New York, 1860). 
Chart 6: Total Tonnage of Vessels Calling at Major 
Eastern Ports, 1856. 
 
New York in particular dominated international 
trade. Source: Report of the Secretary of the Treasury 
Transmitting a Report from the Register of the Treasury of 
the Commerce and Navigation of the United States, vol. 2 
(Washington, 1856), pp. 628-629. 
Chart 7: Proportion of Banking Capital Invested by 
State, 1848-1849 
 
New York leading Northeastern cities. Source: 
Condition of the Banks of the United States: 
Condition of the Banks in the United States: 
Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, May 16, 
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Because urban imperialism required government intervention, the process of 
economic centralization raised similar questions to the political centralization of Louis-
Napoleon in France. Federally supported internal improvements had been dealt a blow by 
Andrew Jackson and James Polk, who vetoed projects they saw as a ‘concentration of 
power’ and ‘consolidation of power’ in 1832 and 1846 respectively. 21 But within states, 
historians have shown, both Whigs and Democrats backed government support for 
infrastructure, and although the Federal government could no longer run banks or improve 
harbours, it retained (as the New York mail monopoly showed) an ability to shape the 
nation’s economic geography. Where power belonged across space as well as between 
institutions came into question. Despite the common claim that geography picked out future 
centres of trade, citizens understood that growth was politically contingent. Whoever 
controlled the levers of state power – the capacity to grant railroad charters, fund internal 
improvements, offer steamship subsidies, and revise tariff schedules – could help determine 
where trade would centralize.22 City boosters demanded state action  to realise nature’s 
promise.23 The question of distributing economic power between cities, counties, and states 
therefore raised concurrent questions about the legitimate extent of government authority 
and who should control it: questions that bore a striking similarity to those asked about 
Louis-Napoleon’s France. 
Contemporaries were fully aware of this economic and political centralization 
unfolding around them, even if they did not always believe its benefits and costs were shared 
equitably. As Illustration 3 below shows, cartographers imagined multiple city-centred 
railroad networks spreading outwards over vast metropolitan hinterlands rather than 
portraying a single national network. Since the Early Republic, many Americans had feared 
the prospect of urban interests dominating their surroundings in such a way.24 Some of these 
sceptics turned to the idea of an agrarian ‘empire of liberty’ as a counterbalance to the 
corrupting power of large cities.25 Surprisingly, though, midcentury Americans in major 
eastern metropolises also drew on republican fears of empire cities in competing with one 
another for economic growth. For example, conservative papers in New York and 
Philadelphia publicly accused each other’s cities of using railroads, government spending, 
and even slanderous whispering campaigns to create a dangerous ‘centralization of 
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commerce’ and make their city an American Paris.26 When Congress proposed moving the 
United States Mint from Philadelphia to Manhattan, the Boston Evening Transcript satirised 
Philadelphian concerns that ‘the country is centralized, to be devoured as all centralized 
countries must be’ as hyperbole, but the fears were real.27 Southerners like George Fitzhugh 
too claimed New York used the telegraph, steamship, and postal service as agents of 
economic ‘centralization’.28 These Americans saw the processes underway in midcentury 
American cities, but rather than believing that they would lead to an integrated economy 
that would work to their benefit, they believed an economy centralizing around their more 
rivals signalled a potential threat. The negative connotations of the term centralization 
therefore made it a useful political weapon with which they could try to delegitimise – and 
even reverse – changes in economic geography. 
But where many Americans saw economic centralization as a threat, others saw it 
as an opportunity. In growing western cities, so-called boosters described the centralizing 
tendencies of rivers and railroads as a source of metropolitan prosperity. They claimed to 
have found the spot on which climate and geography would naturally centralise the trade of 
an entire continent, and urged eastern capitalists to fund the improvements needed to its 
potential. William Gilpin, for example, enthusiastically promoted the tellingly named 
‘Centropolis’ in Independence, Missouri as the destined geographic centre of the American 
economy. 29  To facilitate this materialistic vision of wealth creation, boosters proposed 
turnpike, canal, and railroad connections from such cities outwards, to ensure a growing, 
dependent and monopolised hinterland could ‘pay tribute’ – as they often called it – to their 
metropolises.30 These Americans did not always use the term centralization to describe their 
ideas about urban growth, but they embraced the same process of economic consolidation 
that other Americans condemned. Boosters, then, could embrace centralization when it was 
in their own economic interest to do so.  
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Illustration 3: Principal Cities of the United States 
 
Map showing how many Americans observed growing railways as a set of discrete networks each 
spreading outwards from an individual major metropolitan centre. Source: Principal Cities of the 
United States (Washington, 1850), The New York Public Library, 
http://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/510d47df-f4e4-a3d9-e040-e00a18064a99 [Accessed May 
21, 2016]. 
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Unsurprisingly, perhaps, these supporters of economic centralization also embraced 
stronger government as a way to build the infrastructure required to expand their 
hinterlands.31 This marked one part of a wider project of state-building around midcentury. 
In the antebellum period, Americans often strengthened city and state governments, seeing 
such action at the local level as a palatable alternative to European-style centralized 
regimes. 32  City consolidations and police reform movements remade municipal 
governments.33 Vigilance Committees provided extra-legal authority in San Francisco and 
New Orleans.34 The question of slavery also involved the organisation and powers of new 
states and territories in the west. 35  The same conservatives who warned against 
agglomerations of economic power also hinted that they wanted to experiment with now 
forms of government capable of intervening in the national or local economy. These often 
involved preventing political power draining away into remote capitals. Philadelphian 
political economist Henry Carey, for example, cautioned against treaties and unions with 
the UK that he claimed pooled national sovereignty and allowed the domination of London 
as a global centralized city.36 But his proposals for tariffs, conversely, showed his support for 
a powerful national government. On a local level, the Baltimore American in 1854 proposed 
that cities in Maryland and Virginia establish their own publicly owned and subsidised 
steamship line to rival those in Manhattan, an extension of government’s role in economic 
life designed to ward off a larger centralization of power.37 This came in addition to the city’s 
own investment in the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. 38  Philadelphians who supported 
strengthening the city government argued that this too would give them the political 
authority to promote their city as the preeminent metropolis of the United States.39 These 
examples suggest how Americans in major cities linked the question of changing economic 
geography to the issue of who controlled government power and how strong it needed to be. 
The mid-century American economy therefore developed in a way that both 
historians and contemporaries perceived as centralized. Railroads and other improvements 
in transportation spreading outwards from American cities allowed cities to grow rapidly in 
population, dictate the terms of trade with surrounding regions, and become the seats of ever 
more powerful corporations. And to achieve this, politicians, investors, and propertyowners 
relied on government power, which despite the supposed dominance of Jacksonian laissez 
faire, allowed the state to intervene in the economy at the local level in particular. 
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Importantly, though, they framed this competition not as one between classes, interests, or 
groups within cities but as a competition between places, each of which had a unitary interest 
in benefiting from the centralization of the American economy and avoiding becoming 
subservient to a more dominant neighbour. Centralization could therefore easily help 
American conservatives understand the geographic power relationships of capital, trade, and 
an expanding economy, as well as those of states, governments, and democracy.  
Conservative Perceptions of Centralization in American Cities 
American conservatives also perceived this centralized economic geography, but this was 
particularly acute in the cities that appeared to lose out to the New York and London for 
transatlantic mercantile trade. In their writing, conservatives routinely warned that other 
cities – and other nations – were dangerous centralizers, impoverishing their annexed 
hinterlands to satisfy their own greed. Two examples from Philadelphia show how 
conservatives used the term to describe and delegitimise these economic processes. Political 
economist Henry Carey warned against the supposed centralization of trade in London, 
while other Philadelphians argued that New York’s westward railroad and commercial 
ambitions amounted to a centralization too. Trade networks tended to centralize because 
they spread out from cities and subordinated remote environs to metropolitan cores. In turn, 
these networks seemed to divert trade, capital, and population inwards, accentuating the 
geographic division of wealth between a colonised hinterland and a wealthy city. Like many 
other Americans, conservatives also described – and feared – not just the centralization of 
power in a small number of corporations, interests, or institutions, but a geographic 
centralization of power in one place. 
The language of centralization occurs frequently in economic debates of the 1850s, 
but two examples in particular indicate how some conservatives sought to shape the 
direction of the process at the national and international level. Both are drawn from 
Philadelphia: a city whose industrial base and declining position relative to New York made 
centralization a particularly potent language. Firstly, in his criticisms of free trade, the 
eminent Philadelphian political economist Henry Carey40 used centralization to understand 
the global economy. Carey moved in conservative circles, being friends with the Whig editor 
Morton McMichael, flirting with third party ‘union’ movements that form the basis of the 
final chapter, and considering himself more of a supporter of compromise with slaveholders 
than a radical reformer.41 However, his relentless pursuit of the protective tariff made his 
economic policy seem far more radical, as he pushed a course that he insisted would create 
a healthy, decentralized economy free of colonial ties. International free trade, he warned, 
pried producers and consumers of goods apart, when he believed they should be as close 
together as possible. Where a protected economy would build up local strength through 
exchanges between neighbouring farmers, artisans, and factory owners, free trade tended 
towards the opposite, creating colonial dependency between remote buyers and sellers. Long 
distance ties of trade between the metropole and a colonial unprotected economy, he argued, 
allowed merchants in London to control wealth and labour in the likes of Ireland, India, and 
increasingly the United States. With the metropole centralizing trade and manufacturing, 
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Britain’s economic empire became a mere producer of raw materials, and a dumping ground 
for goods produced in the core. Incapable of building up a diverse, decentralized economy 
of its own, the dependent periphery sank further into poverty, and without the material 
prosperity for republicanism to prosper, would soon descend into despotism. 42  Though 
Carey is usually read as a theorist of national protection, he sometimes scaled down his 
critique of economic centralization to a local level. Thus he had the same concerns about 
the distribution of wealth, capital, and trade within (and across) individual states. Like 
southerners and the residents of American cities who charged New York with centralizing 
designs, Carey presented other cities’ interest in gathering the trade of a local, national, or 
international hinterland as a geographic centralization of power.43  
Secondly, conservatives in Philadelphia also observed the 1853-54 Erie Gauge War, 
which took place as New York and Philadelphia competed to build railroads to the Midwest. 
This struggle centred on the lakeside city of Erie, which lay on a small strip of Pennsylvanian 
territory between the states of Ohio and New York. It also stood along railroad routes 
(whether built or projected) between the West and the two great metropolises of the East 
Coast.44 Until 1853, the Pennsylvania legislature ensured that Erie divided incompatible 
eastern and western railroad networks.45 This state-mandated incompatibility forced goods 
crossing Erie along the railroad to change cars, bringing prosperity to Erieians who benefited 
from the transfer, and giving hope to Philadelphian merchants who wanted to tap the flow 
of goods with a railroad of their own. 46  (See Illustration 4 below.) But in 1853, the 
Pennsylvania legislature allowed the railroads to convert the whole line to Ohio’s standard, 
which enabled trains from the West to run to New York State without having to stop in Erie. 
The move – which probably came about through legislative bribery on the part of 
Manhattan-based interests – denied Erie its income from transhipment and deprived 
Philadelphian railroad builders equal access to western material wealth. 47 (See Illustration 5 
below.) The neglected dispute that followed provides an insight into how concerns over 
economic centralization in a city like New York animated late antebellum economic 
conflict. 
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Illustration 4: Western Railroads as Planned by Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, and Erie 
 
Illustration 5: Western Railroads as Built, 1854 
 
These maps show the railroad network around Erie, PA just before the Erie Gauge War. The 
railroads and the Pennsylvania legislature proposed that the eastern and western railroad networks 
would meet at Erie. This would allow Erie residents to profit from transferring goods betwween 
these networks’ termini, and Philadelphian merchants would have access this merchandise through 
their own railroad. But to reduce costs the railroads decided to build a single Ohio gauge line 
terminating in Buffalo. This would allow trains from the West to run through Erie to Dunkirk and 
Buffalo, leaving merchandise out of reach for Philadelphian merchants reliant on the enforced stop 
at Erie. Erieians responded to this threat by rioting, preventing the conversion of a small portion 
of the line between Erie and the New York state line, preserving an enforced stop there. These 
violent riots and their battles with railroad officials gave the Erie Gauge War its name. 
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Erieians tore up the Lake Shore railroad, preventing the conversion of the through 
route to New York. Only when the federal government intervened and gave the line its 
protection did New York’s railroad companies build the line. 48 Notably, Philadelphia’s 
conservative press supported Erie’s right to fight ‘centralization’, rather than backing the 
rights of private property or the efficiency savings that would have come through compatible 
railroad standards throughout the Northeast. Here they were happy to accept rioting if it 
helped them to establish their own power relationships over western soil. They turned to 
using state power to regulate the use of private property and bolster their defences against 
centralization, not through tariffs, but through public regulation, gauge laws, and state aid 
to railroads, even expropriating and running for themselves parts of the railroad in order to 
prevent New York extending its sphere of interest.49 Conservative Philadelphians and their 
allies described the struggle not as a product of corporate profiteering, regulatory failure, or 
national integration, but as a consequence of Manhattan’s supposed desire for 
‘centralization’: an economic empire that threatened to subsume both Philadelphia and the 
West. 
In such battles, conservatives refashioned common critiques of the economic power 
of corporations, turning them into attacks on nations and cities extending power over 
territory. The Democratic Erie Observer drew on Jacksonian hostility to corporate power in 
comparing the railroad’s colonial ambitions to the Second Bank.50 But Morton McMichael’s 
conservative North American described gauge conflict as an urban dispute between 
Philadelphia and its geographic ‘rivals’: one that Philadelphians of all classes had a common 
interest in fighting.51 The issue here was less corporate power in itself, and more where 
corporate power would tend to centralize. Philadelphians argued that New Yorkers sought 
an ‘unscrupulous monopoly’ over western trade.52 In turn, New Yorkers described Erie and 
its Philadelphian supporters as selfish provincials.53  
Where power lay between cities and nations to conservatives seemed just as 
important as its distribution between institutions. Indeed, addressing one with considering 
the other was futile, Carey implied, for economic dependence on a remote power could 
doom projects for political decentralization. Louis Kossuth, the popular Hungarian 
revolutionary, found substantial support among Americans for his belief in national self-
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determination and opposition to despotic government. 54  Carey, though, cautioned 
Americans against supporting his movement, claiming that Kossuth’s free trade politics – 
whether wittingly or not – supported British centralization.55 London, he argued, would 
soon usurp Hungarian independence, just as New York threatened to monopolise the wealth 
of Erie and Pennsylvania. Like Philadelphian observers of the gauge war, he redefined 
dangerous centralization not just as the vertical power relationship between a centralized 
state and the people but as the horizontal geographic relationship between metropoles and 
their surrounding – in this case global – territory.  
Conservatives recognised that the railroad network developing in the 1850s often 
focused on major cities. They visualised the layout of their railroads as geographically 
centralized, describing them as spreading outwards from big cities rather than forming a 
national polycentric network. (See Illustration 3 above) After all, transport networks had 
only just begun to connect disparate regions into a single national market. 56 When the 
Baltimore American described their hoped-for railroad network fanning from their ‘common 
centre’ across the South, its writers built on a common assumption.  57  Newspapers in 
Philadelphia, Boston, and Newark visualised their own railroads in similar terms.58  This 
was more than local boosterism. The American also described Cincinnati as a ‘centre of a 
great system’ with ‘railroads-moving as radii’ outwards, forming the centre where ‘the trade 
of a vast region is to concentrate itself’.59 Even the American Railroad Journal described the 
‘centralization of railroads’ as of the expansion of monocentric networks, each spreading 
outwards from a single Atlantic city.60  
And far from being a cluster of private corporations acting in a politically neutral 
marketplace, urban-centred railroad networks, conservatives assumed, carried power 
outwards, as New Yorkers' capacity to influence Pennsylvania legislators evidently showed. 
They often described these railroads as agents of a rival city rather than businesses or 
representatives of an emerging national bourgeoisie. Urban historians suggest that 
nineteenth-century American cities had a singular identity, as people often discussed 
‘Philadelphia’ or ‘Baltimore’ interests, as though each had a single common interest rather 
than amounting to a collection of independent interests, identities, and individuals. 61 
Conservatives often described railroads and steamship lines as public goods that satisfied 
their city’s collective public interest  rather than as private investments on behalf of 
capitalists.62 Moreover, when describing railroads, they used the name of the company and 
the name of the city interchangeably, and situated competition between lines and companies 
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for trade in terms of a competition between cities for control over a hinterland. Conservatives 
in Philadelphia and Massachusetts63 recognised that the railroads and canals through Erie 
were ‘a New York road, was built by New York money, and is controlled to suit New York 
interests’. Conservatives therefore described railroads not as private corporations acting in a 
national market but as agents of the cities that they served.64 The logic could be extended 
abroad. Carey linked the construction of internal improvements to the furthering of the 
interests of the metropolitan centre, arguing that Paris controlled public works and licences 
to ensure that provincial towns and cities did not build lines that challenged the capital’s 
supremacy.65 Such reasoning, then, conceptualised private profit making in public terms of 
a mercantilist city exercising power over a hinterland. Railroad corporations seemed less 
like private businesses and more like tools for the city that controlled them to exercise 
colonial control over territories they penetrated.  
Carey applied the same principle that infrastructure carried a power relationship on 
an international scale. While the construction of a Pacific Railroad – agitated from the 1840s 
onwards – would have obvious benefits for Pennsylvania’s iron and locomotive industries, 
and therefore drew considerable booster support in the city, he opposed what he saw as a 
tool to give London ‘commercial power’ over the American west. The supposedly 
‘centrifugal’ nature of trunk lines would only lead to the export of raw materials to the 
United Kingdom, which would profit from draining the wealth of the American hinterland. 
66 He blamed New York’s mercantile firms for allowing London to control the cash crops of 
the South and West and discourage decentralized diversification.67 Carey may have been 
unusual in opposing long distance railroad building, but he shared with many conservatives 
the conviction that Even landownership in Ireland, Turkey, and India, could give London 
power over territory, as ‘the monopoly of land is the centralization of power’.68 The power 
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relationships in international trade therefore did not lie between institutions and people but 
instead lay between places. Commercial interests were not independent of place. Instead, 
they furthered the influence of the metropole over a surrounding colonial hinterland. 
These power relationships over railroad tracks seemingly reduced regions to 
subservience to the city that they served. On an international scale, Henry Carey and the 
Baltimore American criticised London’s ‘centralization’ and ‘monopoly’ of merchant 
shipping, arguing it extended over an economic empire that could subsume the United 
States. 69 Preoccupations with geographic economic power relationships had national as well 
as international implications. Carey described the Camden and Amboy railroad’s termini in 
New Jersey as having a ‘monopoly’ on surrounding land due to the line’s influence.70 Other 
conservatives also applied Carey’s theory to make sense of regional inequality at home and 
abroad. The American Whig Review, for instance, warned that Louis-Napoleon was creating 
a network of railroads centred on Paris to keep the nation dependant on the capital.71 In 
Boston, the conservatives warned that Massachusetts was in danger of becoming ‘provincial’ 
to a centralizing Manhattan. 72  In the minds of these urban conservatives, cities and 
mercantile infrastructure carried power outwards and created a region dependant on the 
central city. Rather than uniting the entire country into a single national market, new trade 
routes seemed to divide the Union into rival spheres of interest, within which the economy 
became more integrated and ‘centralized’.  
Conservatives who saw their cities losing out economically to their larger and more 
successful rivals thus claimed that they were victims of geographic centralization. 
Conservative Philadelphian papers, for example, warned that the extension of New York’s 
railroads into Pennsylvania threatened to drain wealth and power from their city. The North 
American and the Public Ledger situated the Gauge War within this wider fear of urban failure, 
seeing it as an attempt on the part of New York to make Pennsylvanian material wealth 
‘wholly tributary to her own advantage’.73 ‘The first revolution of the engine on the Lake 
Shore places the traveller within the magnetism of Broadway’, the North American warned, 
illustrating its fear of a city pulling wealth inwards through the power of its railroads.74  
Moreover, as centralization happened, the rival city consumed the wealth of the 
periphery. Both the conservative Philadelphia diarist Sidney George Fisher and his 
acquaintance Carey warned that Paris showed the dangers of ‘centralization’ in a 
commercial capital that ‘swallowed up’ wealth and population of a surrounding nation.75 
Carey too argued that the British metropole prevented dependent regions from developing 
their own manufacturing and commerce.76 Locally, at the scale of the city and its immediate 
surroundings, and internationally, at the scale of a colonial metropole and empire, these 
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conservative city residents interpreted economic change in terms of geographic dependency. 
They saw the trade routes spreading outwards from New York and London outwards into 
Pennsylvania and the British Empire and assumed that they were part of a deliberate effort 
to subordinate an economic empire to the interests of colonial metropole. This formed the 
centralization that many Americans, including some conservatives, wanted to avoid.  
Conservatives in cities losing out to New York and London’s growing commercial 
role perceived their economic decline as a dangerous process of economic centralization. 
They vividly described how rival cities extended railroads, steamships, and trade outwards 
over their immediate surroundings and informal empires. Ties of private trade, capital, and 
corporations, rather than just carrying lumber, grain, or passengers, seemed to carry material 
wealth, power and dependency on their central city. These cities, infrastructure, and 
economic development seemed to create spheres of influence distinct from the political 
creations of states, nation, or municipalities, within which these conservatives believed 
larger cities were centralizing wealth. This process could exist locally , as New York 
extended its geographic market south and west, or internationally, as London grew as the 
major mercantile centre of the Atlantic economy under a free trade policy. These perceptions 
of centralization would come to inform how conservatives competed for what they believed 
was the material wealth of western territories, as they used the language and imagery of 
centralization to challenge these developments when larger rivals – notably London and 
Manhattan – appeared to threaten their own prosperity. However, it would also help inform 
how conservatives sought to build their own political institutions and economic power 
relationships within their own cities, regions, and states. 
Economic Development and Political Centralization 
This centralized economic geography, where territory became dependant on the 
infrastructure, markets, and capital of a single city, also seemed to have profound 
consequences on the geographic distribution of formal political power. The infrastructure 
that tended towards centralization required government authority to build. For 
conservatives, economic centralization was therefore seen as both an effect as well as a cause 
of its political counterpart, and tied the question of economic centralization to prevailing 
concerns about state-building, democracy, and strong government. 
Midcentury Americans used ‘empire’ to describe extending political boundaries 
outwards as well as strengthening the ties of political dependence within the polity. 77 
Conservatives drew from this definition of imperialism to understand how cities secured the 
public investment that they needed to expand their hinterland and to caution against a single 
city securing political dominance within the republic.78 They warned in geographic terms of 
political authority concentrating inwards towards big cities like New York and London, as 
imperial metropolises forced their surrounding regions to surrender control and weakened 
their colonised citizens’ fitness for self-rule.  
The links between a centralized economic geography and state power were obvious 
to conservatives. Heirs of the antifederalist tradition cited opposition to ‘consolidation’ to 
warn against national infrastructure programmes that might set a precedent for stronger 
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federal government.79 But while Washington’s role in building internal improvements was 
curtailed in the Jacksonian era, cities continued to turn to government – often on a local 
level – to realise their ambitions.80 The same was true of these conservatives: The Baltimore 
American, for example, demanded the federal government spend money on Baltimore’s 
harbours as it had done for New York and Philadelphia.81 In the 1830s and 1840s, wealthy 
Philadelphians convinced the state government to stop Baltimore railroads penetrating their 
hinterland.82 New York boosters also persuaded Albany lawmakers to prevent the Erie 
Railroad from sending trade to Pennsylvania, New Jersey, or Ohio cities, in a move that 
prefigured the Erie War of 1853-4.83 As well as looking to the state to effectively restraining 
interstate commerce to protect urban markets, conservatives often backed direct funding of  
internal improvements through stock purchases and bonds, which left corporations in 
private hands but financed by public money. Advocates of such projects fully understood 
that programmes to reorganise economic geography relied on state power. In the eyes of 
many city conservatives, then, economic imperialism and big government went hand in 
hand. 
Political and economic centralization seemingly drove each other forward. City 
builders threatened by New York’s expanding hinterland argued that their Manhattan rivals 
had extended corrupt influence over distant areas. Morton McMichael’s Careyite North 
American even argued that New York had corrupted the federal government to get its ‘virtual 
monopoly’ of steamship trade with Europe, threatened the ‘individuality of the states’, and 
conspired to move the national seat to Manhattan, so the whole government could be 
‘tributary to her aggrandizement’.84 However, they were by no means the only Americans 
to attack their rivals as centralizers. Further south, for instance, the Baltimore American 
reported that New York City and Philadelphia were using the federal government to further 
their centralizing designs.85 From the viewpoint of residents of the periphery, big city control 
of state and national governments explained the rise of monocentric railroad and trade 
networks that brought them into the sway of centralized power, and made them subject to 
remote executive authority. The Eagle felt aware of New Yorkers’ ability to outvote Brooklyn 
in any election,86 and blamed this supposed monopolisation of representation in the state 
legislature for its lack of supposed respect for the rights of residents of Brooklyn and Long 
Island.87 Conservatives in such places used centralization to imply that their opponents 
translated economic influence into political power. Centralizing control over governments 
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inwards into big cities allowed them to project state power outwards over its surrounding 
hinterland.  
This conceptualisation of how political power could concentrate in major cities 
resembled criticism of Paris, with urban centralization here becoming a way to explain 
republican failure. Conservatives used political centralization to understand how Paris had 
come to dominate all of France. According to Sidney George Fisher, ‘all power is centralized 
in Paris’.88 His acquaintance Henry Carey too argued that Paris showed the dangers of giving 
a single city too much control over state authority, as it had used that authority to build the 
infrastructure that safeguarded its own dominance.89 Conservatives too often feared that 
France lacked robust local sources of state authority that checked the centralizing tendencies 
of big cities and seats of government. Both Francis Lieber and the Brooklyn Eagle warned that 
French and American constitution-makers needed to divide their cities among ‘many 
sovereignties’, as 'centralization is by its nature corrupting'.90 In place of that commitment 
to a broad geographic distribution of power, French ‘centralism’ meant that Paris 
telegraphed political decision-making outwards from the capital, with little room for input 
from the rest of the nation.91 Seeing centralization as a process tied to outward expansion 
rather than one characterised by the intensification of power within a given space might 
seem paradoxical. Yet this made sense to many conservatives, who believed that cities 
expanded their political reach outwards over geography in order centralize wealth and 
power inwards. Here, indeed, they could apply classical republican lessons to modern 
economic growth, as those reared on this and the course of French republics after 1793 and 
1848 knew that large republics easily fell to a centralized tyranny. 
Such power centralized in one city clashed with the American idea of government 
divided among national, state, and municipal authorities, and led conservatives in New 
York’s periphery to laud local government as a check on consolidationist projects. After all, 
most nineteenth-century Americans interacted with government principally through local 
rather than national administrations, and so threats to the former raised questions about 
dangerous concentrations of power. 92  Accusing rival cities of endangering that balance 
became a useful tactic. Philadelphian conservatives thus warned that Manhattan’s political 
influence threatened the federal system, arguing that New York’s tendency to drain wealth 
from its expanding hinterland would allow it to supplant all the state, county, and city 
governments within its domain.93 Conservative fears about New York therefore married 
concerns about geographic as well as institutional centralized power. Carey, for example, 
turned to British as well as French history, in warning that the abolition of Scottish and Irish 
local governments under the Acts of Union turned independent nations into mere 
‘provinces’ of England, unable to resist the transfer of wealth to London.94 In France, too, 
he insisted, the destruction of local governments led by provincial aristocrats allowed Paris 
to control public works and consolidate its control over the national market.95 Carey then 
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argued that the weakening of local governments transferred power inwards over national 
geography from the hinterland to the metropole. By tying the fate of institutional autonomy 
to changing economic geography, conservatives in cities like Philadelphia could present their 
economic rivals as a centralizing threat to the republic.  
Without political authority distributed geographically between multiple local seats 
of government, big mercantile cities could become states within a state, wielding executive 
authority outwards over the hinterland. Conservatives described cities’ authority over 
surrounding land as a form of governance that transcended state and national government. 
Carey, for example, criticised the New Jersey railroad monopoly both in institutional terms 
as a monopoly that that selects our governors, appoints our judges, dictates our legislation, 
elects our senators in congress, and taxes us’ 96 and in geographic terms as ‘the sources of 
taxation, Camden and Amboy’97 This language moved between criticising both corporations 
and places as the de facto government of the surrounding market. Philadelphians described 
the cities at the centre of a railroad network as having a ‘monopoly’ on surrounding land 
and territory and talked about ‘foreign’ and ‘rival’ corporations jostling for empire.9899 New 
Yorkers too expected that the Pacific railroad would make the West ‘ours’ to the exclusion 
of all other cities.100 In their writings, such figures saw cities as rivals seeking influence 
beyond their borders, using railroads rather than rifles and cannon. Imperialism, it seemed, 
operated at both an international and at a smaller scale as residents of the hinterland 
perceived a small geographic centre seizing control over state authority for itself and 
projecting power outwards over wider surrounding territory.  
This process of economic centralization did not exist in isolation from wider 
concerns about governance. Conservatives – both Whigs and Democrats – commonly 
believed that government institutions could promote economic growth by issuing charters, 
granting subsidies, and creating regulations. Figures like Carey therefore used geography to 
link centralized economic and political power by showing how each shaped the other. To 
reshape economic geography to their own advantage, imperial cities needed control over 
formal political authority. As well as altering the distribution of wealth between cities, states, 
and regions, conservatives therefore referred to a geographic centralization of political 
authority too. Again, conservatives who perceived themselves to be losing out in this process 
used this term pejoratively to delegitimise rival mercantile cities. Opponents upheld the 
virtues of an American federalist tradition that cautioned against consolidating power in a 
single state, city, or body, which also made the threat of power centralized in a single city a 
powerful political weapon Americans could use to warn against the ambitions of their 
competitors. However, this connection many American conservatives made between 
centralizing economic dependency and political authority over space into a single city 
strongly informed their responses to both their economic competitors and wider political 
concerns.    
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Local Centralization as a Defensive Response  
Conservatives on the periphery to New York and London conceptualised centralization as 
a process of wealth and political authority concentrating in a remote city, and used this 
pejorative term as a political weapon to attack their competitors’ mercantile ambitions. 
However, believing that monopolising the material wealth of a wider territory was a path to 
prosperity, albeit at the expense of surrounding settlements, these conservatives were 
themselves centralizers. These conservatives supported a centralization of power on their 
own terms, arguing that local state building – like Carey’s protectionist national government 
– amounted to a relative decentralization of power. They often claimed that a smaller scale 
centralization than their rivals – one at the scale of the township, region, or state as opposed 
to the nation or Atlantic world – would share wealth between multiple cities. Claiming that 
this local response to a larger, dangerous centralization therefore helped these conservatives 
legitimise a different centralization closer to home. In the hands of some conservatives, then, 
opposition to centralization in the 1850s offered a means to extend power over their own 
city, subjects, and hinterland. 
Conservatives often enthusiastically embraced the language of centralization, which 
had seemed such a threat when trained against their opponents. Urban opponents of the 
supposedly centralizing ambitions of remote cities sought economic centralization on their 
own terms. Cities on the Atlantic seaboard had all seen the West as a colonial resource to 
develop the eastern urban economy.101 Merchants in Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Boston 
each invested in railroads to compete with New York’s Erie Canal and Erie Railroad in 
gathering the wealth of the West.102 Conservatives here saw centralized economic geography 
as an opportunity, even a necessity, for their own city, where a network that carried wealth 
over long distances to New York City appeared threatening. When western Massachusetts 
delegates to a state constitutional convention claimed that Boston threatened to concentrate 
wealth and power in the state, George Upton responded that ‘I know, Sir, of no evil which 
has resulted from centralization.’103 Others hoped railroads would gather trade for Boston 
that the Erie Canal made ‘tributary’ to Manhattan.104 The Baltimore American predicted that 
their city would become the ‘common centre’ of a railroad empire running out of Baltimore 
carrying inward the resources of the South from as far as the Pacific.105 McMichael’s North 
American strongly supported the construction of railroads to Pittsburgh and Erie so that ‘our 
commercial metropolis, Philadelphia’ would command a ‘the entire trade (or nearly so) of 
the country, from West to East and East to West, to pay tribute to her.’106 When it came to 
their own cities, then, conservatives embraced this ideal of centralization for themselves, 
believing it would bring them wealth, even as they condemned their opponents’ centralizing 
schemes as a drain of capital. Just as Henry Carey only opposed economic centralization 
when it benefited Philadelphia’s larger mercantile rival cities, these conservatives made it 
clear that they opposed centralization only when it hurt their own cities. 
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Conservatives used the vision of many railroad systems building up different centres 
to give the impression that their designs would spread power across a series of powerful 
cities, but they remained convinced that economic development required centralization in 
some form. Even Carey acknowledged as much. When writing in opposition to the Camden 
and Amboy’s railroad monopoly in New Jersey, Carey had warned that western expansion 
facilitated ‘centralization’, as long distance relationships encouraged dependency on a single 
city. Rejecting this model, Carey proposed that tariffs would create a dense web of self-
sufficient towns, each with their own agricultural hinterland and only minimal contact with 
far flung markets. 107 At a local level, then, Carey therefore sought to replicate the political 
economy of protectionism, erecting geographic (rather than political) barriers to long 
distance trade, within which a town would have power over its surrounding territory to 
direct economic development. Despite claiming to oppose centralization, Carey still 
believed that progress required an economic centralization in which a city extended 
authority over its surrounding market, even if he limited the workings of the process to an 
imagined patchwork of towns, counties, and townships 
Other conservatives tried to legitimise their local centralizing ambitions by 
suggesting that theirs would act as a stimulant – rather than a drain – on an enlarged 
hinterland. City boosters often claimed that their plans for centralization would bring 
prosperity to satellites. 108  Bostonians and Philadelphians argued that building railroad 
networks outward from their cities would prevent larger metropolises – Usually New York 
City – from carving up Massachusetts and Pennsylvania between them. Instead, prosperous 
small towns would grow ‘all over the surface of the state’ and become ‘the great central  
point’, the ‘depot of commerce’ for western counties.109 Conservatives who articulated such 
ideas argued their designs for centralization in the form of railroad building would spread 
wealth and power. Carey, too, distinguished between long-distance railroads that 
concentrated power at the termini and local railroads that encouraged exchange between 
towns across the route.110 Such a polycentric system of railroads and canals, in contrast to 
lines radiating from a trading centre to the hinterland, would allow multiple towns to benefit 
from trade and exchange.111 Rather than imagining a network radiating out from a major 
city, they visualised a decentralized economic geography where multiple towns and cities 
each had their own trade networks carrying wealth to and from a hinterland. Rather than 
opposing centralized economic geography, these conservatives hoped to appropriate a 
smaller portion of it for themselves. 
Conservatives therefore used the threat of centralization to delegitimise long-
distance economic power relationships while legitimising those same power relationships on 
a scale that benefited them. Comparing their own supposedly local centralization to the 
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supposedly larger imperial ambitions of their larger rivals allowed conservatives to package 
their railroad and transportation programmes as a defensive, decentralizing measure. To 
avoid becoming ‘provincial’ to New York City, the Boston Herald, advised, Boston should 
‘finish at once the iron arms which diverge from our metropolis’ and command the trade of 
Vermont and upstate New York. 112  In other words, to prevent Manhattan realizing its 
centralizing ambitions over the entire nation, the Herald urged its own city to dominate New 
England. Carey used the same technique, contrasting the dangerous international 
centralization of trade in London to internal trade within Germany and the United States 
under protective tariffs. He defended both the German Zollverein113 and his proposed tariff 
for America on the basis that encouraging national-state oriented economic centralization 
provided ‘efficient protection against the British monopoly.’ 114  Free trade within tariff 
boundaries – and the resultant centralization – seemed legitimate on a local scale if it could 
help prevent power concentrating in London. Conservatives therefore tried to define 
legitimate local from illegitimate large-scale centralization and marketed their own plans for 
centralization in the democratic language of decentralization. 
The danger of large-scale centralizations in imperial cities or nations here could be 
used to harmonise competing interests closer to home. Urban historians have shown that 
cities on a national or regional scale might have perceived a united interest in gathering the 
trade of its surrounding hinterland. But on a local or neighbourhood scale this perceived 
unitary interest broke down between neighbourhoods and streets that also competed for 
western trade.115  Conservatives in Baltimore did the same, looking out at a larger national 
scale to harmonise conflicts within their own smaller claimed hinterland. In 1854, the 
conservative Baltimore American outlined what it called a ‘Trade League of the Chesapeake’, 
in which Virginia, Washington, and Maryland cities would invest in a steamship line from 
Baltimore to Europe to compete with New York’s monopoly. It pre-empted criticism that 
‘jealousy amongst the cities’ would doom the enterprise by arguing that they all had a 
common interest in competing with New York City, the ‘common monopolist of all 
commerce’. 116  In pushing Baltimore’s business interests, the American used the relative 
closeness between Baltimore and the Chesapeake region to argue that for a common interest. 
This, in turn, allowed them to give the impression that the smaller scale of centralization in 
the Chesapeake region would lead to widely shared benefits. Baltimoreans therefore 
tactically used the threat of centralization at the hands of a more distant rival to justify 
building the infrastructure of centralization in its hinterland. Opposition to centralization 
was, to these conservatives, a tool to legitimise their own power over the citizens and 
territory and surrounding their own cities.  
Conservatives in Boston, Baltimore, and Philadelphia were therefore themselves 
avid centralizers. They too wanted to define their own hinterland and within it enforce 
political and economic authority over surrounding territory. They did this on a variety of 
scales, ranging from Carey’s polycentric network of small railroad towns, to northeastern 
conservatives’ demands for economic hegemony over their surrounding state, and even 
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protectionist proposals for tariffs to create a sheltered national market safe from the imperial 
pull of free trade. To help legitimise their own attempts at centralization, they claimed their 
own centralization was a smaller defensive response to their competitors’ supposedly larger 
imperial-scale ambitions. This helped legitimise their own ambitions in contrast to those of 
larger cities. So rather than opposing centralization outright, then, they used it as a political 
weapon against their larger competitors so that they could extend power over their own cities 
and hinterland. In other words, it was not economic dependency, mercantile power, and 
corporate infrastructure that they opposed. Where in the hands of Jacksonian radicals, 
centralization could seem like a weapon to restore a flagging agrarian republic, in the hands 
of modernizing midcentury conservatives it could sustain an aggressive programme of 
economic development and state building.    
State-Building in Response to Economic Centralization 
Conservatives feeling marginalised by New York and London recognised the link between 
economic and political centralization and accepted that economic centralization could bring 
their city prosperity as much as it could threaten ruin in the wrong hands. It therefore made 
sense for them to seek a political centralization of their own capable of serving their own 
interests rather than those of their commercial rivals, both in terms of creating stronger 
political institutions and ensuring that control over it lay firmly within their own city. 
Proposals for city reform, private corporations, and even protective tariffs all gave 
conservatives the means to shape economic geography to their own advantage. To legitimise 
their claims, they insisted that their cities should share political influence, precluding a 
Parisian-style centralization of political authority. However, in practice, this professed 
opposition to centralization became a path for conservative state-building in the mid-1850s. 
Conservatives often endorsed political centralization as a necessary accompaniment 
to this centralizing economy. When western Massachusetts delegates to a constitutional 
convention warned that fast-growing Boston threatened to overwhelm the state, 
metropolitan conservatives demanded that the state government give the city in the power 
it needed in the state legislature. Responding to western warnings against centralization in 
Boston, George Upham was not the only Bostonian to propose that Massachusetts’ ‘network 
of railroads all over its surface’ demanded ‘a government adapted to the present state of 
things’.117 In other words, as the economy centralized in Boston, conservatives claimed that 
politics should too. In Brooklyn and Philadelphia, wealthy reformers also described 
consolidating multiple municipalities into larger and more powerful city governments as 
‘progress’, despite facing accusations of centralizing tendencies.118 Regardless of whether it 
was a centralization of control over state authority in their own hands or the hands of their 
urban rivals, these conservatives assumed that the times required a centralization of political 
authority in American cities.  
Conservative designs for local political centralization linked their economic designs 
to their desire to combat popular disorder. Failure to consolidate government power over 
cities and hinterlands, they warned, would lead to the kind of tumult that threatened France 
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under the second Republic. Unless Boston retained its authority in the state government and 
Brooklyn’s municipalities consolidated, the lack of ‘centralization’ at a local scale would 
lead to popular anarchy and disorder. 119  Delegate Hillard warned the Massachusetts 
constitutional convention that ‘the moment the government ceases to be central, it ceases to 
be government’ and ‘if the tendency to centralization be an evil, the opposite tendency is 
also an evil’ that destroyed the cities of Greece and Rome.120 Thus despite claiming to oppose 
centralized regimes, conservatives were keenly aware that they needed to grow state 
authority over time rather than reduce it.  
And conservatives were clear that efficient rule from the centre would protect the 
interests of property. Many feared that popular violence threatened to upend the state itself. 
The Baltimore American, for example, describing attacks on railroad property, compared the 
Erie War and the ‘military power of a single village’ to Shay’s Rebellion and demanded that 
Pennsylvania ‘execute the laws’.121 Where Philadelphia conservatives saw violence as a 
legitimate tool to defend access to their own western hinterland, Baltimorean conservatives 
with their own long standing rivalry with their Pennsylvania neighbour fell on a discourse 
of opposition to popular disorder. Others tied the extension of state power to other examples 
of progress. A correspondent to the Evening Telegraph therefore linked strong government 
that could develop suburban property and build western railroads to police power that 
promised to bring ‘order and quiet’ to the city’s main thoroughfares.122 Stronger government, 
then, far from seeming like a tool to attack property, seemed here an important weapon in 
the arsenal of conservatives threatened by rival cities and popular violence. Conservatives 
therefore may have seen in economic changes the possibility for popular challenges to the 
state and authority, and embraced state authority as part of their own programme for 
modernisation. 
To realise these ambitions for strong government, conservatives often turned to the 
city reform movements of the period. Propertied citizens often believed that stronger local 
government would allow their cities to build an infrastructure capable of extending their 
commercial power outwards. At Philadelphia’s bipartisan consolidation celebrations – 
which marked the extension of municipal power over three dozen different jurisdictions and 
127 square miles –  speakers defended enthusiastically both Erie’s involvement in the Gauge 
War and Philadelphian attempts to build their own railroad to Erie; each were read as part 
of a strategy to capture western trade and prevent it going to New York.123 State-building in 
the urban centre and extending Philadelphia’s imagined economic hinterland here went 
hand in hand. Indeed, in New Orleans and Philadelphia, conservative newspapers argued 
that merging municipalities under a central local state would create governments capable of 
building in the internal improvements required to turn their cities’ commercial influence 
outward over the ‘surrounding states’. Philadelphia’s Consolidation Act, indeed, spurred a 
wave of city investment in railroad building. ‘Divided people’ and ‘an inefficient and 
districted government’ explained their inability to resist New York’s centralizing pull.124 
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Despite accusing their rivals of imperialism and tyranny, conservatives sought to use 
stronger state authority to extend their own economic reach. Where the post-Civil War 
bourgeoisie turned to classical liberalism – free trade, supply and demand, and the gold 
standard – to advance their interests,125 their antebellum predecessors turned to building 
stronger governments, even if this often meant stronger city governments rather than an 
interventionist national or federal government. Notably, even though they did not, and 
under the constitution could not, embrace tariffs to shape interstate economic geography to 
their own advantage, they, like Carey, looked for strong government that could police the 
boundaries of their sphere of interest. At a local level, then, they embraced a similar state-
building scheme to Carey’s national vision, looking to give their governments the necessary 
resources to intervene in the economy and frustrate economic development when it appeared 
to threaten them.  
Concerns about the skewed distribution of economic power therefore became a 
pretext for centralizing political authority in enlarged city governments. Like many 
Americans, conservatives often assumed that cities ought to have a leading role on account 
of their size and wealth. Even those who continued to hold a classical republican reverence 
for the virtues of rural life, like Sidney George Fisher, recognised that towns were necessary 
engines of culture, money, and power. Newspapers, ranging from the liberal New York 
Tribune to the conservative Philadelphia North American ranked their cities alongside the likes 
of London, Paris, and Vienna, often disregarding in their comparisons the undemocratic 
means they used to centralize legislative authority.126 The size and scale of consolidated 
cities fascinated writers, who celebrated the physical area of enlarged municipalities and 
even claimed they were more important than many states of the federal republic.127 In 
Brooklyn, for example, a conservative Democratic paper claimed the enlarged city would 
rightly have more political ‘weight’ within their own state and nation.128  Consolidating local 
power here could once more rebalance the equilibrium empire cities threatened. 
These conservatives therefore hoped to ensure that their city, and their city alone, 
governed its hinterland. In their writing, they suggested that cities had a rightful claim to 
control state governments that served exclusively their mercantile interests. The Brooklyn 
Eagle and The New York Herald both predicted that the consolidation of the ‘village’ of 
Brooklyn into a ‘grand city’ would lead to it becoming the capital of an independent Long 
Island State, which it would use railroads to develop and control.129 In 1853, the Boston 
Herald also defended state aid to railroad construction, claiming that the state government 
existed to protect Boston’s ‘right’ to the trade of western Massachusetts that ‘New York is 
so fast absorbing’.130 Just as important as having a government with the authority to build 
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railroads, levy taxes for their construction, and stimulate trade, was having a government in 
which cities had a leading role in the political decision-making progress. Appeals to the 
tradition of American federalism might have suggested that these conservatives were 
interested in power-sharing, but in practice, they tried to ensure their cities could control 
surrounding territory without interference. 
The control cities exerted over private corporations also helped conservatives exert 
power closer to home. The American state had a long history in using private means for 
attaining public ends.131 Improvements like early turnpikes and the Erie Canal had been 
funded by federal and state governments. After the Panic of 1837, promoters often asked for 
municipal support to fund transport connections, and vast corporations like the 
Pennsylvania Railroad (chartered in 1846) were backed by city debt. Soliciting support for 
public investment in a line from Philadelphia to Erie, the North American described railroad 
corporations in New York and Baltimore not as profit-seeking private entities, but as 
pursuers of these cities’ collective good.132 As well as lobbying for federal investment, the 
Baltimore American urged Chesapeake city governments to subscribe to the stock of a private 
steamship line to Europe to give Baltimore control over European and Chesapeake trade.133 
What mattered was not whether the state or private corporations built such investments or 
contributed the capital for their construction, but whether the mercantile interests of a 
particular city had control over where infrastructure would centralize trade. Where 
propertied interests were able to solicit enough private subscriptions to railroad and 
steamship corporations, local capitalists’ private ownership of railroads and corporations 
formed a part of their wider state building programme to concentrate control of political 
power in the metropolis. Corporations under the control of urban investors and mercantile 
interests served as the infrastructure of a political centralization much as railroads and 
steamship lines were the infrastructure of economic centralization. 
A similar logic – that government should serve the mercantile ambitions of cities – 
appeared in Carey’s justification for the protective tariff. He often framed support for tariffs 
as an issue of state strength and sovereignty. Repealing tariffs and entering into copyright 
treaties with Britain, Carey warned, weakened the American national government and its 
ability to enforce law over its own territory. In effect it amounted to a pooling of sovereignty 
with another country. 134 Free trade also made the Turkish government ‘as weak as the 
people… entirely dependent on the bankers, that they may be regarded as the real owners of 
the land and the people, taxing them at discretion’. 135 His argument therefore went beyond 
economics and instead raised the issue of whether government was capable of intervening 
in economic geography, something the weak American and Turkish governments could not 
do. Conversely, Carey praised Spain for establishing tariffs, lauding an example of how 
strong interventionist government helped establish strong law enforcement at home and 
avoided the colonial weakness that came at the hands of free trade.136 Tariffs took on a wider 
significance as evidence of national state-strengthening. Like the conservatives who turned 
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to city reform, Carey saw a problem in weak government that seemed vulnerable to the 
ambitions of distant cities and unable to build the infrastructure that would allow a process 
of economic centralization closer to home. 
His support for stronger national government through the protective tariff therefore 
resembled demands for stronger city government capable of making these economic 
interventions. On a national level, Carey defended self-government for India, not to bring 
democracy to the Indian people, but because a protectionist state could build the railroads 
that would keep Indian trade within an independent nation’s borders. 137 Carey’s advice 
centred on ensuring that state power served the economic interests of Indian cities, as those 
cities, in turn, would benefit their hinterlands too; a not dissimilar argument northeastern 
newspapers’ belief that government should support urban imperialism. Indeed, when talking 
about the importance of city government, Carey sounded like a city reformer. In his critiques 
of the British Empire and European monarchies, claimed that powerful local village, town, 
and city governments had the ‘strength’ to ‘resist’ imperial seats of government.138 Within 
the USA, Carey also defended his supposedly decentred patchwork of strong township, 
town, and city governments, as tools to centre political authority in urban areas and 
institutions and allow them to build the infrastructure of economic centralization on a local 
level. Centralization into multiple local cities allowed the construction of local roads, 
colleges, and schools that made the town ‘a common centre of attraction to the whole 
people’, he argued.139 The conservative Brooklynite Maurice Richter, too, told his readers 
that strong local government could make ‘every town a Paris’.140 When he discussed both 
the need for strong national government and the need for strong local government, Carey’s 
proposals also resembled plans to ensure that strong government served the interests of large 
cities and establish the centralized economic geography that many Americans believed 
could, properly harnessed, bring prosperity. 
The political supremacy of smaller eastern cities over their surrounding towns, 
counties, and states, though, raised the same fears of political centralization that the 
supremacy of New York and London raised on a larger scale. When Williamsburgh Village 
residents opposed annexation to Brooklyn, the Brooklyn Daily Eagle replied that 
consolidation would allow both Long Island municipalities to ‘stand against the oppressive 
measures of the big city over the river’ and avoid the ‘centralizing influence of New York’.141 
Resisting the ‘absorbing and centralizing influence of New York’ went hand in hand with 
building a stronger government at home. 142 Philadelphians too answered critics of their own 
consolidation in 1854 by insisting a much bigger city government would save the metropolis 
from becoming a satellite of New York. Conservatives often tried to suppress such contests 
over power within and around their own cities. Defining New York as the ultimate 
centralizing threat therefore allowed them to deflect fears about their own designs for 
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political centralization. Conservatives in Boston and Philadelphia also claimed that 
strengthening their own cities and giving them extensive political influence in their state 
government could prevent their cities from becoming ‘New Yorkized’ and indistinguishable 
from the Empire City. 143  These conservatives used the apparent smaller size of their 
centralization to give the impression that they were sharing power between multiple cities 
instead of creating a national or international empire and becoming the next Paris. Indeed, 
they also suggested that city building protected the American system of federal government. 
Boston and Philadelphia, they claimed, were only consolidating political authority within 
individual states, within which a single city could legitimately assume authority without 
dominating a nation in the manner of a Paris, as New York supposedly intended. 144 
Contrasting their designs to the remote centralization at the hands of New York allowed 
them to try and redefine dangerous centralization so that it only applied to the supposedly 
larger centralizations of New York and London. This, in turn, helped them try to overcome 
the perception that they, too, were centralizers, and legitimise their own plans to consolidate 
political power in their own cities. 
To offset charges that they were also centralizers, conservatives often tried to mask 
the political basis of their designs, even as they pursued new charters, subsidies, and 
protectionist measures. The imperial language of city boosterism allowed them to give the 
impression that geography, not government authority, would send goods from a tributary 
hinterland to their cities. One railroad promoter wrote to the North American, claiming that 
the topography of the Appalachians predestined Ohio Valley trade to concentrate at 
Philadelphia, if only Philadelphians would build a railway to the region.145 Such overtures 
transformed the basis of urban power from the kind of imperial state authority Americans 
associated with central cities like Paris into the natural contours of a topographic survey. A 
‘central’ location, a shorter route, or easier grades would centre trade on their city through 
‘natural advantage’.146 Where the likes of New York, Paris, and London supposedly needed 
a politically protected monopoly, their cities did not. Their opponents relied on dangerous 
government authority while they themselves would rely only on the natural laws of trade 
and geography.  
In addition to claiming not to need big government to help them build their 
centralized trade networks, the same conservatives also gave the impression that they would 
share control over political authority with the hinterland. Benjamin Hallett – a Boston 
lawyer who opposed the radical 1854 Massachusetts constitution and enforced the Fugitive 
Slave Act in Boston147 – and Boston newspapers argued that their city had the right to a ‘just 
                                                     
143 Mr. Flanigen, p. 8; Report of the Debates and Proceedings, vol. 2, p. 320; Price, History of Consolidation, pp. 79-80. 
144 Report of the Debates and Proceedings, vol. 2, pp. 131-132, 234-235, 624-625; Speech of Wm. Schouler, The Boston 
Daily Atlas, July 21, 1853; ‘The Convention and Representation’, Boston Post, June 28, 1853. 
145  ‘Philadelphia and the West—No. 1, NA&USG, January 3, 1853; ‘Philadelphia and the West—No. 2’, 
NA&USG, January 4, 1853; ‘Philadelphia and the West—No. 3’, NA&USG, January 7, 1853; ‘Philadelphia and 
the West—No. IV’, NA&USG, January 10, 1853. 
146 Mr. Flanigen, pp. 5-9. ‘The Northwestern Railroad’, NA&USG, August 9, 1853; ‘The Railroads and the West’, 
NA&USG, January 4, 1853; ‘A Liberal View of the Matter’, NA&USG, January 24, 1854; ‘The Erie Railroad 
Troubles’, PL, December 20, 1853; ‘Patabsco River and Chesapeake Bay’, BL, March 21, 1854; ‘The Movement 
for Trade with the South and West in Baltimore’, BL, December 25, 1852. 
147 President Franklin pierce appointed Hallett United States Attorney with jurisdiction for Boston, and he 
defended the Fugitive Slave Act in court. See Stanley Campbell, The Slave Catchers: Enforcement of the Fugitive Slave 
Law, 1850-1860. (Chapel Hill, 1970), pp. 110-147. 
 
Chapter 2: Centralization and Geography: Railroads, Tariffs, and Cities  97 
influence’ over the state, but would not create a ‘Babylon’ or a ‘Rome’.148 The Baltimore 
American also compared its plan for Chesapeake trade with Europe to the Hanseatic League, 
which ‘gave law to kings’, emphasising local cities would retain political authority under 
Baltimore’s commercial leadership. 149  Indeed, critics in Philadelphia claimed that they 
would claim their ‘rightful share’ of ‘metropolitan influence and prosperity’ only through 
‘honourable means’. They would not, they suggested, assume control of local government 
in the hinterland, while in their own cities the defensive measures they had taken against 
centralizing New York and London would safeguard republican self-government.150  
Conservatives in major cities therefore recognised that economic required a measure 
of political centralization. Rather than turning to the classical liberalism that marked the 
politics of retrenchment after the Panic of 1873, they assumed that the growth of an urban 
economy required a substantial amount of state activity. This included strengthening state 
and corporate authority to reorganise the hinterland economy through railroad construction, 
tariff enforcement, and government regulation. But for conservatives who believed they were 
peripheral to New York and London’s commercial empires, it also meant ensuring that 
control over this newfound state power remained in the hands of their own city and interests 
rather than that of rural agrarians or their mercantile competitors. In other words, they 
wanted to ensure that their city could govern, if often indirectly, its surrounding territory, 
and turned to government reform to realise these ambitions. Stronger city government, 
private corporations, and national tariffs enforced by a strong national government could all 
be justified based on their ability to ensure economic centralization served the right people 
and cities. Claims that they would share power suggested that they were aware of, and 
wanted to defuse, contests for power within their own cities, between the neighbourhoods, 
towns, and municipalities over which they wanted to extend control. However, these claims 
of support for power sharing, like claims of opposition to centralization at the hands of 
empire cities, only helped conservatives legitimise new forms of government that 
concentrated power in practice. 
Henry Carey, Centralization, and Citizenship 
As well as being a pretext for centralizing political authority over surrounding towns, cities, 
and states, the need to control changing economic geography also justified centralizing 
power within cities too. Carey, in particular, discussed the problem of popular sovereignty 
in areas that had been come under the influence of larger cities. He blamed New York and 
London’s growing geographic influence for the emergence of this unpropertied wage-
earning class in Philadelphia, a class that could not resist political dependency on propertied 
Manhattanites. He therefore refashioned in geographic terms warnings that dependant 
voters could not maintain self-government. Moreover, Carey talked about the industrialising 
economy not in terms of a vertical power relationship between a propertied upper class and 
unpropertied artisans and workers but as a horizontal power relationship between cities. The 
centralizing threat came not from local capitalists, as radical workingmen claimed, but from 
British and Manhattan-based traders, allowing him to justify a state building programme at 
home that centred on strengthening power in less democratic regimes. Despite the 
egalitarian appearance of Carey’s programme, it came with a far less democratic set of 
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assumptions about the role of unpropertied citizens in government. Opposition to long-
distance centralizations might have sounded like a democratic language, but as with France, 
conservatives found ways to use this language to advance a conservative agenda over 
property, democracy, and power much closer to home. 
Carey’s warnings against dependency on great commercial cities included scepticism 
of dependency and unpropertied citizens in the American republic. Southern slaveholders 
claimed that northern wage earners were in no different a position to their own slaves as 
they too lacked property and independent control over their own labour.151 Carey agreed, 
but saw this power relationship spatially, warning that free trade turned the natural harmony 
between local capital and labour into an exploitative power relationship between London-
based capital and dependant wage labourers on a colonial periphery. 152  He viewed 
agriculture in a similar fashion too: throughout the British Empire, he accused Britain of 
using free trade to reduce independent farmers to tenants dependant on landlords and 
London capital.153 His arguments therefore drew from an older suspicion that tenancy and 
wages turned independency citizens into dependant subjects. These rural and urban wage 
labourers appeared as ‘slaves’ because workers in the hinterland were economically 
dependent on the central marketplace that controlled the value of their labour and 
produce.154 Like the bonds of railroads and steamships spreading outwards from major cities, 
the ties that linked London capital and provincial labour formed a geographic power 
relationship. Indeed, in his critique of the Act of Union, he identified the poor law in Ireland 
as a tool that allowed British capitalists to control Irish labour from their seat in London. 155 
Carey therefore warned against mass wage labour in his lobbying for a protective tariff. But 
his analysis of wage labour as the consequence of geographic inequality helped reframe fears 
of dependency and unpropertied voters in less proscriptive terms of dependency on remote 
cities and towns. 
Carey’s opposition to geographic centralization therefore might sound radical, 
insofar as it seemed opposed to of the inequality that came with wage labour. But in fact it 
had a far less democratic and far more antiradical agenda. It implied Carey shared 
assumptions about unpropertied voters with conservative critics of the French in 1848 and 
1852: both believed that unfit citizens could not prevent dangerous concentrations of power. 
His protectionism here spoke to deep unease about the effect economic change had on 
farmers, workers, and the electorate. As he put it, as the British became less and less 
propertied, they were ‘declining in self-government’ as ‘low-priced labourers’ could not 
govern themselves.156 And as the expansion of trade and railroads westward encouraged 
dependent cash crop agriculture in the West, he argued, Americans were reduced to 
‘barbarianism’ as homesteaders allegedly fell into crime and poverty, and inhibited law and 
order and self-government. 157  Unpropertied wage workers dependant on London were 
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therefore the source as well as the victims of centralization. London might have usurped 
workers’ economic authority in the global free trade system, but Carey also warned that 
these impoverished citizens themselves allowed political centralization into despotic 
government.  
An assumption that unpropertied citizens could not prevent – and might even further 
– the centralization of political authority in remote metropoles pervaded his appeals against 
free trade. In addressing the South, he even blamed the training of dependency on London 
and New York for the creation of a despotic slave society.158 He could argue that free trade 
would lead Americans to become like the ‘bayonet-governed, priest-ridden, pauperized 
millions of Europe’ because he believed centralizing wealth created a population unable to 
resist the centralization of power in the hands of reactionary regimes.159 From Virginia to 
Scotland to Hungary, Carey predicted that breaking bonds of dependency that spread 
outwards from London in particular would allow unpropertied citizens to acquire property 
and become full citizens in a free society.160 Implicit in Carey’s thought, then, was the 
assumption that property created citizens capable of freely participating in a republican 
polity. Claims that free trade limited growth and led to tyranny might seem unsurprising 
from a protectionist. Yet Carey’s argument that the centralized geography of free trade 
would undermine republican liberty had implications for an emerging urban wage-earning 
class and impoverished western farmers in the United States. His home city of Philadelphia, 
like New York, Boston, and Baltimore, had seen growing industrial unrest in the first half 
of the nineteenth century. Journeymen, mechanics, and artisans stridently opposed the 
increasing use of wages as a tool to organise labour.161 It was in this context that Carey 
warned that unpropertied voters, under the sway of centralized economic power, were not 
fit voters in the American republic.  
Carey’s pro-tariff advocacy therefore drew from the idea that ownership of property 
gave citizens the ability to participate in political life. Defining the ideal citizen in terms of 
the bourgeois urban values that protectionism purportedly fostered, he argued tariffs would 
create citizens who would preserve local centres of economic and political authority. In place 
of the exploitative wage labour and chattel slavery that a system centred on New York and 
London, tariffs – by offering peripheries protection from metropolitan dominance – would 
promote the ‘association’ of independent propertyowning farmers and manufacturers, a 
decentred economic geography where individual workers and farmers kept control over their 
own labour, capital and agency.162 ‘Freedom of trade, or of man’ were mutually exclusive in 
his view because economic exchange between independent producers formed the basis of a 
free society, not wage labourers voting for – and dependent on – the representatives of 
distant, powerful cities.163 Carey, then, saw citizenship in material terms. The ‘barbarism’ of 
western poverty and supposed misgovernment contrasted to the growing towns, local 
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railroads and banks that were the hallmarks of civilization and progress under decentralized 
republican government. 164  Rather than defining citizenship through a universal right to 
participate in elections, Carey defined citizenship through participation in middle-class 
economic institutions like banks, owning property, and engaging in the local commercial 
life of the town and city. A stake in local property was vital to Carey’s understanding of 
citizenship, despite the seemingly egalitarian language of his protectionist campaign. 
As well as subtly cautioning against democracy under free trade and unpropertied 
voters, Carey also looked to less democratic forms of state building in response. Redefining 
dependency on another city as the most dangerous centralization of power allowed him to 
justify centralizing power in relatively authoritarian governments. Like conservatives 
responding to 1848, he looked to European monarchy to find examples of good government. 
He was certainty happy to use Alexander II’s autocratic government in Russia as an example 
of good protectionist government.165 Given Carey’s prioritisation of property over popular 
sovereignty in his writing, it is unsurprising that he defined free governments based on their 
power to prevent supposedly centralized political power relationships, rather than their 
commitment to universal suffrage. He advised Kossuth, for instance, that France and 
Scotland showed how ‘commercial centralization’ under free trade was far more dangerous 
to Hungarians’ liberties than the ‘political centralization’ of the Hapsburg monarchy.166 His 
definition of liberty, then, seemed more based on the state power to impose protective tariffs, 
regardless of whether it embraced democratic authority, rather than the ability of the masses 
or minorities to influence their government. Based on this assumption, Carey distinguished 
between English ‘consolidation’ of land and the ‘centralization of exchange’ that went hand 
in hand with the destruction of ‘local self-government’167 and German ‘decentralization, 
local activity and freedom’ when Prussian tariffs promoted the division of land from large 
to small landholders.168 In Carey’s reasoning, Britain could never be a free as Germany 
because only a decentralized economic geography created citizens that could resist political 
centralization too. Comparing the United States to France under Louis-Napoleon, he argued 
that America was following a path to ‘centralization, barbarism, and slavery’ while the 
protected Second Empire was on the road to freedom. Warning against centralized 
economic power relationships allowed Carey to argue firstly that government power was a 
far better protector of the people’s liberties than the democratic will of the people themselves. 
In other words, defining centralizing power in cities as the dangerous threat to the people’s 
liberties allowed him to legitimise centralizing authority in strong institutions and 
governments. Opposition to economic centralization here justified, in Carey’s opinion, 
centralizing power in authoritarian governments.  
As London and New York emerged as global trade hubs, Carey sought to redefine 
the centralizations of wealth and power taking place within cities as a geographic 
centralization of power that reduced American workers to dependency on remote 
metropoles. His hostility to centralization might suggest he favoured popular government 
and a more equitable division of property. After all, opposition to the centralizing ambitions 
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of major cities and their supposed aristocratic interests easily was common among 
Jacksonian Democrats.169  
Carey’s argument that high tariffs would redistribute property to all American 
workers was clearly well suited to his political agenda, and many Americans at all ranges of 
the political spectrum took issue with his economic policy. However, Carey’s warnings that 
free trade economies could not sustain republican government refashioned in geographic 
terms an argument that unpropertied and dependant voters could not maintain self-
government. In the context of a city rife with industrial unrest, he made it clear to his readers 
that the growing number of unpropertied wage workers in the unprotected American 
economy posed a challenge to republican government. Stressing that republican government 
could not rely on the votes of the unpropertied was an assumption that Carey shared with 
other midcentury conservatives. Suggesting that tariffs could build propertied citizens 
capable of maintaining a republican government therefore allowed Carey to talk about the 
problems of mass suffrage without having to talk directly about disenfranchisement, as 
fellow Philadelphian Sidney George Fisher did in private.  And like other conservatives, he 
used opposition to centralization as a platform he could use to justify a state building 
programme of his own, one that did not necessarily rely on a particularly democratic 
foundation. Carey’s opposition to long-distance economic centralization over geography 
therefore spoke to deeper conservative concerns about democracy, property, and citizenship 
within their own cities, and a desire to centre political authority back into the hands of men 
of property and privilege. 
Geographic Centralization, State-Building and Popular Government 
Carey’s obsession with tariffs by no means applied to all conservatives, but they all used the 
threat of remote centralization to embark on a state building programme that centralized 
power in an elite-controlled government. The struggle between conservatives in different 
cities for control over political and economic power had consequences for democracy within 
their cities too. Reactions to 1848 suggest that they did not want to concentrate power in 
their own city only to share it with the masses that lived there. Given Carey’s warning that 
long distance economic ‘centralization’ threatened to bring about a Parisian-style 
concentration of unpropertied voters in dependent regions, and the readiness of 
conservatives to seek state power to prevent this eventuality, it is unsurprising that many 
conservatives did not want government to fall into the hands of those they wanted to reform. 
Therefore, when conservatives attempted to centralize political power inwards through state 
strengthening and the extension of metropolitan power over a hinterland, they also sought 
to transfer control over policymaking from people to the state. In practice, this meant putting 
power back in the hands of a conservative elite. The process of extending geographic power 
from the city outwards therefore sometimes involved a parallel concentration of sovereignty 
in elites, institutions, and the state itself, at the expense of the people, just as many 
conservatives supported a similar process of centralization to bring order to Paris and 
France. 
When defending the leading economic and political role of cities within their states 
and nations, conservatives often pointed to the large number of urban citizens to give their 
political aspirations democratic legitimacy. And since country delegates wanted to distribute 
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power away from the towns and cities where most voters lived, it is unsurprising that 
Boston’s representatives used a language of majority rule to stake their claim for political 
leadership of the Commonwealth. They often claimed there was no reason that political 
power should not be concentrated in cities if that is where voters lived,170 and described the 
overrepresentation of rural towns as ‘anti-republican’, a ‘partizan madness’, or an ‘Anti-
democratic assumption of power.’171 Carey’s critique of political authority beyond any kind 
of democratic control – such as Great Britain’s dominion over Ireland and the Camden and 
Amboy’s rule over New Jersey – implied support for a kind of popular sovereignty. After all, 
he suggested that these entities held power that ought to lie with the people in a much wider 
diffusion of political authority. Concentrating political power geographically in the city gave 
conservatives rhetorical ammunition to claim they were sharing political and economic 
power with the people. 
Despite using this democratic language, these conservatives often implied that the 
people were more of a threat to the government than a natural part of it. When describing 
their state-building programmes, conservatives again turned to the image of Paris to caution 
against the risks of creating an overbearing democratic capital. When New York aldermen 
suggested annexing Brooklyn to Manhattan, the Brooklyn Eagle and its correspondents 
raised the image of 1848-style Parisian violence to demonstrate the supposed dangers of this 
consolidation, warning all power would lie in the ‘central legislature’ of a dominant, violent 
city.172 Respectable Brooklynites, like the inhabitants of French provinces, would become 
victims to mob rule if they centred political power in a city full of those unfit for citizenship. 
Bostonians had to respond to western accusations that they were creating a Paris. Rather 
than arguing that urban citizens proved the greatest centralizing threat, they argued that 
Bostonians’ ‘moral character’ and ‘stability and integrity’ contrasted to French ‘mobs’ and 
‘Jacobins’. 173  Only Bostonians deference to the city’s social and political elite, these 
conservatives claimed, made Boston a suitable custodian of state power. These Brooklyn 
and Boston conservatives might have disagreed over whether rural agrarians or urban rioters 
posed the greatest democratic threat, but seemed to agree that Paris showed the dangers of 
allowing the people – however defined – to seize power. The Brooklynite Richter, too, 
claimed that Paris proved the danger of allowing larger cities to accumulate too much 
political authority at the expense of towns, wards, and townships, as urban residents could 
easily overthrow any government based there. 174 These conservatives may well have wanted 
to centralize power in cities in spite of, rather than because of, their large voting populations. 
In the minds of conservatives, reorganising the economic and political power relationships 
outside the metropolis and its hinterland was linked to questions over the distribution of 
power between people and elites too.  
The question of whether power lay in the right hands therefore had a social as well 
as geographic dimension. Conservatives in Massachusetts tried to redefine curbs on the 
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political authority of Boston as a democratic centralization of power in a dangerous 
(western) agrarian democracy. Advocates of a strong Boston cautioned against allowing 
voters to send ‘instructions’ to legislators at state elections, making judges and officeholders 
elective, and removing vestigial tax qualifications for voting. Adopting these reforms, they 
warned, would replace a ‘learned, impartial, and trusted magistracy’ with a ‘pure and direct 
democracy’ with ‘no law of any kind, save the expressed will of the majority of the day’, 
akin to the Second French Republic.175 As well as being an opportunity to protect their 
control over state power, the constitutional convention allowed Boston conservatives to 
protect constitutional tools that concentrated political decision-making in the hands of a 
small number of well-connected elites. Philadelphians, too, seemed to recognise the risks of 
centralizing power close to unfit voters and looked for constitutional tools to make state 
power safe in growing cities. Explicitly denying that the United States was a democracy, the 
North American cited the threat of Parisian-style mob violence as a risk of majority rule, 
lamented that city gentleman had to vote alongside lower-class rowdies, and even suggested 
disenfranchising Philadelphia’s unpropertied could help ensure clean elections and public 
order.176 Despite leaving universal white male suffrage untouched, conservatives who looked 
to consolidate government authority in their metropolis were also looking for ways to 
concentrate power in the state and elites, rather than the enfranchised masses. Promoting 
economic centralization and the political leadership of their own city went hand in hand 
with reminding Americans that they faced a potential centralizing threat at the hands of 
Paris-style urban mobs and western radicals.  
The willingness of conservatives like Carey to laud authoritarian regimes also 
suggests an ambivalent relationship at best to democratic rights. When Carey defended 
protectionist countries like Prussia and Russia, he neglected to mention that these states did 
not share political authority with their citizens. 177 He suggested that strong government with 
power to enforce its will over its national borders better protected people from his 
centralization than democratic rule. Indeed, he claimed that the Zollverein gave Germany 
freedom, even though governments had quashed the democratic aspirations of the German 
people in 1849.178 Rather than seeing democracy as the basis for republican government, he 
suggested to his readers that freedom meant liberty for governments to act without the 
restraints of centralized economic power rather than in accordance with the desires of voters.  
His support for strong local government as a tool to resist larger national and 
international centralization could also hide an antidemocratic agenda. Dividing the 
economy into self-sufficient townships, towns, and cities with only minimal long distance 
trade rejected ambitions for a national market place based around individual workers and 
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capitalists. Instead, he saw the corporate town, internally harmonious and without class 
competition, as the basic building block of an economy that would not leave individuals 
labouring under the direction of remote cities like London and New York. 179 Harmony 
under the aegis of strong local government, he implied, could help dampen political 
radicalism closer to home. 
Within the United States too, Carey therefore emphasised state strengthening over 
popular government as the best way to prevent dangerous centralizations of power.  He 
described Jackson’s claim of a popular mandate180 that overrode the power of unelected 
institutions as a ‘centralization’. 181  What Jacksonian Democrats saw as the tenets of 
democracy – that government should be accountable to a white male electorate – he warned 
amounted to a dangerous consolidation of power.182 Instead, he emphasised the role of 
town, city, and county governments in preventing geographic centralized power 
relationships. In America, just as in Germany, freedom meant the capacity for governments 
to act independently, and did not mean popular control. 183  To prevent centralization, 
Carey’s proposals resembled the compact theory of John C. Calhoun. Control over state 
power, including the power that a central bank could hold over the economy, had to be 
divided among a network of state institutions, rather than united in the undivided electorate. 
Conservatives seemed reluctant to discuss repealing universal white male suffrage. Carey’s 
definition of centralization as a geographic phenomenon and insistence that strong 
government was not the sole centralizing threat nonetheless allowed him to undermine the 
principles of majority rule too.  
When looking to build governments that could help them build up their own regional 
economies and resist the centralizing pull of empire cities, conservatives drew from some of 
the lessons that Louis-Napoleon’s coup d’état seemed to confirm: that consolidations of 
political authority in the hands of the people could lead to disaster. Giving cities the power 
to govern their immediate hinterlands therefore came with significant dangers if this gave 
too much power to the masses of unpropertied voters that lived there. Centralizing political 
authority in cities therefore also required consolidating power in the hands of elite-led 
government institutions. Conservatives in the 1850s may not have been able to challenge 
universal white male suffrage. But when designing their governments, they emphasised that 
independent government institutions, rather than popular action, best protected the republic 
from dangerous concentrations of power. Therefore, as well as seeking to centralize political 
authority over their surrounding spheres of interest, conservatives in smaller cities sought to 
centralize power within their own cities too. These conservatives’ support for a process of 
centralization therefore combined centralization of power into institutions and over 
geography so that they could maintain control over a powerful government that catered to 
their needs, and shows how their desire for building new centres of power reflected anxieties 
closer to home. 
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Conclusion 
Conservatives, like a large number of Americans observing the economic changes around 
railroads, steamships, and industry around the 1850s, used centralization to understand how 
political and economic power relationships could operate across space. They considered 
how a single city could extend control outwards over surrounding territory as well as 
theorising how power could centre in institutions or the people. Yet centralization in its 
geographic and political aspects were related. Henry Carey in particular showed how the 
threat posed by remote centralizing cities could be used to restructure political relations 
within the likes of Baltimore, Boston, and Philadelphia.     
Carey’s obsession with the protective tariff might have been exceptional, but 
conservatives frequently used the negative connotation of centralization to challenge the 
emergence of large commercial cities, principally London and New York. These cities 
acquired through their economic might the same imperial power that Paris enjoyed through 
its privileged political position. Both protectionists, like Carey, and other conservatives with 
more liberal views on trade saw these centres as colonial cities that threatened to dominate 
their surrounding state, national, or even international hinterlands. Economic and political 
power overlapped, with one reinforcing the other. 
Yet they knowingly embraced the same process of expanding economic power when 
it gave them the opportunity to extend their own geographic markets. And just as they often 
associated their opponents’ economic centralization with a dangerous monopolisation of 
state authority, the conservatives in this chapter often looked to centralizing state authority 
themselves to pursue their regional ambitions through trade policy, railroad funding, and 
local state building. Projects to centre trade in their own metropolises here were justified as 
local defensive manoeuvres, necessary responses to the national and international scale 
aggressive posturing of imperialistic rivals. Conservatives in different cities therefore drew 
on their understanding of economic centralization as a process to compete between 
themselves for the imperial riches of a vast hinterland.  
The 1850s marked a moment of intense local state-building efforts, whether it was 
in the form of vigilance committees in San Francisco and New Orleans, city consolidation 
movements, and territorial organization in Congress. Understandings of geographic 
centralization of political and economic power linked how conservatives engaged with these 
processes at an international, national, and local level. Carey’s opposition to the trade routes 
spreading out from major American and especially British cities and his desire for forms of 
local and national centralization in response bears similarity to how other American 
conservatives responded to the threat of New York’s dominance. Local and national ideas 
about how to use the state to intervene in the economy were therefore closely linked. 
Midcentury America may have often rejected the idea of a powerful federal government in 
Washington with the necessary authority to intervene in the national economy. The veto of 
the Second Bank of the United States and Marysville Road charters, the failure of the Rivers 
and Harbours Convention of 1846, and the adoption of squatter sovereignty in the territories 
in 1850 and 1854 suggest a very limited role for the federal government in constructing the 
political and economic infrastructure that could bind America together, even if calls for 
stronger tariffs and a Pacific Railroad indicate that not everyone accepted that settlement. 
Urban imperialism, though, may have at helped conservatives engage in state building, 
albeit in different forms to contemporary European regimes.  
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As supporters, rather than opponents, of a developmental state that used public 
authority to promote the interests of wealthy property developers, merchants, and nascent 
corporations, it is also unsurprising that the people explored in this chapter were rarely 
enthusiastic about majority rule and often saw strong government instead as the best 
custodian of liberty. Conservatives used centralization to help modernise the American 
economy and government on their own terms. But if centralization was not a means to turn 
back to the pastoral ideal of Jeffersonian republicanism, nor did they necessarily imagine a 
centralized economy in the sense historians of the Gilded Age might understand the term. 
Indeed, forestalling the centring of the American economy in Manhattan, avoiding social 
conflict between capital and labour, and limiting the capacity of free markets to redistribute 
economic power were all aims of midcentury conservatives whose distinctive vision stood 
between the yeoman republic and corporate capitalism. Their methods often reveal their 
mistrust of centring power in the people. 
Debates over the geographic centralization of economic might in the 1850s were 
therefore closely connected to discussion of political power. Conservatives who believed that 
sovereignty needed transferring from unpropertied voters to state institutions found in the 
idea of centralization over space a powerful weapon. Just as they often insisted they were 
decentralizing economic power from places like New York to legitimise their own 
programme of centralization, they also claimed the mantle of majority rule while in practice 
curbing it at its margins. Centralizing control over state authority by strengthening local 
government gave them opportunities to rebalance power between the people and the state, 
and when designing governments, they sometimes took steps to impose order on disorderly 
populace at home. Indeed, defining centralization in London and New York as the most 
dangerous threat to liberty and prosperity only made it easier for them to distract attention 
from their attempts to centralize power in stronger institutions often shielded from direct 
popular control. Unlike radical supporters of democratic republics, conservatives believed 
that that state – and not the people – was the best custodian of power in a republic. 
Conservative state-building in the 1850s, then, may have looked to modernise regional 
economies, but it often rested on the same fears about centring power in the people that had 
animated debate over the 1848 Revolution in Paris. Conservatives could employ a seemingly 
democratic language of decentralization here to pursue far more conservative ends. 
Regional elites’ fears of becoming part of a colonial hinterland exporting goods to 
New York or London can be read as geographic expressions on social anxieties. 
Conservatives’ professed desire to maintain a polity of propertied citizens rather than 
dependant farmers and labourers might have seemed egalitarian, especially when they 
prescribed decentralization of economic power away from large cities and corporations as 
the remedy for rising inequality. But what sounded democratic in theory was not necessarily 
in practice. Their critique implied the unfitness of propertyless urban voters for the franchise, 
and their program often called for local centralizations of power under their own authority 
to combat empire cities. Moreover, by seeing geographic rather than social relations as the 
source of urban malaise, they could deflect attention away from the ‘labor question’: the 
centralization of power in owners of industry that working people were attacking through 
the likes of craft unions and radical societies. then, they anticipated upper class scepticism 
about the role of unpropertied urban voters that led to hysteria over the Paris Commune in 
1871, the Tilden Commission in 1877, and a retreat from Reconstruction’s commitment to 
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expanding democratic rights.184 But instead of arguing for restricting voting rights to the 
propertied, as would happen under the Tilden Commission, they tried to restructure the 
geography of power so that the state served the interests of capital at the centre, and gave an 
urban bourgeoisie a privileged position. This, they hoped, would allow them to reconcile 
class tensions within their own city by presenting the metropolis as united in fighting the 
centralizing threat posed by rivals. The likes of the Erie Gauge War, or Baltimore’s design 
for a Chesapeake successor to the Hanseatic League, illustrate how conservatives tried to 
unite cities and regions around their leadership. 
Two decades later, with economic growth, industrialisation, and proletarianisation 
continuing apace, postbellum conservatives often understood questions of urban political 
economy more in terms of class formation rather than as a matter of competition between 
cities over where economic power would centre. By then a national bourgeoisie – shaped by 
the Civil War, class conflict and strikes on a national scale, and the integration of hitherto 
city-dominated railroads into a nationwide system – were less inclined to think in regional 
terms about power, and were more inclined to see the ‘labor question’ as fundamental. 
Conservatives in the 1850s, though, tended to conceptualise the problems of 
industrialisation, class conflict, and urbanisation differently to their postbellum successors. 
They may even have laid some of the intellectual groundwork for the retreat from 
democratic reform that followed the Civil War as they kept alive in their discussions of 
centralization scepticism about the wisdom of universal white male suffrage. Their belief 
that economic and political modernisation at a local scale could rebuild, rather than 
threaten, their authority, then, is one marker of a conservative rationale for modernisation. 
Despite claiming to oppose centralization, conservatives more often tried to redefine the 
pejorative term to make it apply in economic terms only to the supposedly imperial designs 
of their larger rivals, and in doing so used the term to claim power over their own citizens 
and expanding hinterlands. These conservatives therefore accepted a process of political and 
economic ‘centralization’ on their own terms, but did not see themselves as a national upper 
class, lauded the benefits of a national market only when it came to opposing international 
rivals, and remained suspicious of democratic rights. Centralization here became a language 
conservatives could draw on to contest which propertied elites in different cities would 
benefit from long term processes of economic change and to impose their will on their own 
city and economic empire.  
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Introduction 
The lessons from France and political economy helped inform conservative attempts to build 
local governments in the mid-1850s. In these years, cities like New Orleans, Philadelphia, 
and Brooklyn supported what was often called ‘consolidation’: merging cities and suburbs 
into larger big city governments. Others, like Boston and New York, sought to reform their 
charters, police, and institutions as an alternative route to strong government. Conservatives 
in these cities drew on similar processes of centralization they had described in Paris and 
from criticisms of urban imperialism. They described a process of centralization of power 
into the hands of rioters and urban voters, a state within a state that exercised power over 
the entire city. However, again, conservatives used this threat of centralization to justify a 
centralization of their own. They often hoped to centralize power geographically in larger 
city governments and claimed that economic ties over suburbs and neighbourhoods could 
tie disorderly cities together. Politically they hoped to remove barriers to state institutions 
and, concentrate political decision-making in the hands of institutions and propertied elites. 
Conservatives may not have had the chance to reform politics on a national level, but 
looking at how conservatives used centralization as a process and political weapon in local 
government can highlight conservative state-building and attempts to restructure political 
power in midcentury America. 
American cities in the 1850s had a long history of urban violence, which drove 
movements for consolidation. Echoing their censure of the Paris crowd in the Second 
Republic, conservatives warned that American mobs and voters had become a single source 
of violent power with potential to subject the city to its rule. Urban disorder confirmed to 
conservatives the danger of allowing the people to usurp government control over public 
space, just as the events in France between 1848 and 1852 had done. Moreover, 
conservatives, drew from a radical tradition that saw rioting as a part of American 
democracy, a way for the people to assert their authority over public space and officeholders 
who defied the will of the people. Conservatives, though, looked upon this with horror. To 
these Americans, consolidation took a wider significance than just bringing law and order 
to seemingly disorderly cities. Consolidation therefore showed how conservatives believed 
they could reassert the authority of government in public space over the people and their 
democratic capacity in a republic that supposedly embraced universal white male suffrage. 
Having warned that the people were centralizing power in American cities, 
conservatives were able at reject republican warnings that consolidating government 
authority a local level to led to tyranny. Movements supporting police reform and enlarging 
the boundaries of city governments in particular gave conservatives opportunities to 
strengthen local governments and bring order to the American metropolis. Suggesting that 
balanced government and local decentralization were less important in city government, 
conservatives hoped that they could remove institutional and geographic checks on power, 
and enable the law-enforcing power of the centre. These reformers often embraced the 
assumption that removing outdated institutional and geographic checks on power through 
creating police forces and annexing independent districts could impose order on growing 
cities. Such measures helped conservatives strengthen government in response to urban 
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disorder, and ensure that centralization as a process benefited a conservative-directed state 
rather than a violent democratic rabble. 
When confronted with stronger city government in the hands of their partisan 
opponents or democratic control, however, the strongest conservative reformers could 
become avid decentralizers. Conservatives used decentralization of authority in the spheres 
of property and finance, especially as a tool to prevent urban majorities from usurping power 
too. This, perhaps, helps to explain why research on municipal government in the 1850s can 
seem so contradictory. While some see the antebellum years as moments of aggressive state-
building, others, notably Robin Einhorn, argue that decentralization allowed 
propertyowners to insulate property from majority rule.1 However, both centralization and 
decentralization of government authority here allowed conservatives to ensure control over 
state power remained in the right hands. Local centralization – coupled to occasional 
decentralizing measures – therefore helped conservatives pursue their own programme of 
state strengthening without embracing the kind of European-style national centralization 
they had critiqued in France. 
The percent power relationships between people and government consolidation 
could set locally was also of national importance. Despite the distinctions historians have 
drawn between federal and local power, however, city reformers – conservatives prominent 
among them – moved back and forth between local and national centralization in making 
their case, sometimes treating cities as microcosms of the Union as a whole.2 One reformer 
in Philadelphia, for instance, proposed to consolidate the city into not one but two 
municipalities, a South Philadelphia and a North Philadelphia, just after Congress adopted 
popular sovereignty in the territories as a solution to the sectional crisis. 3  As well as 
providing a window onto seeing how national federalism shaped local politics, though, the 
local experience of reform also came to inform how conservatives responded to the national 
sectional crisis too. Municipal reform therefore formed part of a much wider conservative 
response to midcentury challenges posed by turbulent democracy, economic transformation, 
and divisions over slavery, and provided one arena for conservatives to pursue an agenda 
that predated the turn to retrenchment in the 1870s.  
Conservative supporters of municipal reform in the 1850s used ideas about 
centralization to fight over democracy, power, and union in their cities and the country as a 
whole. Their battles offer insights into how they expected the state to modernise in the face 
of industrialisation, urbanisation, and sectional conflict on both a local and national scale. 
At a local level, it allowed them to argue that the people were responsible for a process of 
centralization, just as they were in Paris, but their responses had national implications. The 
conservatives studied here recognised their governments needed to evolve over time, rather 
than remain static, if they were to maintain the proper distribution of power between the 
state and the people. The debates surrounding consolidations and policing helped them 
explore what that evolution might look like: 1848-style republic or British-style propertied 
rule; a patchwork of local governments or a centralized unitary state; a powerful government 
shielded from democratic sway or one directly amenable to the people. Midcentury 
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municipal reform, in addressing some of these questions, allows us to see how conservatives 
hoped to build their own path to modernity. 
Examples of municipal centralization – often called consolidations – in the 1850s, 
suggest that centralization was more than just a political weapon to describe phenomena on 
an international, national, or regional scale. Urban conservatives also used the concept to 
contest the legitimate institutional and geographic centres of authority within cities. In so 
doing, they helped define a conservative approach to building a government quite different 
to that of their republican eighteenth-century forbearers, and the ostensibly egalitarian vision 
of Jacksonian democrats.  And when applied on a national scale, their approach can help us 
understand their response to the slavery crisis. 
Riot and Reform in Midcentury America 
Questions about the where power belonged in the metropolis arose while American cities 
confronted a problem of urban disorder. Like in Paris, it seemed that the people had the 
potential to monopolise violence in public space outside of the control of the institutions of 
republican government. 4 For conservatives, these questions about disorder were closely 
related to concerns about democratic overreach. In response, they looked to the many city 
reform movements of the era. In this period, smaller cities like Brooklyn, Philadelphia, and 
New Orleans merged with surrounding townships, counties, and municipalities to form 
larger city governments, often citing the need for strong policing as a reason. Others, 
including New York and Boston, engaged in institutional reform, merging separate police 
forces, strengthening city executives, and reforming city charters. To opponents, these 
reforms seemed like a dangerous curb on American democracy, and they drew from ideas 
like states’ rights to demonstrate their opposition. But for proponents, this process of 
geographic centralization in more expansive municipalities and centralization in formed an 
important part of how they hoped to build stronger conservative government fit for the 
pressures of the nineteenth-century.  
Historians have described the 1840s and 1850s as particularly violent decades, as 
ethnic, class, and political tensions often led to outbreaks of unrest. Just one riot in 
Philadelphia in 1844 between Irish Catholics and nativist Protestants led to over twenty 
deaths and over fifty wounded, and while the death toll was unusually high, the street 
fighting was not. The Philadelphia nativist riots followed riots against abolitionists and 
African-Americans in particular in 1842, and resulted in the burning and looting of many 
black churches and property. New York experienced major riots through the 1830s and 
1840s, culminating in 1849, when class and ethnic tensions exploded at a performance of 
Macbeth, leading to the death of 25 people and over one hundred injuries. In the 1850s, the 
city’s two rival police forces fought each other and, in this power vacuum, the city’s gangs 
started a year-long violent gang war.  In this decade armed uprisings also successfully ruled 
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New Orleans and San Francisco in the period, and Baltimore too experienced violence at 
the hands of nativists and firemen.5 
Moreover, much of this rioting was inherently political. Not only did rioters often 
have political aims, such as protesting abolitionism, brawling gangs were often politically 
connected to volunteer fire companies, ward bosses, and police forces. Urban Americans 
also had a long tradition of using rioting as a legitimate way for the citizens themselves to 
settle disputes between the governed and the governors. Even eminent citizens often 
accepted that rioting was a form of democratic expression, even if by the 1840s most had 
come to oppose it. From the revolutionary era onwards, many Americans had seen in 
popular violence – ranging from violent urban protest to the Shays and Dorr rebellions – the 
potential for the people themselves to claim sovereignty outside the formal channels of 
elections. Some, drawing on earlier traditions of legitimate revolt and community justice, 
saw this as legitimate. Even wealthy citizens sometimes headed the crowd in the Jacksonian 
era.6  
But to conservatives, this right to rebel increasingly looked more like a licence for 
insurrection, anarchy, and mob rule.7 If crowd violence could be read as democratic excess, 
elite control over public space could also become a tool to curb a wider definition of popular 
sovereignty.8 Defenders of white male democracy suspected as much. Their concerns often 
stymied plans for a stronger police force in many cities. 9 Conservatives might not have 
openly discussed disenfranchisement as a tool to curb the democratic rights of the masses 
and create a British-style government in the hands of a smaller number of propertied citizens, 
though such proposals did occasionally surface in the Nativist movement.10 However, this 
thinking – that democracy and mob violence were intrinsically linked – was central to how 
conservatives in the 1850s understood urban disorder as a centralization of power in the 
assemblage of the people themselves, and in their response, they looked to both restore law 
and order and curb urban democracy. 
Looking at midcentury in this way can help bridge understand the links in 
antidemocratic politics between the Jacksonian era and the late nineteenth century. 
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Historians often take the Gilded Age as the beginning of a major conservative turn in 
approaches to American city government. The most spectacular example of this lies in New 
York. In 1871, wealthy taxpayers revolted against the high-spending regime of city boss 
William Tweed, who had used patronage and corruption to reconcile the city’s fractured 
class and ethnic groups. These taxpayers demanded lower taxes, smaller government, and 
democratic retrenchment; the official inquiry into preventing another Tweed Ring in New 
York recommended all cities in New York State effectively disenfranchise non-
propertyowners in most municipal decision-making.11 However, conservatives in the 1850s 
– who were hardly enthusiastic converts to the creed of Jacksonian democracy – used 
American cities as an opportunity to redefine centralization in the people as a threat to 
republican government. Like their attempts to combat economic centralization in empire 
cities, they used urban disorder here to legitimise their own state-building programme, and 
linked strengthening government to forms of democratic retrenchment. 
The riotous antebellum era saw substantial experimentation in local government 
too. Unlike the 1870s, though, municipal reform tended to mean creating stronger 
governments rather than just opposition to property taxation and perceived government 
corruption. Conservatives at midcentury inhabited fragmented cities in which state power – 
though often considerable in theory – was widely dispersed in practice. Big cities like 
Brooklyn, Philadelphia, and New Orleans were often divided among multiple municipalities 
and townships that provided their own police, services, and regulations. Others, including 
Boston and New York, devolved power among multiple wards and institutions. Police 
forces, for instance, were sometimes split between different officeholders, and ward 
aldermen often had substantial authority over criminal justice and improvements within 
their district. In this regard, American cities resembled the American government, with 
power divided among many smaller municipalities and states. It is perhaps therefore 
unsurprising that the response to both national and local disorder came to involve a similar 
programme of centralization. 
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Illustration 6: Map of the Circuit Ten Miles Around the City of Philadelphia 
 
 
Source: ‘Map of the Circuit Ten Miles Around the City of Philadelphia’ David Rumsey Historical 
Map Collection, http://www.davidrumsey.com [Accessed August 19, 2016]. Image copyright © 
2000 by Cartography Associates. Image may be reproduced or transmitted, but not for commercial 
use. 
 
This map shows the area that would become the City of Philadelphia as it existed in 1847, divided 
among many municipalities each with their own government, debts, and police. The Act of 
Consolidation, 1854 amalgamated the highlighted area north of the Delaware River into a single city 
after many years of intense lobbying by municipal reformers.  
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To many city-dwellers, this decentralized system represented an American tradition 
of self-government, yet it was one that could seem increasingly outmoded. In the 1850s, 
many cities turned away from divided municipal authority in favour of what they often 
called ‘consolidation’. Charter reforms in 1853 saw New Orleans and New York restructure 
their divided city governments. One year later, Brooklyn and Philadelphia annexed their 
surrounding municipalities and formed big city governments. 12  (For example, see 
Illustration 6 above.) Reformers saw their projects in centralizing terms. Philadelphian 
reformer Eli Kirk Price, for example, cited conflict between the intricate networks of elected 
and appointed boards, commissions, and offices as a reason for consolidation, claiming 
instead that these needed to be placed under the aegis of a single city government.13 While 
these movements took place in individual cities, and were different in each metropolis, 
Americans saw the consolidation of cities across the nation as part of a national trend 
towards centralized municipal government.14   
Other cities removed institutional, rather than geographic, boundaries to 
government power. Police reform also gave reformers an opportunity to respond to the 
changes taking place within American cities. Until the 1840s and 1850s, city policing – like 
municipal government more widely – remained decentralized in the hands of a variety of 
institutions, notably separate day marshals and night watches, but also ward constables, 
marshals, and lamp lighters. These often had little overall control and direction. Beginning 
with New York in 1845, cities therefore began merging these inefficient law-enforcing 
systems into modern police departments, often accountable directly to the city mayor, and 
considered tools like uniforms, telegraphs, and firearms to give them more authority over 
city streets.15 These were not simple modernizations, even if they were sometimes seen as 
such, and they often involved fierce political conflict. When the Republican New York State 
Legislature created a metropolitan wide force in 1857, for example, the existing Municipal 
Police rejected the authority of the new force, and, instead of disbanding, fought with its 
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rival in the  streets. 16  Others denounces measures like police uniforms, meanwhile, as 
militaristic and authoritarian.17 Where consolidation helped remove geographic boundaries 
to government power, cities also looked to removing institutional barriers that restricted the 
government when it sought to impose order on citizens, but neither project was uncontested. 
American conservatives engaged with – and sometimes led – these municipal reform 
movements. The leader of the consolidation movement in Philadelphia, Eli Kirk Price, for 
example, took part in union meetings18 that denounced abolitionists for threatening the 
Union, affirmed the harmony between the free and slave states, and suggested that 
Pennsylvania counties should be liable for compensating slaveholders for fugitive slaves.19 
He also supported Buchanan as a union candidate against John C. Frémont in 1856 and 
John Bell over Abraham Lincoln in 1860.20 Additionally, conservative leaning newspapers 
often provided the strongest support for city reform movements. The New York Herald was 
one of the foremost proponents of centralizing New York City’s myriad elected and 
appointed officeholders, boards, and departments into a single city government in the 
1850s. 21  Price’s good friend, the newspaper editor and conservative Whig-Republican 
Morton McMichael, presided at a public meeting in support of consolidation and wrote 
about the movement extensively in his North American; he chaired the committee that drew 
up a new charter in 1853-4, which included wealthy Democrats, Whigs, and Nativists.22 
Conservative papers with partisan inclinations here saw themselves working towards similar 
ends too. The Philadelphia Inquirer argued consolidation was an electoral opportunity for 
Whig conservatives, and the Democratic Brooklyn Eagle, which positioned itself as a 
bipartisan ‘conservative’ alternative to radical Whiggery, which it associated with 
‘fanaticism’, also supported Brooklyn’s union.23 Consolidations typically drew support of 
economic elites regardless of party affiliations. 
Historians of these movements have often seen them part of a city booster impulse 
that led many citizens to embrace the internal improvements and railroad construction 
outlined in the previous chapter. Believing that ‘bigger is better’ – as Kenneth Jackson put it 
– boosters boasted about the size of their consolidated cities’ and believed that their rank in 
the census and their territorial dimensions reflected their modern, prosperous, and 
metropolitan condition. 24 Other have seen consolidations like Philadelphia’s in 1854 as 
backward-looking measures – lackadaisical responses to disorder that failed to confront 
entrenched interests - rather than attempts to create modern city governments.25 But these 
scholars have been exceptions. Writing about the consolidation of Philadelphia, one 
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historian, more typically, sees the 1854 charter as part of a programme of modernisation that 
created a more democratic, efficient, and nationally prestigious metropolis.26 Many others 
argue that urban elites turned to city consolidation as a tool of social control, as they looked 
to extend police powers over riotous citizens, at the cost of the civic engagement and 
democratic culture that marked the decentralised eighteenth-century system of city 
government. In this respect, police reform, school reform, and crackdowns on prostitution, 
gambling, and, alcohol all proceeded together.27  
For conservatives, though, modernisation and social control – curbing the violent 
democratic excess – went hand in hand. As much as many other reformers, conservatives 
were dissatisfied with an outdated system of government and wanted municipalities capable 
of promoting their city and intervening in the wider economy. This fitted within their own 
conservative vision of modernisation. They sought to build a stronger government, restrain 
the influence of propertyless voters, and ensure urban development over time took place 
under what David Scobey calls elite ‘stewardship’ – government by a supposedly high-
minded propertied elite.28 City reform movements offered conservatives the opportunity to 
pursue this much wider reform of politics and society that went well beyond their own 
municipal boundaries. The fact that cities or towns were the layer of government Americans 
interacted with on a regular basis meant that local reform, especially when it came to 
enforcing law and order, gave conservatives the opportunity to radically change the 
relationship between the state and the people, while seemingly leaving the federal structure 
of the American government relatively untouched.29 As William Novak and others have 
pointed out, states often outsourced the police power reserved to them by the 10th 
Amendment – the power to regulate for the common good – to municipalities, which, in 
contrast to the carefully circumscribed Federal government, therefore wielded considerable 
capacity to intervene in everyday life. 30  Historians haver therefore used the distinction 
between a relatively weak federal government and relatively vigorous local government to 
understand how the American state remained both decentralised but relatively powerful. 
American cities in the 1850s were violent places. Many cities responded to the 
problem of disorder with a programme of centralization. Some sought to enlarge city 
governments by merging multiple local governments into larger consolidated cities. Others 
sought to amend or replace their city charters and strengthen city government with 
streamlined law enforcement powers. Conservatives often engaged with these movements, 
lending support to reforms that sought to bring stronger government to city streets. However, 
the conservative assumption that public violence was a symptom of democratic excess 
suggests that their motives for doing so may have extended beyond simply curbing crime. 
As when observing Paris and when looking to build governments capable of reforming 
economic geography, conservatives may have seen embracing the cause of centralization at 
a local level as part of a wider reform to reassert the role of property and elites in governing 
the American people. 
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Conservative City Reform as a Centralization of Power 
Conservatives applied similar ideas about centralization of power in institutions and over 
geography that they had used to understand France and urban imperialism to understand 
the politics of reform in American cities. Like critics of the Second Republic and empire 
cities, opponents of city reform and consolidation movements often used centralization 
pejoratively as a political weapon to delegitimise plans to create larger governments, and 
warned of dependence on remote sources of power. Rather than denying that they were 
centralizing power, consolidationists and city reformers accepted the charge, and argued that 
centralizations of power were necessary in a modern metropolis. They, too, accepted that 
reforms like police telegraphs and enlarged municipal boundaries helped the city extend 
power outwards, and that establishing impersonal bureaucracies could strengthen 
government institutions and their ability to compel citizens to the will of government. 
Conceptualising these changes to city government as a process of centralization therefore 
helped conservatives understand how city reform might remove institutional and geographic 
barriers to executive power and create new centres of political authority.  
To more than a few Americans, mid-century city governments seemed increasingly 
dysfunctional, but whether centralization was the right response was open to debate. In New 
York, for example, commercial growth in the 1840s had not solved the problem of rising 
property taxes, while city services, such as wharves and docks, the paving and clearing of 
streets, and the provision of effective policing, remained conspicuously poor. Mayors had 
advocated a radical restructuring of government in response to these issues. Mayor Robert 
Morris had in the 1840s proposed to make all city offices elective and to devolve huge 
amounts of power to individual wards to give the people power to directly control their 
government. One of his successors, William Hevemeyer, who would serve a second term as 
a municipal reformer in the 1870s, conversely, proposed creating a far stronger municipal 
civil service and streamlining the divided executive branch to improve city efficiency. 
However, none of these programmes came into effect. New Yorkers could never agree 
whether an efficient city government required strengthening the executive or dividing its 
power among elective officeholders to prevent executive tyranny. 31 While there seemed 
agreement on the need for government reform, there seemed less agreement on how to do 
this in practice. 
Such contrasting views on the wisdom of remaking municipal government appeared 
in other cities too. When reformers proposed merging municipalities into larger consolidated 
cities, opponents invoked ‘centralization’ again, casting tyrannical local government as a 
threat in a similar manner to the way Carey and others had warned of distant imperial cities 
and colonial metropoles. For example, in Southwark district – an independent municipality 
just south of Philadelphia proper – commissioners claimed that annexation to their larger 
neighbour would lead to a ‘centralization of power in the hands of the few’.  32 Maurice 
Richter, a Brooklyn-based physician and publicist 33  warned that ‘Encroachments’ and 
‘Consolidations’ into larger cities caused ‘Centralization’ and ‘Despotism’.34  
Critics imagined that, as well as concentrating power in a small number of people, 
institutions, and officeholders, consolidation would concentrate political authority inwards 
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at the expense of the urban periphery. Echoing on a local scale the kinds of concerns that 
Henry Carey and other city boosters had seen in New York and London’s growing 
geographic dominion, some warned that more remote seats of government posed a threat. 
A correspondent to the Cleveland Herald feared that ‘the balance of power would be in the 
lands of the West side of the Cuyahoga’ if the city consolidated with its western suburbs, 
while Williamsburgh papers claimed consolidation with Brooklyn would displace the city 
from its present ‘central’ position.3536 Brooklynites, too, warned that consolidation with 
Manhattan would ‘remove the seat of government’ across the East River.37 Opponents of 
consolidation used centralization to counsel that territorially larger governments would 
create bonds of dependency between city centres and  citizens of surrounding suburbs, 
neighbourhoods, and towns. Such ties, they suggested, were too high a price to pay for 
bringing order. 
As with the spreading ties of urban infrastructure, conservatives also saw the 
extension of a municipality’s territorial reach as a tool to extend power relationships over 
greater territory. What it did not resolve was whether it would centralize power in the right 
people and places. Richter, for example, elaborated on how big cities created ties of 
dependency between people and government, contrasting London, Dresden, and Paris’s 
town, ward, and borough authorities under weak central city government to the ‘pyramid of 
official bureaus’ of bureaucratic, consolidated city government. 38  Smaller municipal 
governments, relying on more personal relationships, would allow the people and the 
government to exercise ‘mutual control’ over one other, without needing long-distance ties 
of bureaucratic dependency.39 The danger of an enlarged city government lay not so much 
in its vast patronage – the bugbear of many reformers – but rather because it established 
impersonal bureaucratic ties between citizen and state that enabled the government to 
exercise power without restraint. Others though could see this impersonality as an advantage 
in overcoming local sources of power. The conservative Whig Philadelphia Inquirer, for 
example, agreed with Richter that consolidation bound people to the state through the 
institutions and workings of government, but saw this as a virtue rather than a flaw. 40  
The forces driving these changes were not just a matter of re-drawing borders. Just 
as railroads redrew national power relationships around mid-century, technological 
advancements did the same in cities. By the mid-1850s several municipalities had adopted 
police telegraphs, which allowed the circulation of information across rapidly extending 
metropolitan areas, and helped direct state power quickly to where it was needed. Police 
reformers understood this too. In similar language to Francis Lieber, who had claimed that 
Paris had ‘telegraphed to the departments’ the Revolution of 1848,41 the Baltimore Sun, as 
part of their campaign for the consolidation of a new police department, cited evidence from 
Philadelphia of how a police telegraph office allowed police officers to relay orders, the 
Mayor to direct subordinates, and officials to transmit dispatches to city government. 42 
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Conservatives, indeed, tended looked on approvingly at the technological advancements 
that brought state power into suburbs. The Philadelphia paper owned by Morton Michael – 
who had fought suburban rioters as county sheriff in the 1840s – noted soon before the Civil 
War how horse-drawn trams, an innovation of the late 1850s, had resulted ‘in the carrying 
of law and order among the rude urchins of the outlying streets and districts.’43 To reformers, 
increasing government’s geographic reach and technological capacity allowed a state to 
impose its will on citizens. Reforming supposedly dysfunctional city administrations would 
allow governments to impose their power vertically from officeholders and institutions over 
the people and horizontally from the centre to the periphery. 
This two-fold process of centralization, rather than taking America back to the past, 
seemed an important part of how the United States would cope with its projected urban 
future. The New York lawyer and police reformer James Gerard 44  – a leader of the 
conservative union movement in the 1850s – described London and Paris as ‘a century ahead 
of us’ in their ability to maintain order, but he remained concerned that despotic 
governments used these police forces as tools of coercion. 45  While Gerard understood 
republican warnings against strong states and centralized government, he saw that New 
York needed a government capable of dealing with a modern city.46 Indeed, conservative 
reformers like Eli Kirk Price, the North American, and the Baltimore American also indicated 
that urban areas divided among petty municipalities belonged to an outmoded agrarian age. 
Cities, they believed, needed stronger government to impose order on a society growing 
more disorderly over time. They expected ‘centralization’ and the strong power relationships 
it brought would help them keep up with a changing society around them. 47  To these 
Americans, the process of centralization meant modernization and progress, as it gave 
government the tools to impose order on cities that grew more diverse, disorderly, and larger 
over time.  
Others, though, felt that the power of large cities posed a threat rather than the 
opportunity, and Europe again served as a warning rather than an example to follow. 
Richter, in writing about consolidation, policing, and municipal government, felt that large 
cities ‘monarchized’ republics, as larger polities required European-style state intervention.48 
Progress, he argued, meant large states and cities should divide as their population grew, lest 
the polity fall victim to the ‘monarchy’ and ‘centralization’ of powerful government.49 But 
both supporters and opponents of municipal reform expected government power to grow 
with cities themselves, although they seemed unable to agree on whether this was always a 
good thing in practice. 
American supporters and opponents of these city reform movements understood city 
reform as a process of centralization of political authority. Indeed, opponents often accused 
reformers of being centralizers as a political weapon to undermine these changes, just as 
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opponents of New York or London’s commercial growth had done. Conservatives also 
conceptualised these changes as processes of centralization, just they had done so to 
understand the changing power relationships of Second Empire France and internal 
improvements. Both supporters and opponents recognised that these seemingly small 
changers to city government could remove some of the barriers to state authority and 
allowed city government to exercise stronger power over a larger area. Given the importance 
of their local governments to the American constitution, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
seemingly trivial changes to municipal authorities could seem like a more fundamental 
reorganisation of the state, in which republicanism might give way to something 
approaching monarchy, or order could come out of anarchy. Thinking about the process of 
centralization at a local level could therefore help conservatives think about the relationship 
between the people and government more widely. 
Consolidation and Urban Disorder 
Conservatives who supported consolidation movements conceptualised the urban disorder 
that they supposed plagued their cities in a way that mirrored their reading of the Second 
French Republic. Like the Paris mob, they suggested that urban rioters had monopolised 
violence and power in public space and become a state within a state, like the French 
republican counterparts. The American people, too, could drive a dangerous process of 
centralization straight into the wrong hands. Conservatives therefore conceptualised riot and 
reform as an issue of government strength against government weakness. Conservatives 
therefore turned to the city reform movements of mid-century America as a tool to bring 
about law and order, centralizing power on their own terms. Rather than seeing geographic 
and institutional barriers on government power as necessary guarantors against tyrannical 
government – as federalism and checks and balances did nationally – urban conservatives 
sought to remove them. They did so by consolidating executive authority, creating police 
forces, and abolishing the political boundaries between municipalities. Conservative critics 
of consolidation may have opposed creating larger municipalities, but far from rejecting 
centralization in principle, they demanded centralizations more amenable to control by their 
own party. Conservatives therefore used geographic and institutional centralizations of 
power as tools to strengthen city governments in response to a violent threat from below, as 
well as compete among themselves for power to direct this new stronger government. 
City reformers focused on combating urban violence in midcentury American cities. 
Philadelphia’s consolidated city charter reformed the police department, and followed years 
of lobbying to reform the police system, which had already resulted in the creation of a 
metropolitan wide force in 1850 – a compromise between conservatives and politicians who 
disagreed over whether a full consolidation was necessary. The city government also 
established a police telegraph system to ensure the new department could efficiently patrol 
the entire city from its central headquarters.50 The consolidation of Brooklyn also coincided 
with the foundation of a stronger police department for the entire city, and the first mayor 
of the consolidated city had a record of lobbying for police reform. 51  Historians of 
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consolidation, indeed, have often seen social control as the main motive for extending the 
territorial and administrative powers of municipal governments.52 
Cities that did not annex smaller neighbours also looked to strengthen law 
enforcement. In mid-century New York City, wealthy citizens had been demanding a ‘civic 
army’ since the 1840s, and charter reforms of 1845 and 1852 did not satisfy their desire for 
change. James Gerard, for instance, vividly compared disorderly New York at midcentury 
to the supposedly peaceful streets of London under the watch of the Metropolitan Police.53 
Fernando Wood, Mayor of New York from 1855-1858 and a prosperous merchant, won 
election as a Louis-Napoleon-esque figure who could bring order out of New York’s chaos, 
although most turned against him once he endorsed workingmen’s calls for public aid after 
the Panic of 1857.54  
Elsewhere concerns over disorder led to real and imagined seizures of state power 
on the part of ‘best men’. The San Francisco Vigilance Committee – largely made up of the 
mercantile community – overthrew the city’s elected government and executed and exiled 
enemies in 1856 partially because elite citizens believed the city government had grown too 
corrupt to maintain local law and order. 55  Sidney George Fisher, one of the leading 
conservative diarists of the age, predicted that rioting and crime would make the same kind 
of coup necessary in New York and Philadelphia.56 Indeed conservatives in eastern cities 
often approved the actions of San Francisco’s genteel vigilantes, who carefully staged rituals 
of government to ensure that their reign over the city looked more legitimate to elites than 
mob law.57 Across the United States, conservatives in major cities sought various changes to 
city government in response to the threat of popular disorder. In doing so they created the 
physical, legal, and extra-legal infrastructure – uniformed police, telegraph lines, and 
institutions like consolidated municipal governments and vigilance committees – that gave 
the centre power over a wide area. 
To justify such changes, conservatives described their cities as under mob rule, 
arguing a violent people seemed to hold complete authority over public space. Conservatives 
described rioters, gangs, and criminals as a source of power able to control the whole city, 
similar in composition and character to the Paris mob in the Second Republic. The lurid 
descriptions of urban violence in editorials proposing reform emphasised the violent control 
that the people could exercise over the city.58 The fact that rioters, gangs, and mobs had 
access to guns, while policemen patrolled unarmed, seemed particular evidence that a state 
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monopoly on legitimate force was a fiction in American cities.59 Conservative commentators 
in Philadelphia and Baltimore  both described gangs – dozens of which flourished in 
midcentury metropolises – as literally ruling the streets in place of civil authority.60 The 
Baltimore Sun could warn that rioting – in which gangs often participated – would create an 
anarchic city divided into ‘feudal’ and ‘warlike factions’. It marked a ‘total perversion of the 
republican theory’ to the paper because popular violence challenged the principle that 
government, not the people, should wield power in public. 61 Private groups, distributed 
across the city, and ready to use violence therefore seemed to hold ultimate sovereignty 
because of a weak state unable to wield power from the central seats of city institutions.62  
Urban disorder therefore illustrated, to conservatives, a problem of state weakness, 
as the people formed dangerous states within states that were simultaneously geographically 
decentralized among gangs and rioters across the city, but institutionally centralized in the 
democratic principle and urban violence. The reforms they demanded in response would tie 
individual citizens all over the city to the municipal government and ensure that the state 
held a monopoly on violence with no rival sovereignties to challenge its authority. 
To combat these states within a state, then, conservatives looked to centralize power 
in governments capable of maintaining state control over the city. Where Richter saw the 
power centralization brought as dangerous, reformers tended to see necessary government 
authority over the people as a tool to maintain law and order. Conservatives described their 
projects in hegemonic terms of state power and supremacy, emphasising that the state should 
direct violence against rival sovereignties in their cities. Baltimore papers pressed for the 
‘supremacy of the law’, an ‘energetic interposition of the law’, and ‘quietness and order’ on 
city streets. 63 And in New York, even though the Democratic Herald and Republican-leaning 
Courier and Enquirer opposed the partisan Metropolitan Police, both demanded after riots in 
1857 a ‘thorough’ force to maintain order, the vigorous use of the ‘strong arm of the law’, 
and the strengthening of the ‘powers of their chief magistrate’ on the London and Paris 
model.64 In Philadelphia and New Orleans, too, conservatives warned that the American 
people as much as the French needed ‘military resistance to popular insurrection’ and 
‘power’ to keep them in line. 65  This language of ‘power’, ‘forcible resistance’ to 
‘insurrection’, and ‘order’ all suggested that conservatives intended to ensure that the people 
were subject to the power of the state. Conservative consolidationists therefore saw their 
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reforms as tools to increase the authority of the state over the people. They wanted to create 
a simpler, more visible state government that would allow the institutions and individuals at 
the centre to extend their authority over the people of the hinterland. They clearly visualised 
government agents imposing order and ensuring that the government ruled city streets. In 
place of a ‘spirit of lawless insubordination’, the press imagined a polity where the people 
owed the government obedience and respect. 66  The consolidated and policed city, 
conservatives hoped, would have a single sovereign, capable of governing a midcentury 
metropolis, in place of the centralization of power in the mob. 
Streamlining government institutions so that they could more easily exercise state 
power allowed conservatives to strengthen the power relationships that bound the people to 
the government. Newspapers in Baltimore, for example, argued that merging the city’s day 
police and night watch as part of their reform programme would encourage the ‘efficiency’ 
of the police department and guarantee an active corps of beat policemen in place of the 
supposedly passive watch.67  The Sun insisted an ‘energetic Mayor of Baltimore’ would 
ensure ‘an active, zealous exercise of that [municipal] authority’.68 The division of the police, 
such voices suggested, inhibited an active city government that could govern the streets. 
When the Louisiana state legislature placed New Orleans’s police under the control of a 
multi-member board, city critics argued too that where having a single Mayoral executive 
gave law enforcement ‘promptness’ and ‘efficiency’, the new organisation would always be 
‘weak and ‘feeble’. 69  Such a board could never maintain order as well as a single 
officeholder. 70  Again, reformers hoped that consolidating control over local law 
enforcement in a smaller number of officeholders with fewer checks on their power would 
lead to a more active government capable of limiting popular violence and disorder. 
Simplifying government institutions could make it easier for a small number of men to make 
policy decisions and have them enforced over the entire territory of the metropolis. 
Consolidators therefore recognised that seemingly trivial bureaucratic reforms could enable 
stronger government from the centre. 
Indeed, when it was their man in charge, conservative consolidators cheered ‘one 
man’ government as bringing order to city and government. The Herald opposed weak 
government, at least, so long as its favourite Democrat Wood held the Mayor’s office, 
fearing the ‘paralysis’, ‘municipal decay’, and ‘anarchy’ that would set in without someone 
of his ilk. 71 But in 1857, Republicans increased the number of independently elected city 
officers in New York to curb Wood’s authority. In response, the Herald suggested that this 
blatantly partisan reform ‘aggravates the present scheme of decentralization’ and counselled 
that ‘such a contrived government could never exercise power as efficiently as one 
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officeholder.72  And it reminded the New York Tribune that it too had once believed adding 
to ‘the complication which renders our municipal administration unwieldly to a proverb’ 
would lead to riot and disorder.73 Only a ‘centralization of authority’ and ‘concentration of 
responsibility’ in the Mayor, giving Wood complete control of the police, city departments, 
and offices, could bring order to city government.74 The Herald saw the plethora of elected 
officeholders as a check on state power, but rather than seeing this as a necessary guarantor 
of republican liberty, it appeared to the paper as the symptom of a dysfunction that led to 
disorder.  
Such views extended beyond a paper with Democratic sympathies, and even those 
with little time for figures like Wood often supported centralization of executive power in a 
single office. New York’s conservative Courier and Enquirer, for example, shared the Herald’s 
scepticism at the decentralizing thrust of Jacksonian democracy, describing the number of 
elected officials as a ‘monster’ and demanding that the executive be ‘strengthened’, even if 
it meant handing power to a Democratic mayor.75 Eli Kirk Price, retrospectively defending 
consolidation, boasted that ‘a single Executive’ could use Philadelphia’s new police 
telegraph to ‘meet riotous proceedings’.76 Within their municipalities, these conservatives 
embraced centralization, arguing that consolidating power in one man could bring order to 
a turbulent democracy where the checks and balances of Madisonian government and 
Jacksonian government could not. 
Removing institutional barriers to state power was only one weapon in 
conservatives’ arsenal. They also saw urban disorder as a problem of power over space. To 
bring peace to the riotous streets of suburban Philadelphia, consolidators in the city argued 
that ‘the extension of a strong government to weak and neglected suburban districts carries 
with it the blessings of order’.77 The New Orleans Picayune too claimed that a police under 
‘one central and experienced authority’ would bring order over the city’s municipalities.78 
Such perspectives on consolidation implicitly involved extending the supposed order, 
harmony, and government of the centre over conflict-ridden, weak, and disorderly suburbia. 
Consolidation would carry order out from the centre to the hinterland, but even reformers 
who did not envision expanding municipal boundaries supported this geographic extension 
of power. In New York, police reformer and union Party activist James Gerard praised 
London’s police for their ‘constant communication by telegraph from the great station at 
Whitehall to all parts of’ the city, with information ‘radiating and communicating like a 
spider’s web from the chief office as the common centre, to all the ramifications of the great 
metropolis.’79 Gerard joined other conservative admirers of England’s capital in boasting 
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that ‘the eye of the Policeman, in his steady, ceaseless round’ put the entire city under the 
supervision of the government’. 80 Conservatives who shared such views sought to subject 
suburbs to a new geography of power in which the city projected authority over its suburban 
hinterland, a local equivalent of their designs for urban imperialism.  
Sharing power among multiple municipalities across the city only encouraged 
disorder where a central government could act in what conservatives believed was the 
interest of the whole metropolis.81 Both the Brooklyn Eagle and Eli Kirk Price blamed the 
‘mutual contest’ and ‘conflicting interests’ between adjoining and overlapping municipal 
governments for disorder, and prescribed amalgamation as a remedy.82 The Eagle, indeed, 
saw in Philadelphia’s riotous fire companies – often closely tied to street gangs and aligned 
with suburban politicians – as an example of what Brooklyn could expect if it failed to 
consolidate its city, village, and township governments. 83  Instead of containing corrupt 
power, such voices insisted, small municipalities inhibited the pursuit of the common good. 
Cleveland’s Herald thus argued that the ‘union’ of Cleveland and Ohio City would end 
disputes over bridges, dredging, and navigation of the Cuyahoga River, as well as strengthen 
law enforcement. 84  To city reformers, rather than checking the power of a corruptible 
government, the boundaries separating local centres of political authority actually led to 
disorder within the metropolitan region, and inhibited the kind of policies required for 
development.  
When looking for stronger local government, these conservatives looked for 
analogies at national and international levels. Conservatives who saw divided government 
as an impediment to development sometimes praised Napoleon III’s centralized government 
for its ability to develop the French economy by building railroads and canals. Both the 
Cleveland Herald and Morton McMichael’s Philadelphia North American praised Napoleon 
III’s strong, imperial state for delivering the commercial prosperity that the Second Republic 
had been unable to create.85 The logic of state centralization could be scaled up or down, 
with debates about political economy – as Robin Einhorn has argued in the case of Chicago 
– having ramifications at municipal, state, and federal levels. 86 Similar ideas about the 
boundaries between different municipal governments, would also come to influence 
conservatives when they looked to stronger government to prevent the disorder of national 
disunion. 
Conservatives indeed believed that the invisible boundaries between municipalities 
weakened the executive power of central governments. This could be useful or dangerous, 
as many challenged Napoleonic centralization, threats to the federal system, and even 
metropolitan consolidations when they threatened to centralize power beyond conservative 
control. Francis Lieber, for example, warned that Paris had deliberately redrawn French 
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municipal boundaries to wield power over the rest of the nation.87 City reformers agreed, but 
wanted to use this newfound source of political power. Having rival police forces had 
prevented New Orleans and Philadelphia from maintaining order. 88  Commentators 
recognised that the division of Philadelphia and Brooklyn into ‘little local governments’ had 
‘paralyzed’ state power, as the polities limited policemen to working within their invisible 
municipal boundaries, while fugitives crossed borders and evaded justice.89 Brooklyn and 
Philadelphia’s consolidationists shared Lieber’s assumption that dividing law enforcement 
power within strictly defined boundaries weakened government’s ability to suppress popular 
violence – and turned to a ‘powerful central government’ or a ‘centralized’ administration 
to strengthen police power.90 They agreed with Lieber that ancient municipal boundaries 
prevented political power spreading out from city centres – but saw the process on a 
municipal scale as a way to impose order. Indeed, the Picayune claimed that ending the 
division of the New Orleans police into multiple municipalities would give government 
‘energy and efficiency’ in place of weakness.91 Price meanwhile compared the process of 
consolidation in Philadelphia to that of the replacement of the Articles of Confederation, 
drawing from a conservative reading of the Constitution as a document designed to replace 
ineffective state governments with a powerful central government in Washington that could 
suppress disorderly states and people.92 Adopting the mantra of states’ rights within the city, 
he warned, invited Shays-like uprisings on the streets of Philadelphia. Embracing the process 
of opening up power relationships and removing boundaries to the power of the state might 
seem dangerous nationally, but at the local level, they supported centralization so that the 
centre could rule the masses. 
Not all conservatives were happy to support consolidation, and pressed their claims 
in the language of opposition to geographic centralization. To avoid the risk of handing 
power to their political opponents these Democrats instead turned to centralizing power in 
institutions. Centralizing power in state institutions could instead diffuse the threat a violent 
people posed to state integrity. Thomas Fernon, the ranking Democrat on the Pennsylvania 
Senate committee on consolidation and an ardent railroad promoter, repeatedly denounced 
the consolidation of the city as a precedent for a ‘doctrine of centralization that would spread 
the power and the laws of one city corporation over its whole surface’.93 Yet he and other 
opponents of consolidation also demanded a ‘powerful’ and ‘efficient’ Marshal’s Police to 
deal with violence on the streets of the city. 94  They supported giving the ‘powerless’ 
government the authority to impose ‘obedience to the laws’ over the ‘spirit of riot and 
ruffianism’, and believed having the police under ‘one head’ accountable to ‘one body’ was 
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the best means to do this. 95  Despite this opposition to geographic centralization over 
territory, they nonetheless supported strengthening the state’s law-enforcing power by 
removing institutional and geographic barriers to the exercise of police power. Only on a 
more local scale than the whole city would Fernon accept geographic centralization. He 
supported the separate mergers of the municipalities North and South of Philadelphia, which 
would give them the ability to ‘build up’ their own territories, just as an independent West 
Philadelphia had already been created in the 1840s.96 Fernon’s Democratic politics may 
have influenced his desire to avoid a consolidation as large as that undertaken in 1854, as 
many suburban Democrats feared a Whig inner city outvoting them, and he readily invoked 
a Jacksonian idiom of local self-government to resist the amalgamation of the entire 
metropolis.97 But he nonetheless remained convinced that centralization in the sphere of law 
enforcement was necessary to suppress disorder. Like consolidationists, he hoped reform 
would streamline government and remove the obstacles to giving officeholders and state 
institutions the power to impose order upon the territories they governed. 
Conservative opponents of geographic centralization could therefore also be 
supporters of stronger government and centralizing power in institutions, even if they 
wanted to keep it at a more local level to keep power out of the hands of rival cities or the 
people themselves. Richter, for example, warned against the possibility of ‘mobs’ and 
‘vigilance committees’ wielding power in towns and cities.98 He warned that consolidating 
towns and counties into Philadelphia-style big governments would weaken and make 
‘unwieldly’ American cities.99 While he claimed to reject geographic centralization, he did 
so on the understanding that consolidation would weaken city government. To strengthen 
the power of the government over the people, he urged instead concentrating government 
authority in fewer municipal officeholders and removing barriers to their political authority. 
Like many other conservatives, he demanded that local government adopt a single executive 
head to wield power over independently elected officeholders, and bring order to his 
patchwork of town governments. 100  Town, county, and ward police forces under this 
direction, he proposed, would guarantee ‘laws are well executed’ and that ‘society will be in 
order’.101 He even proposed that town governments charge residents for damages incurred 
in riots as a way to protect property – a measure already on the statute books in 
Pennsylvania, and one bearing a similarity to Eli Kirk Price’s suggestion at a Philadelphia 
Union Meeting in 1860 that local communities compensate slaveholders if they fail to 
respect the Fugitive Slave Act.102 Richter therefore applied to metropolitan areas the ideal 
that opponents of urban imperialism had described on a regional scale: local centralizations 
of power as a defensive measure to prevent more remote central places emerging. Under 
Richter’s reforms, then, municipal statelets would be given the power to impose order. 
Power would be centred in strengthened institutions rather than consolidated over space, 
but the end – the supremacy of the state over the people – remained the same.  
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Conservatives might have supported a centralization of power in response to 
disorder, even if they did not always agree in whose hands they ought to centralize power. 
To conservatives, it seemed that the people – or at least a portion of them – held ultimate 
authority over life, death, and property in public space in American cities, as they had in 
Paris in the 1848 Revolution. They demanded that government restore its legitimate 
monopoly on the use of force. To do so, consolidationists and police reformers imagined a 
new political geography. What once may have appeared necessary checks on government 
authority now appeared as outmoded responses to riot and disorder. To conservative 
consolidators, increasing the intensity and territorial reach of state power, required 
simplifying structural boundaries to government authority. Consolidation and police reform, 
conservative supporters of law and order hoped, would remove these geographic and 
institutional barriers and allow state institutions – if necessary under the authority of one 
man – to wield law-enforcing power from the city centre outwards. Police and metropolitan 
consolidations provided the means to the same ends as telegraphs, uniforms, and armed 
policemen did: ensuring the centre ruled a governable city. Even conservatives who rejected 
the expansion of urban territory accepted the need to centralize power in city institutions. 
Removing institutional boundaries to power within individual municipalities, they hoped, 
would create multiple centralizations, in place of a larger – and perhaps more dangerous – 
metropolis. These conservatives, far from adhering to warnings about concentrated state 
power, also embraced the idea of centralizing geographic and institutional authority over 
the city.  
City Decentralization, Property, and Partisanship 
Disputes over whether large geographic centralizations as opposed to smaller institutional 
centralizations in response to disorder would concentrate power in the right people or party 
spoke to wider concerns among conservatives. Partisanship and disagreement between 
conservatives on national issues often divided conservatives and complicated plans to 
centralize power in city governments. Conservative reformers and opponents therefore 
agreed on the need for some form of centralized power to enforce the law, but rarely had 
any intention of centralizing or decentralizing power over property, improvements, and 
assessments, if doing so handed further power to their partisan opponents or democratic 
majorities. When reform seemed to place such powers out of their control, conservatives 
often denounced reforms as a dangerous centralization – with all the negative value 
judgements the term imparted. But as in the case of urban rivalries over trade, they opposed 
the people who benefited from centralization more than the principle of centralization itself. 
Moreover, conservative consolidationist movements often structured their programmes 
carefully to ensure that political authority did not fall into the hands of anyone who might 
stake a claim to their property either, as they feared the consequences of allowing new state 
power to fall into the hands of the people themselves, as it had done in Paris in 1848. 
Consolidationists and opponents of consolidation therefore balanced the need for 
centralization to maintain law and order with the need to prevent centralizing power in a 
whole range of other affairs that divided Americans, including conservatives, by class, party, 
and region. When building these new power relationships between governments and people, 
they were all careful to ensure that they centralized power in the correct people, parties, and 
places.   
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Both supporters and opponents of reform envisaged centralization in the sphere of 
law and order while retaining unwieldy government in other areas of municipal government. 
In Chicago, property-owners embraced a ‘segmented’ political economy that devolved most 
decision-making over improvements, assessments, and finance to individual wards as a tool 
to ensure that taxpayers in one neighbourhood did not have to pay for services elsewhere.103 
When Philadelphia consolidated in 1854, a united police force under an elected marshal 
already patrolled the city and its immediate suburbs, while the city’s many municipalities 
retained control over all other areas of municipal life.104 Many Philadelphians, like Fernon, 
were happy with this system of consolidated police and decentralized general city 
government. Consolidated city governments, Fernon warned, would simply concentrate 
power in the hands of the downtown Whig establishment.105 Fernon may have lost in 1854, 
but consolidators sometimes envisioned a similar distribution of power within the 
boundaries of enlarged cities. Consolidated New Orleans in 1854 retained vestigial districts 
with some autonomy from city government.106 (See Illustration 7  and Illustration 8 below.) 
The Eagle in Brooklyn proposed that ward aldermen should be responsible for improvements 
like lighting, paving, and water within the new metropolis. 107  (See Illustration 9 and 
Illustration 10 below.) Historians have seen such measures as concessions to local interests 
as part of a liberal modernising agenda, but conservatives had their own reasons to support 
keeping some local authority.108 Such reformers happily removed geographic boundaries to 
state executive power, so that city government could impose order from the centre at the 
expense of the people. But in all other spheres they accepted a much more complicated 
government to prevent centralization and strong government that might damage them.  
Even avid supporters of centralization worried about who might benefit from their 
state-building. Wide partisan divides made it difficult for many to consider removing barriers 
to state power lest the new machinery came under the control of the wrong people. They 
even used centralization as a political weapon when they sensed that their partisan 
opponents might benefit from it and wanted to delegitimise state strengthening that would 
not advance their interests. The first attempt to merge Philadelphia’s city and districts in 
1844-45 had failed after strong opposition from Whig conservatives, including Sidney 
George Fisher and Federalist nostalgic Horace Binney. They believed suburban Democrats 
wanted to use the prosperous city centre’s property taxes to subsidise suburban 
improvements. ‘It is not democracy; it is not federalism’, one protestor – probably Binney – 
argued. ‘[I]t is centralization, in its worst application.’109 Decentralization was still useful 
when it protected private property from assessment and taxation under metropolitan 
majority rule.  
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Illustration 7:  Norman's Plan of New Orleans & Environs, 1845 
 
Map shows New 




municipalities and the 
City of Lafayette in 
place of a single city 
government.  
Source: ‘Norman's Plan of New Orleans & Environs, 1845’, Library of Congress Geography and 
Map Division, The Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/item/98687133/ [Accessed December 
12, 2015] 
Illustration 8: Norman's Plan of New Orleans & Environs, 1854. 
 
Map showing New 
Orleans following 
consolidation, with 
the retention of the 
former municipalities 
and Lafayette as the as 
districts with residual 
powers over city debt 
and finances.  
 
Source: ‘Norman's Plan of New Orleans & Environs, 1854’, Library of Congress Geography and 
Map Division, The Library of Congress, Source: http://www.loc.gov/resource/g4014n.fi000029/ 
[Accessed December 12, 2015] 
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Illustration 9: Map of the City of Brooklyn, and Village of Williamsburgh 
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Brooklyn divided 













Source: ‘Map of the City of Brooklyn, and Village of Williamsburg’ Lionel Pincus and Princess Firyal 
Map Division, New York Public Library, http://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/510d47da-f01b-
a3d9-e040-e00a18064a99 [Accessed December 12, 2015] 
Illustration 10: Map of the Consolidated City of Brooklyn, for Bishop's Manual of the Corporation 
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Source: ‘Map of the Consolidated City of Brooklyn, for Bishop's Manual of the Corporation’, Lionel 
Pincus and Princess Firyal Map Division, New York Public Library, 
http://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/c4a48df1-917c-6ecc-e040-e00a18064536 [Accessed 
December 12, 2015] 
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Similar fears persisted into the 1850s. The Louisiana legislature in 1854 transferred 
municipal control of the consolidated New Orleans police from the mayor to a board of city 
officers who could appoint officers in their wards without the city council’s advice and 
consent. The Picayune condemned this reform as a dangerous centralization of political 
authority.110 Similarly, many New York Democrats and conservative Republicans opposed 
to the ruling antislavery faction of the party challenged the merger of Manhattan and 
Brooklyn’s police forces in 1857 as another dangerous ‘centralization’.111 They invoked fears 
of geographic centralization in a remote capital to help illustrate the dangers of dependency 
on Republican Albany. France, the Herald warned, showed the dangers of ‘centralization’ 
where all power was ‘in the possession of a single city’ with control over the police in far-
flung provinces.112  And New York City, it repeatedly opined, was ‘as dependant on the 
central power at Albany as the people of a department or prefecture or municipality in 
France are on the central power at Paris’.113 As well as implying that the people had become 
a power over and above the institutions of government, consolidators also used 
centralization against their partisan opponents when they proposed to create stronger 
government too. Party conflict on national issues related to the sectional crisis therefore 
made the imagery of national centralization a powerful political weapon to contest who 
would control these powers to reorder the metropolis.  
But despite warning against centralization, these figures nonetheless supported 
centralization when it did not conflict with their party or political interests. The Picayune, for 
example, had warned against centralizing power in an ‘irresponsible’ police board. 114 
Consequently, when the Louisiana legislature returned control of the police to the mayor – 
this time without any council oversight – the Picayune raised no objection to this new form 
of centralization.115 Others opposed centralization in one institution or city only to support 
it when it benefited their objectives or party. The Herald, defending municipal policing, 
upheld strong local government in the hands of the states and municipal governments in 
England and America as the only alternative to the centralization of power in Paris and 
Albany. This came despite editor James Gordon Bennett’s traditional Anglophobia.116 Even 
when criticising the 1857 police merger, the Herald pointed out that a powerful city 
government would protect life and property and prevent ‘State centralization’ in a contest 
for power between cities and state governments. 117  Such comparisons contrasted 
Republican-driven national and state power grabs with a smaller, defensively-driven 
Democrat-led local centralization of authority. Richter, too, argued that ‘centralized 
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governments’ made cities harder to govern and less able to maintain order, which expanded 
the opportunity for national and state government to intervene.118 Rather than opposing 
centralization per se, the Herald and Richter supported centralization on their own terms to 
assert state supremacy they could control. Their position as Democratic outsiders to 
Republican Albany led them to perceive that new centres of political authority could fall 
under the influence of partisan rivals. The difference in scale between their party’s own local 
centralization and Albany’s more remote state building plan therefore allowed the Herald to 
legitimise a more centralized government where their party would benefit from it. It was 
therefore not the principle of centralization that concerned these conservatives, but the 
possibility that it could fall into the hands of their partisan opponents. 
In addition to using centralization as a political weapon to prevent strong 
government falling into the hands of partisan opponents, conservatives also used it to 
prevent government exercising too much control over property. Conservatives may not have 
had the example of the 1871 Paris Commune to illustrate the threat of the masses seizing 
control of the city government, but they were nonetheless aware of the challenge that 
Workingmen’s Parties, the unemployed (especially following the Panic of 1857), and Anti-
Renters posed to property. They also used the June Days in France as evidence of the 
dangers of ‘red republicanism’ and its socialistic doctrines.119 They therefore understood the 
risks of allowing a powerful government to acquire jurisdiction over private property as well 
as public space.  
Property and finances frequently appeared in discussions over consolidation 
movements. In Boston, questions over municipal annexation and division centred on paying 
for poor relief and keeping revenues from property development.120 In Philadelphia, early 
opponents of consolidation had worried that poor, indebted suburbs would use annexation 
to tap the propertied wealth of the city centre.121 A few years later, Thomas Fernon predicted 
that Philadelphia’s union would increase taxes, depress property values, and distribute 
responsibility for paying the excessive debts of profligate municipalities among the city’s 
taxpayers.122 This insight proved insightful, as many municipalities issued debts and spent 
money on the basis that the consolidated city would have to pay once governor Bigler – who 
at the time in Erie supporting the Gauge War – had given his assent.123 These questions, 
which transcended partisan divisions, featured in questions over who would control power 
in consolidated government.  
Opponents of consolidation therefore drew on wider fears of how strong centralized 
government could exercise power over property. Given the context of sectional debates over 
slavery, tariffs, and internal improvements, Fernon’s midcentury proposal to incorporate 
separate North and South Philadelphias – with their own power over property taxes – 
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implied his conviction that geographically centralized governments would give majority 
parties and sections dangerous powers over the property of a minority.124  
Concern for property also appeared in Richter’s defence of decentralised city 
government. He took the Jacksonian laissez-faire approach to the economy to its near 
extreme, arguing that state and federal governments should not own public works or 
interfere with private businesses, as such measures led to ‘debts and high taxes’ on private 
property. Napoleon III’s rehabilitation of the Landes Forest, the Erie Canal, and the 
Pennsylvania Main Line of Public Works – two of which, at least, were often lauded by 
conservative boosters – served as examples for Richter of how centralized polities attacked 
private property.125 Similarly, on a local level, he warned how removing geographic barriers 
to government allowed the centre to establish economic power over the people. Richter 
argued that attempts to create gas, railroad, and public works monopolies, and subject the 
people to excessive taxes and assessments to pay for them, lay behind city consolidation 
movements.126 He even described government charity for the poor as a ‘bad centralization’ 
and a ‘monarchical’ policy as it led to ‘high taxes, standing armies, frequent laws,’ and 
‘interference with industry by laws’.127 Richter may sound like the archetypal individualist, 
but like Fernon – and some conservative consolidationists – he intended to keep power over 
property contained within smaller municipal boundaries, rather than rejecting the principle 
of government entirely. Patchworks of municipal governments, with strict geographic limits 
to their power, would serve as local ‘communes’ with the capacity to organise the likes of 
schools without ‘unjust’ taxes on property, would allow people to assess their own tax 
burden without any need for state intervention, and would levy taxes to penalize rioters and 
protect property-owners.128 Richter’s link between small polities and the libertarian tenets of 
Jacksonian political economy suggests that he too saw the geographic boundaries that 
inhibited state power as vital guarantors of property rights as much as city consolidators did. 
Both supporters and opponents shared a common interest in maintaining geographic and 
institutional barriers to government authority over property, even if they did not agree 
whether removing geographic barriers to police power brought order or tyranny. 
Like these opponents of consolidation, though, consolidationists themselves 
embraced devolution when it prevented a majority section in the city from claiming power 
over property. Brooklyn, for example, rebuffed consolidation with New York; citizens feared 
the measure would expose Brooklyn to the corruption and caprice of Manhattan’s politics.129 
Within their own city, too, the Eagle suggested that devolving power to ward, districts, and 
neighbourhood governments would prevent New York-style ‘centralization.’ 130 While they 
wanted to remove boundaries to police authority, they had no intention of letting that turn 
into unrestricted majority rule across the city. Dividing power and re-establishing checks and 
balances prevented control over state power falling into the hands of the majority and 
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establishing a Parisian-style centralized democracy. Philadelphians therefore defended 
electing council members by ward rather than at large in their consolidated city because it 
would allow a ‘balance of local power’ between the parties and ‘sectional interests’, where a 
citywide ballot would hand power to a ‘single section of the city’.131 They, too, intended to 
distribute power geographically across the city rather and ensure the representation of 
minority interests. Conservatives therefore made it clear that clearing away barriers to city 
government did not mean that they intended to hand power to outright majority rule.  
When designing governments and justifying dividing power within the city, 
reformers either retained or created institutional and geographic barriers to power over 
private property. Centralization and state power could legitimately create order only where 
city consolidators felt it necessary to suppress what they saw as violent threats to 
conservative control of city government. Consolidators in Brooklyn and New Orleans 
argued that city-builders needed to avoid ‘centralization’ when it came to dealing with city 
finance, property, and improvements. In Brooklyn, for example, the Eagle hoped that having 
elected aldermen responsible for assessments and infrastructure in their own wards would 
prevent the city taxing propertyowners to pay for improvements in annexed territories.132 
The Daily Picayune too used similar logic to oppose an earlier New Orleans consolidation 
project; such an unwarranted ‘centralization’, it argued, would lead to citywide control of 
control over taxes, development, and public services.133 When they changed their editorial 
stance 1851, they nonetheless the supported ‘uniform port and police regulations’ of a 
consolidated government, but approved devolving assessments, schools, and debts to the 
city’s former municipalities.134  
State authority over private property therefore followed a very different geography 
to that set by the consolidated police forces. In the sphere of city improvements, assessments, 
and debts, conservative reformers happily kept the kind of cumbersome geographic 
boundaries to central government that they had lambasted when they had inhibited the state 
from intervening effectively in the sphere of law and order. In these areas, conservatives 
seemed happy to embrace the kind of ‘segmented’ model that kept government weak, taxes 
low, and government in the hands of the propertied. But this did not necessarily prevent 
them from embracing a strong consolidated government that could maintain order over 
disorderly citizens, street, and suburbs.  
Only when they could use state power to improve property values did conservatives 
envisage removing institutional and geographic barriers to government’s taxing power. To 
answer conservative critiques of aspects urban centralization, then, supporters of measures 
like consolidation tried to show how it would benefit property. Reformers and consolidators 
in Brooklyn, Cleveland, and Philadelphia urged voters to support reform to strengthen the 
provision of water, gas and street railroads, and the establishment of universities and public 
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services.135 Price too justified consolidation on the grounds that ‘simple government’ would 
raise land values, presumably outweighing for property owners any increase in taxation.136 
Bigger government without restrictions on its power to build infrastructure could look 
legitimate when it had the capacity develop private property. Indeed, imposing order and 
private profit often went hand in hand. In Philadelphia, the Inquirer argued after 
consolidation that establishing a new inspector of buildings to regulate safety and creating a 
professional fire brigade naturally followed the creation of a larger city.137 In other words, 
removing geographic boundaries to central power from the centre allowed government to 
bring order to the city’s property market and legislate in the interest of property owners. The 
North American even saw the fire department as an ‘auxiliary’ to the police under the ‘central 
command’ of the Mayor, such was their association of concentrated executive authority with 
preservation of property. 138  Gerard similarly claimed a reformed police would secure 
commercial property in city ports. 139  State involvement in property therefore became a 
justifiable part of a broader crusade to protect law and order when it protected the wealth of 
city elites.  
Consolidators also saw in government power to develop and protect property an 
economic centralization in which the city centre exerted control over its suburban 
hinterland. Annexing municipalities allowed them to extend ties of capital, ownership, and 
communications that mirrored on a smaller scale the internal improvements advocated by 
urban imperialists. Years after the city’s enlargement, the Brooklyn Eagle argued that further 
property development in annexed areas and ferry connections to downtown would ‘make 
consolidation more complete’ and ‘practically consummate consolidation’.140 This linked 
political consolidation of the city and municipalities to an economic geography where the 
city centre was the hub of an expanding transport network and property market, but one safe 
behind barriers that protected it from an overbearing New York City. Similarly, 
consolidators in Philadelphia, who extended the old city’s street grid and numbering system 
outward over its former suburbs, also saw their program as radiating power outwards from 
the city centre, making land and property more valuable. Price himself saw this as a virtue 
of the reform while McMichael frequently talked of ‘practical consolidation’ holding the 
metropolis together.141 Others argued in this vein that consolidated government could extend 
street railroads and public thoroughfares to encourage suburban development.142 Within the 
city itself, consolidators imagined creating the kind of metropole-hinterland ties that Henry 
Carey and city boosters portrayed on a national and international scale. New centres of 
political authority might be dangerous in the hands of the propertyless masses. But removing 
geographic boundaries that carried outwards bonds of economic dependency, giving central 
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institutions and city elites the power to reshape the city economy to their benefit, was a 
desirable benefit that consolidators here sought. 
As big cities grew, conservatives situated their projects in time, arguing that 
centralization of power was an inevitable process, of which changes in metropolitan 
government were just one part. The Eagle’s observation three years after consolidation that 
their project remained incomplete suggests how even those who advocated limited reforms 
nonetheless wove their designs into a narrative of centralization. Some consolidators who 
were sceptical of an overly centralised city government expressed support for further 
consolidation in the future, perhaps because the power they believed rationalised 
metropolitan government created tended to offer them more of what they wanted than 
feared. Following the consolidation of New Orleans, the Picayune criticised the ‘cumbrous 
machinery’ of bicameral city government, asked for ‘consolidation’ of the four school 
boards, and the merger of the city recorders. Referring to the escalating sectional conflict 
following the Kansas-Nebraska Act, it argued that the vestigial districts that had once served 
to protect property owners from taxes to pay the debts of the old municipalities only served 
to ‘inflict us with sectional feelings and sectional legislation’. 143 To these New Orleans 
consolidators, it seemed that consolidation, even if caveated with limits to protect private 
property, naturally prompted the further removal of geographic and institutional limits on 
the power of city government. In Brooklyn too the Eagle supported the abolition of 
neighbourhood judicial offices despite having once opposed the ‘corruption’ of 
‘centralization’ in local government.144 And two years after Philadelphia’s consolidation, the 
Public Ledger defended a further transfer of police powers to the Mayor and further 
centralization in institutions,145 while the North American saw the reform as part of a national 
trend.146 Even Richter argued that cities need to further centralize power in city institutions 
over time, though he believed that continual geographic decentralization best achieved 
this.147 So long as state powers did not come under the control of those who might use them 
to attack property, it seemed to conservatives that progress required some form of ongoing 
removal of the boundaries to government authority in response to popular violence – even 
barriers they had insisted upon them in the first place. 
Despite agreeing on the need for centralization in the sphere of law and order, 
questions on the ground over property and development and party loyalties meant that at 
first glance conservative city reformers were often more divided than united on the issue of 
how to govern a metropolis, and were happy to raise the threat of centralization to further 
their own financial or partisan interests. These opponents of consolidation often accused 
their partisan opponents of plotting a dangerous centralization of power, claiming that they 
wanted to centralize power in the wrong institution or a remote city centre. However, rather 
than opposing consolidation on principle, many opponents seemed more concerned with 
where and who would control a centralized municipal apparatus, especially when an 
enlarged government had power over property, patronage, or taxation rather than just law 
and order. Even hardline consolidationists sought to avoid such dangerous consolidations 
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of power when they could be used against their property or party. Supporters and opponents 
of consolidation thus had a very similar definition of where power belonged in the 
metropolis, even if they disagreed sharply on who would wield it and how. In the spheres of 
property finance, and taxation, both conservative consolidators and opponents supported 
retaining the kind of complicated governments that characterized ‘segmented’ and district 
systems, and did not see these kinds of divided authorities as inconsistent with the creation 
of centralized control over law and order. Urban centralization and decentralization were 
therefore frequently complementary, rather than contradictory, approaches to building a 
conservative city in the 1850s.  
Centralized Urban Democracy 
Conservative city reformers were therefore sure to ask who would control centralized city 
governments while considering how to reassert the power of government over a seemingly 
disorderly popular multitude. Urban disorder took on a wider significance to conservatives 
who saw it as a democratic challenge to state authority. As a result, they assumed that they 
could not successfully build new institutional and geographic centres of power within cities 
and maintain the rule of law without curbing what passed for democracy in mid-century 
American cities. Conservatives often used antiparty rhetoric to challenge weak governments 
that lacked the authority to prevent the people from monopolising state authority as they 
had done in Paris in 1848. But they often extended this critique of party competition to 
elections and voters themselves, claiming that officeholders’ dependence on disorderly 
voters allowed the people to centralize power that belonged to government institutions. 
Democracy explained to these conservatives both the problem of weak government and the 
existence of urban violence. As well as removing geographic and institutional barriers to 
centralized local government, conservatives used city reform as an opportunity to rein in 
urban democracy. Even if they did not often turn their back on universal white male suffrage, 
conservatives found other ways to avoid democratic excess in reformed city administrations. 
Conservatives often expressed hope that these new powerful political offices could attract 
men of property to stand instead of politicians dependant on the votes of a criminal 
population. Moving institutions of government further from violent suburbs and residential 
neighbourhoods, too, could be a tool to limit the informal authority of the people on 
government. In local government, as in other areas, conservatives linked reform and state-
building to curbing democracy and limiting popular government. 
Antebellum Americans often claimed political parties inhibited democracy, and 
reformers often blamed parties and politicians for urban violence on city streets. 148 
Consolidationists in Philadelphia, for example, expressed deep hostility to the Philadelphia 
party system they intended to ‘sweep by’, and after years of finding their reform blocked by 
Whigs and Democrats in Harrisburg, eventually secured success by aligning conservative 
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voters and Nativists behind an municipal reform ticket composed of ‘best men’.149 Reformers 
in San Francisco had done the same after usurping the official city government in 1856.150 
The Public Ledger explained the success of Philadelphia’s pro-consolidation third party ticket 
as an expression of the electorate’s dissatisfaction with the ‘profitless combat’, ‘obsolete 
doctrines’, and ‘clap trap of hackneyed politicians’. 151  The North American, meanwhile, 
argued that only ‘party discipline’ sustained Philadelphia’s complex and dysfunctional pre-
1854 government.152 But the Baltimore Sun warned that parties threatened to corrupt strong 
government too. A partisan, city-wide police force, it argued, could concentrate too much 
patronage power in the Mayor, while weakening the force’s authority, as officers appointed 
on the grounds of party loyalty every four years would be ‘demoralized’, inefficient, and 
lacking popular respect. Ensuring that no party, ethnic group, or neighbourhood had a 
monopoly on the force, it hoped, would prevent partisanship undermining a state-
strengthening measure. 153 While they arrived at very different solutions to the problem of 
partisanship, both the Sun and Philadelphian consolidationists shared concerns that party 
conflict created obstacles to the authority of city government. Picking up on strands of 
scepticism about the role of political parties in Antebellum American public life allowed 
conservatives to give their proposals greater legitimacy. 
Behind these criticisms of the second party system, though, lay a critique of popular 
elections as a way of choosing officeholders, not the parties themselves as inhibitors of 
democracy.  Politicians who wanted to limit majority rule claimed political decision-making 
needed to be taken out of the realm of corrupt ‘politics’ and into the hands of competent 
‘administration’, which, in practice, used seemingly trivial administrative reforms to limit 
popular rule over city property. 154  Handing control over state power to the people, 
conservatives also implied, weakened government power over law and order as much as 
decentralizing power among municipalities and institutions did. Price himself rejected 
having a police Marshal ‘elected by the people, and subject to no direct control by any other 
body’, suggesting his conservative scepticism at popular government unrestrained by elite 
institutions.155  
Often, such figures assumed that opening offices to democratic elections in large 
cities only opened state power to marauding mobs and gangs. Richter, for instance, thought 
universal white male suffrage and party politics gave politicians an incentive to allow urban 
mobs and abolitionists to disobey the law. 156  Consolidationists and police reformers 
meanwhile claimed that ‘political’ appointments of officers and the involvement of elected 
aldermen in police departments explained poor policing and public violence. 157 According 
to the Baltimore Sun, the city laboured under a ‘spirit of lawless insubordination’ because 
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politicians allowed gangs to rule the streets in return for votes.158 The fact that so many of 
gangs were political, sought patronage from politicians, and looked to control the polls on 
election day only lent weight to the idea that gangs had usurped civil government.159 The 
electoral process of democracy in large cities, it seemed, incentivised the very reverse of what 
reformers expected city government to do: use state authority to protect property and person.  
This logic had a wider basis in conservative circles where De Tocqueville’s warnings 
about majority tyranny were carefully heeded. Sidney George Fisher had long blamed 
democracy for Philadelphia’s disorderly state, arguing that politicians beholden to the votes 
of criminals and gangsters packed juries and prevented a thorough administration of the 
law. 160  Francis Lieber, too, claimed that urban mobs challenged the independence of 
republican government.161 Democracy only seemed to accelerate the centralization of power 
in the hands of the crowd. The question of preventing centralization in a turbulent people 
was therefore inseparable from policing the legitimate limits to democracy.  
In addition to considering removing geographic and institutional barriers to 
government power in response to disorder, reformers also looked at who would control this 
state power. In the antebellum period, supporters of a wide suffrage managed to make local 
and state judicial offices elective, and this included Pennsylvania in 1850. 162 
Consolidationists by midcentury strongly rejected this opportunity to extend more control 
over government power to the average voter. Conservative city reformers seemed horrified 
with the idea that judges could become dependent on the ‘exaggerations’ and ‘excitement’ 
of partisan elections 163 and the ‘ebullitions of feeling which characterize the will of the 
populace’164. The ‘rights and property and lives’ of the people, they argued, should not be 
subject to ‘the passions, the prejudices’ of ‘political factions, always liable to excitement and 
to excess’.165 Opposition to an elective judiciary included the New Orleans Picayune166 and 
the Brooklyn Eagle, which linked the elective judiciary to ‘Fourierism’ and the socialist, 
feminist, and abolitionist writings of Robert Owen and Frances Wright.167 And despite often 
appearing to support local democracy, even Maurice Richter took the time to denounce the 
elective judiciary as ‘a political monstrosity’.168 Reformers may not have openly shared 
Sidney George Fisher’s169 and Francis Lieber’s170 enthusiasm for property qualifications, but 
they showed little interest in extending the boundaries of democracy when given the 
opportunity. 
                                                     
158 ‘Outlawry of the City’, The Sun, November 12, 1850; ‘The Riots’, The Sun, September 16, 1856. 
159 The Peace of the City, BA, October 14, 1856; ’Outlawry of the City’, The Sun, November 12, 1850; ‘The Peace 
of the City’, BA, October 8, 1852; ‘The Riots’, The Sun, September 16, 1856. 
160 HSP: Sidney George Fisher Diary MSS, vol. 1848-1849, p. 89-102, July 22, 1848, 200-203, May 14, 1849, vol. 
1858, pp. 67-71, April 4, 1858. 
161 Lieber, Civil liberty and Self-Government, vol. II, pp. 97-120 
162 Matthew Streb, Running for Judge: The Rising Political, Financial, and Legal Stakes of Judicial Elections (London 
2007), pp. 8-11. 
163 Cited in ‘An Elective Judiciary’, NI (September 23, 1859). 
164 ‘Elective Judiciary’, MC&NYE (September 28, 1960) 
165 ‘The Judiciary’, BA (November 7, 1850). 
166 Quoted in ‘An Elective Judiciary’, MC&NYE, October 22, 1858.  
167 ‘Crudites in High Places’, BDE, December 15, 1858. 
168 Richter, Municipalist, pp. 96-97, 244-246. 
169 HSP: Sidney George Fisher Diary MSS, vol. 1858, pp. 1857-1858, June 4, 1858, vol. 1860, pp. 72-73, April 
2, 1860. 
170 Lieber, Civil liberty and Self-Government, vol. I, pp. 188-191. 
 
Chapter 3: The Centralization of American Cities  141 
In trying to shield institutions from centralized control in the people, critics argued 
that the role of judges in enforcing the law and keeping order in large cities made them 
particularly unsuitable offices to make dependent on the will of rioters and gangs that sought 
to centralize the power of the balanced institutions of city government. In 1850, the New 
York Courier opined that  
 
Owing his election to a rabble, which, under the workings of universal 
suffrage is sure, in all cities, to control the ballot-box, he [the judge] will, 
unless constituted differently from a majority of those holding office in 
this country, seek, by bending to the will of his constituents, the renewal 
of their suffrages. And when the office, thus thrown open to all, is filled 
by bad and unprincipled men, nothing can save the community from the 
worst of all evils that can happen to it.171 
 
Drawing from the same fear that elections required officeholders to trade law and order for 
support and votes, conservative newspapermen accepted that alleged gang control of judicial 
elections in New Orleans, Brooklyn and New York proved the system unsuitable for 
supporters of law and order: the connection between gangs and politicians allowed the 
disorderly to appoint pliant judges and go unpunished. 172  ‘In crowded cities’, the Eagle 
repeatedly argued, the courts should protect the ‘respectable’ from the violent ‘loathsome 
and unmentionable abominations of the city’ who also controlled primary elections. 
Democratic rights allowed criminals and rioters to violate the law with impunity, and 
elective judiciaries therefore proved cities were unsafe for democracy.173 Within the judicial 
branch, it seemed clear that distributing control to the people left government institutions 
with little authority to impose law and order. Even incidents like corruption in judicial 
nominating conventions, violence in the courtroom, and partisanship in deciding a court 
case seemed to prove the conservative prejudice that democracy led to disorder. 174 
Conservative city reformers therefore saw the need for centralization in city government on 
terms that would shield the state from direct control by the people. Order required more than 
just imposing power on city streets; it meant reducing the power of the streets on city 
government. 
This was particularly true of Paris, which proved a useful lesson in demonstrating 
the close links between, democracy and violence. Some conservatives did not distinguish 
between democracy and violence at all, recognising that riots often had a political role and 
that the crowd could claim to speak for the people.175 They used Paris to illustrate this link 
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between democracy and public violence. Both Fisher and Lieber described Louis-
Napoleon’s government as an informal democracy, where Louis-Napoleon indulged the 
whims of the ‘huzzaing crowds’ of the Paris mob to stay in power. Rather than exercising 
power as a traditional European monarch, he allowed the people to capture the institutions 
of the French government, and simply stood at their head. 176 Other city reformers agreed 
that the people could easily overthrow a French government in the capital and impose a new 
one, demonstrating the ‘centralization of all authority in Paris.’177 Especially after 1848, the 
setting of crowd violence in politically important cities gave it a wider significance to many 
conservatives, who saw in the so-called ‘mob’ an overbearing informal democracy that 
threatened to redistribute control over government power from the state institutions of a 
federal polity to urban people.  
In American cities too, conservative reformers warned that locating centres of 
government power too close to the people might allow them to violently usurp control over 
government power. These northerners shared fears common in the South that large cities 
threatened republican government.178 Conservative editorials warned that voters in ‘large 
cities with mixed populations’ were unfit to distinguish between the sheer number of offices, 
candidates, and parties when voting. 179  Maurice Richter similarly counselled that ‘the 
masses’ were too impulsive, violent, and unrestrained to participate in the political life of the 
republic.180 ‘Centralization’ in large cities, Richter argued, led to a dangerous rule by urban 
rioters, as ‘the crown’ became ‘the plaything of the mobs’, much as the overbearing Parisian 
people had violently overthrown successive governments. 181  When challenging bigger  
governments, Richter and the Eagle – horrified that the New York state capitol could move 
to Manhattan – warned that relocated state governments would need violent authoritarian 
power simply to protect itself from the caprice of the people, just like the French state. 182 
Despite supporting a consolidation in their own city, the Eagle contrasted Parisian and 
Manhattan-centric centralization to the decentralised town governments of Vermont and 
Connecticut that checked the power of corrupt officeholders and prevented an American 
Paris.183 The Eagle had no intention of allowing a city on the scale of New York to reign 
unchecked over the state. Since the physical setting of government helped to determine who 
would control it, such voices wanted to distribute power outwards away from the urban 
voters who threatened sound government. Just as in Paris, the absence of institutional and 
geographic checks on power had the potential to allow unfit citizens to seize control of the 
state. 
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Conservatives opposed to consolidation, like Richter, saw avoiding centring state 
power in populous cities as a solution to the problem of power centralizing in street gangs 
and mobs. Consolidationists, though, often interpreted disorder itself as an expression of 
democracy, and linked curbing the authority of the multitude in public space to limiting their 
authority in democratic elections within consolidated cities. When designing charters for 
consolidated cities, consolidationist newspapers called for a small number of ‘experienced 
and capable citizens’, the ‘best citizens’, and ‘competent citizens’ to draft charters, explicitly 
selected candidates from third party tickets or genteel partisans, and deliberately looked 
outside the second party system for solace.184 Eli Kirk Price saw Philadelphia’s enlargement 
– including larger wards and at-large elections – as a way for ‘quiet and unobtrusive citizens’, 
‘men of large experience and stake in the community’ and the ‘best men’ to take back control 
from corrupt politicians, gangs, and firemen who controlled partisan nominating 
conventions.185 Such manifestoes for nonpartisan consolidated government therefore gave 
the impression of sharing power in a polity purged of party corruption, but they also hoped 
that suppressing party conflict would serve to make consolidated government less responsive 
to popular control. A consolidated government, figures like Price hoped, would allow 
propertied men to rise to office.  
Some conservatives went even further. Where partisan government weakened 
government ability to impose order on the people, a government free of democratic 
competition would enable the efficient exercise of state power outwards. The conservative 
New York Express warned that cities teeming with European immigrant voters needed 
European-style standing armies and police to maintain order, and consolidationists also 
emphasised that their new centres of political authority could wield power outwards over 
people in need of firm government but often all too dependent on inept party leaders. To 
such consolidators, a ‘re-organization of parties’, the removal of ‘corrupt partizan dictators’, 
and a government of the ‘right minded and independent citizen’ would allow for an ‘orderly’ 
fire department, a ‘uniform and rigorous’ police system, and better city railroads.186 To the 
Picayune, the ‘quiet and order’ of elections without the Whigs and Democrats would lead to 
‘vigorous enforcement’ and ‘good order’ within the city. 187 Thus conservatives suggested 
creating new centralized institutions isolated from party control would rein in the power of 
a Paris-style crowd. Rather than replacing the second party system in their consolidated 
cities with a more expansive urban democracy, they hoped that a strong government and an 
orderly society would help make people more deferential both on the street and at the ballot 
box.  
For consolidations, the remoteness of enlarged city government could offer an 
alternative to more proscriptive democratic curbs. In New Orleans, the Picayune argued for 
city officers to be elected citywide rather than by district on the basis that localism 
encouraged them to cater to ‘cliques’ and ‘factions’ above the common good. 188 
Philadelphian consolidators too argued that an enlarged city would create ‘good order’ as it 
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suppressed ‘petty local strifes’ and ‘ward politicians’.189 Replacing politicians close to the 
people with a more remote government would help insulate the state from popular control 
while also, supposedly, allowing the ‘best men’ to rise to the top. Instead of disenfranchising 
voters, they simply hoped to move power to where they believed the people could not access 
it. Moreover, they applied the same logic to the police, hoping that a more distant impersonal 
force would better impose order on the people, replacing the personal authority of 
neighbourhood control in which local alderman and ward constables often relied on the 
votes of wrongdoers. Reformers in Philadelphia and Brooklyn both defended the ‘remedy’ 
of ‘consolidation’ and ‘centralization’ on the basis that it allowed them to separate police 
officers from the ‘local sympathies, local politics, or local fears’ of the neighbourhoods the 
city policed. 190  When consolidationists called for putting power to direct the new 
consolidated city government in people and not parties, they were not calling for a 
decentralisation of sovereignty from the centre outwards to residents of the wards or from 
elites to the people through competitive elections. Rather, consolidators in Philadelphia and 
other cities emphasised that centralising power by expanding the borders of the polity would 
in practice safeguard control over state authority. 
Even conservative critics of ‘centralization’ in its consolidationist guise, however, 
shared some of the scepticism about democracy as their counterparts. In Brooklyn, Richter, 
despite opposing the sort of large consolidated governments consolidationists envisioned, 
did so in a manner that indicated his lack of comfort with Jacksonian democracy. While had 
claimed he opposed bureaucracy and professional government, he also lambasted rotation 
in office, stating that a more ‘steady form of government’ was required. 191  He, too, 
demanded that states and municipalities replace multiple local officeholders and frequent 
elections with single executives invested with broad authority to enforce the law. 
Anticipating the cry of Gilded Age ‘mugwump’ reformers,  who insisted that so-called 
‘administrative’ offices should not be appointed through majority rule or party patronage, 
Richter argued that ‘clerical’ executive offices should not be elected. 192  Thus both the 
democratic aspects of the second party system and the size of consolidated governments 
tended to undermine Richter’s ideal patchwork of town and ward governments, but he, like 
other conservatives, saw the necessity to place state authority in the proper hands. As much 
as Richter decried consolidated government and ‘monarchical’ centralization, indeed, he 
shared the belief that municipal governments needed to centralize power in independent 
officeholders, even if he wanted to contain their power within individual districts, wards, 
and townships in a federated system of local government. Despite opposing the geographic 
centralization of power inwards from the periphery to the centre and upwards from towns 
and counties to states and the nation, Richter followed, at a local level, the conservative 
instinct for centralization of control over municipal government in institutions and 
propertied citizens as an alternative to a riotous partisan democracy. 
                                                     
189 Many Whigs, ‘Consolidation’, NA&USG, August 29, 1853; ‘Passage of the Consolidation Bill’, PL, February 
1, 1854. 
190 ‘Local Affairs’, PL, September 17, 1850; M., ‘Police—No. 7’, NA&USG, November 01, 1849; ‘The Report of 
the Committee on Police of the Consolidation Commissioners’, BDE, January 10, 1854. One speaker at a 
meeting, Judge Anson V. Parsons, also spoke at conventions in support of Philadelphian railroad expansion to 
Erie to compete with New York. See ‘Sunbury and Erie Railroad Convention’, The Star of the North, October 02, 
1851. 
191 Richter, Municipalist, pp. 222-223. 
192 Ibid., pp. 99-100, 238-243, 277. 
 
Chapter 3: The Centralization of American Cities  145 
Such ideas moved between municipal and national politics in the 1850s. Some 
conservatives also used a similar logic to explain the sectional crisis, seeing the disorder as a 
consequence of democratic excess and a problem of government weakness, something that 
would to come to inform many conservatives’ attitudes to sectional tension. Just as 
conservative city reformers used partisanship to explain urban chaos, some also blamed 
partisanship in both Kansas Territory and Congress for the crisis in ‘Bleeding Kansas’.193 
The Public Ledger, in response, enthusiastically supported the use of the army to impose law 
and order on the contending parties much as it had supported militia intervention to rein in 
Philadelphia’s ‘savages’. Yet it also proposed the abolition of the free territorial press and 
democratic elections, and argued settlers should spend their time farming rather than idly 
engaging in politics and violence.194 The Ledger’s response to sectional conflict then followed 
a similar path to their response to urban disorder. They presented it not as an issue driven 
by structural tensions over (say) slavery or class but as a problem of a weak state allowing 
the popular usurpation of power, and one that only concentrating that power in a 
government remote from the people could prevent. Antislavery conservatives could also use 
the same reasoning. The Courier and Enquirer in New York, despite opposing the Fugitive 
Slave Act, stridently opposed abolitionists who ousted a Massachusetts judge from office for 
enslaving Anthony Burns, and described it as an example of a ‘mass-worshipping’ 
democracy overturning the independence of the judiciary, the rule of law, and ‘public 
order’.195 Such Americans explained sectional tension, like social conflict in big cities, as a 
problem rooted in the weakness of democratically-elected governments and the dangers of 
centralizing power in the people. This was a problem that only creating new centres of 
government authority either independent of the people – or at least less dependent on their 
whims – could solve. 
Conservative supporters and opponents of centralization might have disagreed 
stridently over in whom and what party they ought to centralize power. Yet they all linked 
creating geographic and institutional centres of authority capable of enforcing order over the 
city to curbing the perceived excesses of democratic government. Implicit in conservatives’ 
critique of the party system, politicians, and party conflict was a criticism of the universal 
the white male electorate. By voting for politicians who indulged their violent tendencies 
and undermining the rule of law on the streets, voters in large cities reminded critical 
onlookers of the Paris crowd, and with it, the roots of a dangerous centralization either in 
mob rule or authoritarian dictatorship. The growing ranks of unpropertied, immigrant, and 
Catholic voters in America’s expanding cities seemed, some conservatives suggested, unable 
to resist the temptation to become a rival source of sovereignty to the republic. Conservatives 
responded with their own programmes for modernisation, which tried to resist the 
democratic tendencies of the era. Measures to preserve law and order and roll back some of 
the gains of Jacksonian democracy served to concentrate power in the hands of conservative 
elites. Even the most ardent centralizers hoped to retain barriers to state power when it might 
threaten their property. The conservatives examined here therefore did not intend to create 
powerful governments that radicals might use to redistribute property or interfere with the 
enforcement of the laws, which, in the 1850s, included the re-enslavement of fugitives from 
the South. Their reform programs instead stood as counters to a narrative of progress and 
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democratisation. Law and order did not just give conservatives the opportunity to scale back 
democracy at its margins. Conservatives instead hinted that limiting the authority of the 
enfranchised masses and encouraging law and order were one and the same. 
Conclusion 
When writing his history of the Philadelphia consolidation movement, Eli Kirk Price 
concluded that conflicting laws, governments, and police in the region’s municipalities drove 
the movement to merge the metropolis into one government with a strong executive and all 
the constituent parts ‘bound to the common center’. The absence of ‘division’, he argued, 
gave the consolidated government its strength. 196 Price’s analysis captured much of the 
conservative rationale for consolidation. Municipal boundaries limited state authority, so 
consolidated government had a law-enforcing power greater than the sum of its parts, as it 
removed barriers to the central institutions of city government from exercising power over 
the entire city. These questions about geographic barriers to more centralized state authority 
were especially portentous when attention turned from local rioting to national sectional 
conflict, and the conservative justification for consolidation showed how they believed they 
could build strong government, but insulated from democratic control and often in practice 
free from control of party opponents. 
When engaging with movements for municipal reform, conservatives used 
centralization as a political weapon to challenge gangs, rioters, and mobs as a rival state 
within a state. Like conservative critics of Louis-Napoleon and the French Second Republic, 
they used centralization to help understand how the people had assumed a monopoly on 
political authority, though this time the American city rather than Paris provided the 
example. They interpreted violence on the streets of their metropolises as a challenge to the 
rule of the law, rejecting older ideas that riot was a legitimate form of politics, yet accepting 
that violence and democracy seemed to go hand in hand. Consolidating authority in the 
institutions of an expanded municipal government offered an alternative to the centralized 
power of the people. 
But conservatives in different political parties could also use centralization to 
delegitimise rival city strengthening movements. Democratic critics described the 
Republican imposition of the Metropolitan Police on New York City in terms similar to how 
Carey’s warnings about the consequences of international free trade: of dependence on 
remote and centralized sources of power. While conservatives might have agreed on the 
need for law and order, they also diverged on wider issues of political economy, the sectional 
crisis, and ethnic tensions. State strengthening could give them genuine cause for concern 
when it did not put themselves and their political allies in power. Claiming that their political 
rivals were creating a much more dangerous state, regional, or national centralization that 
threatened American traditions of self-government allowed them to work towards their own 
ends, with the term functioning once more here as a political weapon to delegitimise 
opposition.  
Despite claiming to oppose centralization when it threatened to give the people or 
rival parties control over stronger government, conservative consolidators looked for ways 
to create centralized power relationships between places and institutions. Just as they often 
turned to geographic and institutional centralizations nationally and regionally, they applied 
                                                     
196 Price, History the Consolidation, pp. 80-81. 
Chapter 3: The Centralization of American Cities  147 
the same imagined power relationships within cities to bring about law and order. To combat 
the perceived popular threat to state supremacy, reformers looked to removing institutional 
and geographic barriers that inhibited city government authority. Both police reform and 
consolidation allowed conservatives to open up and strengthen power relationships of city 
government outward over deviant people and neighbourhoods. Americans might have often 
claimed that dividing power was necessary to avoid dangerous excesses of government 
power when applied to nations and states. But in practice, while they did take seriously 
republican warnings against concentrations of power, they used these warnings to build 
governments as well as restrict them.  
Even conservative opponents of consolidation, while opposing the consolidation on 
a wide metropolitan scale that supporters enthusiastically embraced, nonetheless supported 
and imagined centralization at a smaller scale, even at the level of the township, ward, or 
municipality. They opposed consolidation not on the grounds of opposition to state power 
itself, but on terms of who would control that state power and to what ends. When defending 
their programme, they emphasised that decentralizing power among a patchwork of 
municipalities would strengthen local government, where consolidation would weaken it in 
comparison to remote state and national governments. Like consolidationists, they 
supported a consolidation of institutions, offices, and officeholders, albeit within strict 
municipal boundaries, and expected these consolidated institutions to wield substantial state 
power over disorderly citizens. Rather than removing geographic boundaries to state 
authority, they instead sought to remove institutional boundaries to government power. 
However, they strongly supported keeping control over this aggregate of state authority (or 
authorities) local, strongly fearing the consequences of this power falling in the hands of their 
economic or political rivals, or, even worse, the assemblage of the people or a single 
demagogic officeholder. 
Given the common conservative assumption that mob violence allowed the people 
to seize the state monopoly on legitimate force and establish a majority tyranny, it is 
unsurprising that many of the figures considered here conceived of their project to establish 
law and order as a form of democratic retrenchment. Informally, they sought to rebalance 
the distribution of power between the people and the government in public space firmly 
towards the state. This meant that conservatives also looked for ways to ensure that control 
over this new stronger government did not fall into the wrong hands. In addition to 
consolidating governments, they proposed another centralization: one of decision-making 
power from the people to a small group of propertied urban residents. While they did not 
necessarily turn away from universal white male suffrage, as would sometimes happen in 
the 1870s, their designs for new city charters indicate that they were relocating centres of 
power away from local control, reducing the number of elective officeholders, and enforcing 
deference through powerful police forces. Making these changes, they implied, would draw 
control of politics away from the masses and the corrupt politicians who managed them, 
and put power back in the hands of propertied elites, now free of the supposed incentives to 
permit disorder in return for votes. Conservatives might have been reluctant to endorse 
European-style authoritarian regimes, despite their occasional praise for Napoleon III, but 
their belief that public order required the rule of the ‘best men’ perhaps made them more 
similar to European state builders than they cared to admit. 
Conservative supporters of ‘consolidation’ may not have described their own 
projects pejoratively as a centralization, but they nonetheless embraced this process. Despite 
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invoking a republican vernacular of opposition to centralization, were by no means 
backward looking, uninventive, or overly enamoured with the state structures of the 
eighteenth century. The growth of large cities, fuelled by economic growth and immigration, 
may have offered conservative elites prosperity. However, the growing numbers of 
immigrant and unpropertied citizens also seemed to pose a challenge. When conservatives 
suggested that Paris showed the future, it was in reference to this ongoing transformation.  
Rather than seeing the extension of democratic rights such as universal white male suffrage 
and the opening of offices like the judiciary to popular ballot as progress, they argued that 
real advancement required greater centralization of power over time in order to preserve 
republican order from this growing democratic disorder. They might have often disagreed 
among themselves over where and whom to centralize power into, but all agreed that they 
needed to remove barriers to city governments downtown. Consolidation allowed them to 
build new power relationship outward from seats of city government over people, 
neighbourhoods, and property. City reform therefore helped conservatives of different 
stripes think about how to build a modern conservative government and contain what they 
perceived as the growing trend towards democracy and disorder.
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Chapter 4: Conservative Opponents of 
‘Centralization’ Confront the Slavery Crisis 
Introduction 
While the conservatives from previous chapters confronted the aftermath of the Revolutions 
of 1848, the growth of imperial cities, and social disorder in burgeoning metropolises, they 
also observed and responded to the widening sectional dispute. Despite often having strong 
opinions on the morality, immorality, and economic consequences of slavery, many 
conservatives in the early 1850s believed that sectionalism was a problem of democracy and 
power relationships rather than slavery. They warned that, through democratic elections 
that gave northeastern voters a sectional majority in Congress and resistance to the Fugitive 
Slave Act in northern cities, the people were again responsible for centralizing power. They 
therefore conceptualised the slavery crisis as a similar problem of democracy and disorder, 
a process of centralization geographically inwards into the northeast and institutionally into 
the hands of northern antislavery voters and rioters. However, as the sectional crisis grew 
over the course of the decade, some conservatives began to use centralization differently. 
Those who moved into the new Republican Party in the late 1850s sometimes described 
slaveholders removing geographic boundaries to power, only this time the power of the 
South, as a political weapon against slavery, the South, and Democrats. Centralization, 
while not determining their stance on slavery extension, helped conservatives conceptualise 
the fraught politics of the period. 
In the first half of the 1850s, conservatives argued again that the people were 
centralizing power. First, direct antislavery action against the Fugitive Slave Act allowed 
them to define northern opposition to the law as a Parisian-style centralization of 
government power in the people, in short mob rule. Second, a northern sectional majority 
in terms of voters, coupled with growing mistrust in the adequacy of the checks and balances 
of a federal system, allowed them to recast democracy as a geographic centralization of 
power inwards from the nation to a single section. Conservatives, then, once again defined 
democracy as centralization in order to delegitimise it. This allowed them to justify a 
different distribution of power and redefine it as power sharing. They hoped to stabilise by 
concentrating political decision making in a small elite inoculated from majority rule. That 
is not to imply a consensus among conservatives: many split on sectional questions towards 
the late 1850s and by the end of the decade old allies argued over whether the greater 
centralizing threat lay in the northern voters rallying to the Republican banner or southern 
slaveholders. Yet in the crisis of the Union lay an opportunity to put forward proposals for 
centralization of their own, which would come to the fore in wartime blueprints and postwar 
Reconstruction. 
Following two years of unrest over the status of slavery in the newly-acquired 
southwest and northern reluctance to enforce the weak Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, Congress 
passed the Compromise of 1850. This included a much stronger Fugitive Slave Act, a fudge 
on the status of slavery in the southwest, and the admission of California as a free state. Its 
supporters hoped that a political consensus on the settlement would end all discussion on 
slavery in the North and South. However, events did not turn out as the compromisers had 
intended. Northern abolitionists continued to protect fugitive slaves, antislavery Whigs 
blocked president Millard Fillmore from the 1852 Whig nomination because of his vocal 
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support for the compromise, and in 1854 Congress reopened the slavery debate in Kansas 
and Nebraska Territory, shifting the focus of agitation from the Mexican cession to the 
remnants of the Louisiana Purchase. This culminated in northern former Whigs, Anti-
Nebraska Democrats, and Freesoilers coming together to form the antislavery Republican 
Party in 1854 as a purely sectional movement. In the second half of the 1850s, tensions rose 
as guerrilla fighting between proslavery and antislavery settlers ravaged Kansas, South 
Carolinian congressman Preston Brooks attacked Charles Sumner in the Senate after a fiery 
abolitionist speech, the Supreme Court sustained the introduction of slavery into free 
territory in the Dred Scott decision, and the militant John Brown brought the violence of 
Kansas to northern Virginia by attempting to start a slave revolt. As old party lines dissolved, 
the Republicans swept several northern states in the 1856 presidential contest, became the 
largest party in the House of Representatives in 1858, and claimed the House of 
Representatives and Presidency outright in 1860. Although a grouping of unionists and 
Know-Nothings prevented an absolute Republican majority in the House in 1858 and 
Democrats retained control of the Senate right up to the point of secession, critical observers 
in the North as well as the South sensed the federal government had fallen into sectional 
hands. Power, they suggested, had been centralized in the northern electorate. 
A number of northern conservatives foresaw this possibility and sought to forestall 
it. Both antislavery and secessionist agitation for them could appear as a problem of 
lawlessness. Southerners routinely criticised northern urban violence as evidence that 
democracy was degenerating into mob rule and, used this to defend their vision of a 
slaveholders’ republic in the South.1 Northern conservatives shared some of these fears. 
Secessionists who upheld doctrines like nullification and disunion posed an obvious threat 
to law and order. 2  Abolitionists of the Garrisonian variety also refused to admit the 
legitimacy of the federal compact, calling it a ‘covenant with death’. Their politics of 
conscience – which turned into a politics of collective resistance in response to the Fugitive 
Slave Act – also threatened to fragment government power.3 Responding to such dangers 
led to some unlikely alliances. The Burkean Sidney George Fisher shared this conservative 
outlook with a number of northern ex-Whig papers but also the Democratic leaning New 
York Herald of James Gordon Bennett. Notables like Rufus Choate and George Ticknor 
Curtis in Boston, Charles O’Conor in New York, and George Mifflin Dallas in Philadelphia 
crossed the old party divides to lend their backing to reorganising the second party system 
to protect the Union.  
Although these movements only achieved minor electoral success late in the decade, 
its origins stretched back further. In 1850 and 1851, a ‘Union Party’ movement hosted public 
meetings in northern cities. With the blessing of senior politicians like James Buchanan, 
Henry Clay, and Daniel Webster, as well as many conservative dailies, they argued that the 
United States should defer to the Compromise of 1850 as a final settlement to the slavery 
question and put abolitionism and southern rights finally to rest. To do so, they suggested 
that the Whig and Democratic parties should officially refrain from nominating candidates 
whose statements on slavery were anything other than glowing endorsement of the ‘peace 
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measures’ of 1850 and ensure that they retained support from both the north and the south. 
But if they failed to do so, they demanded that a bisectional ‘Union Party’ in favour of the 
Compromise of 1850 replace the discredited second party system entirely. Union Party 
supporters therefore threatened to abolish party competition completely. 4  Yet while 
northern conservatives urged northerners to respect the rights of the South and respect their 
demanded states’ rights under the Constitution and Compromise of 1850, they also 
supported the use of force to defend the Union to prevent secession in 1850 and 1860.5 For 
conservatives, ongoing adherence to the Compromise of 1850 took great importance as a 
plan to prevent power consolidating in an unthinking northern electorate or southern 
slaveholders accustomed to brinkmanship. 
For these conservatives, the Compromise of 1850 was less a convenient agreement 
on the status of slavery in Utah and New Mexico and more a tool to curb the democratic 
debate that allowed this geographic centralization of power into Northern cities. Historians 
have discussed the relative success or failure of the Compromise, and whether its terms were 
pro-northern, pro-southern, or the beginning of a political realignment. 6  Indeed, 
conservative supporters of the Compromise of 1850 included men on both sides of the 
slavery divide, and moderates who would not come to oppose slavery until 1856 and 1860. 
I argue that conservatives did not see the Compromise of 1850 as a proslavery or antislavery 
bargain. They rejected such terms because they believed that the process of politicians 
coming to an agreement and forming a political consensus would solve the sectional divide. 
The terms mattered less than keeping slavery out of democratic debate where the northern 
majority could settle it on their own terms, leaving the south out of the decision-making 
process. Democratic debate on slavery seemed anything but part of a plural open-ended 
debate between two opposed but legitimate viewpoints. They assumed that the practice of 
democracy – election campaigns, public debate, and popular mandates – only encouraged 
the people to become a singular source of violent power. Following the passage of the 
compromise, they emphasised that both parties needed to agree to stop discussing any of the 
issues around slavery and assist the federal government in enforcing the law. To them, the 
Compromise of 1850 was a tool to give the federal government power to enforce the law, 
rather than a settlement between a proslavery South and an antislavery North.  
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Raising the threat of centralization at the hands of the northern electorate therefore 
helped conservatives justify their own programme of centralization. Conservatives’ 
responses to the sectional crisis suggest that they used it as a pretext to build a stronger but 
less democratic federal government, just as they used urban disorder as a crisis to do so at a 
local level. Indeed, they cited violent opposition to the Fugitive Slave Act as a justification 
for giving the federal government power to intervene in northern cities as well as enforce the 
union over an unwilling south, just as the same spectre had been used to condemn Parisian 
revolutionaries in 1848 and urban rioters who challenged the rule of law. Their demands for 
deference to the Compromise of 1850 also helped them concentrate decision-making power 
in fewer hands. In place of a plural system of competing candidates, supporters of a Union 
Party sometimes hinted they would curb majority rule by establishing a quasi-one-party state 
and withdrawing the opportunity for the people to elect opponents of the Compromise of 
1850. Suggesting that the federal government and parties would gain legitimacy from their 
ability to command support from northern and southern elites rather than popular majorities 
helped give this strong, undemocratic, and centralized regime the impression of power 
sharing across geography. This distracted from its concentration in the hands of conservative 
men of property and political institutions. Conservatives therefore saw the slavery crisis as 
an opportunity to build a new Union, one less beholden to popular majorities. 
By the mid-1850s, northern conservatives had already failed in their attempts remove 
slavery from the realm of legitimate public debate. But some continued to draw on their 
understanding of sectional politics as a democratic centralization of power when confronting 
the emergent Republican Party and, to a lesser extent, states’ rights Democrats. To put their 
plan to reconcentrate power back in the hands of the federal government into action, they 
turned to the candidacies of Millard Fillmore in 1856 and John Bell in 1860. Pledging 
adherence to the law, finality on the Compromise of 1850, and opposition to disunion and 
abolitionism, their platforms implicitly encouraged the people to defer to the decisions of 
their betters rather than use elections to decide whether the western territories would be free 
or slave. 7  Other northern conservatives, meanwhile, began to define slaveowners and 
proslavery violence in the North as the more menacing centralizing power, and turned to 
the Republican Party itself as an agent of strong government capable of imposing order. 
Unlike their new abolitionist allies, though, they turned to antislavery primarily out of 
concern for the Union and the integrity of the federal government rather than humanitarian 
concern for slaves themselves. Fear of another sovereignty beyond their control – this one 
vested in masters rather than norther voters – created a conservative argument for 
Republican rule that contrasts recent reevaluations of the party that emphasise its aggressive 
antislavery position.8 
These northern conservatives in the 1850s had to weigh up where the greater threat 
of centralization lay: in northern voters or southern slaveholders. In doing so, though, they 
could define their own nation-building alternative to both the perceived excesses of northern 
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majority rule and southern disunion and states’ rights, while marketing it as decentring 
power broadly across sectional divisions. State-strengthening – often tied to anti-democratic 
retrenchment – appeared to offer a solid basis for national stability. As much as southern 
fire-eaters and northern Republicans, then the conservatives studied here actively fought to 
define the form of the changing American nation-state. Saving the Union was therefore a 
means to an end as much as an end in itself: allowing conservatives to rebuild elite power. 
Antislavery Activism and Centralizing Democracy 
In the early years of the 1850s, warnings that the people were about to centralize power, as 
they had in France and were doing in northern cities, were an important political weapon in 
their arsenal against abolitionists, freesoilers, and antislavery. Resistance to the controversial 
and punitive Fugitive Slave Act in northern cities blurred the distinction between antislavery 
activism and the kinds of urban disorder conservatives had seen and opposed in France and 
American cities. Conservatives therefore conceptualised opposition to the Fugitive Slave Act 
as an issue of who held power in American cities rather than a battle over the morality of 
enslaving free African-Americans. They again described the people as progenitors of this 
process of centralization, putting government institutions and city streets under their own 
authority with no institutional or legal limits on their power. Conservatives therefore 
believed that antislavery activism had important consequences on the ground in their own 
cities, counties, and states, and well as throughout the Union between the North and South. 
This allowed them to use the idea of a process of centralization locally as a political weapon 
with which they could attack their abolitionist and antislavery political opponents 
nationally. 
These warnings against popular centralization rested on popular resistance to the 
new Fugitive Slave Act, which strengthened federal power to apprehend alleged runaways 
in northern cities, brought the reality of slavery and the sectional crisis right onto people’s 
doorsteps. Indignant abolitionists, preachers, and mass meetings denounced the law, 
demanded Americans disobey it, and organised to prevent its enforcement by violence if 
necessary. 9  However, the Fugitive Slave Act had numerous supporters in the North, 
including President Millard Fillmore and newspapers, meetings, and political parties. They 
defended it as a measure to hold the Union together and as such demanded strict adherence 
to its provisions.10  
Divisions over race and slavery had long sparked riots on the streets of northern 
cities, and tied national questions over sectionalism to local ones over law and order. In the 
1830s and 1840s mobs had often attacked abolitionists and blacks who met in northern cities 
like New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, often with ‘gentlemen of property and standing’ 
leading and directing violence against antislavery and non-white activists. By midcentury, 
however, mercantile and professional elites had largely embraced the cause of law and order, 
and no longer saw collective violence as a legitimate response to urban tensions over race 
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and slavery. 11 Thus when critics of the Fugitive Slave Law turned to some of the extra-legal 
tactics of the earlier anti-abolitionists they faced censure as much for the methods they used 
as the ends they pursued. Benjamin Hallett, for example, argued that opponents of the 
Compromise of 1850 advocated ‘rebellion, mobism, and anarchy’, and as citizens had 
during the 1787 Shays Rebellion, they now faced a choice between the ‘the supremacy of 
the law’ and ‘the despotism of the mob’. To Hallett the divisions were stark: ‘law or anarchy, 
the magistracy or the mobocracy’.12 Resolutions at a Faneuil Hall pro-compromise meeting 
attended by several conservatives like Hallett and Rufus Choate described any ‘resistance’ 
to the Fugitive Slave Act as ‘subversive’, threatening ‘anarchy and bloodshed’. 13  And 
drawing from similar arguments used to delegitimise domestic radicals after the Revolutions 
of 1848, the Baltimore American compared what it saw as illegitimate Irish resistance to the 
British government to abolitionists’ inability to ‘submit’ to the law.14 As well as provoking 
the South – another common trope in pro-compromise propaganda – resistance to the 
Compromise of 1850 therefore threatened urban order and state authority in the North.  
Here conservative criticism of resistance to the Fugitive Slave Law was woven into 
wider suspicions of the threat a violent democracy posed to balanced government. George 
Ticknor Curtis, a critic of what he saw as the overly democratic 1853 Massachusetts 
constitution, also raised the spectre of Shay’s Rebellion and the French Revolution as 
examples of the people collectively usurping the authority of the state.15 In the late 1840s 
and early 1850s, the Philadelphian Sidney George Fisher routinely defined democracy as a 
system of mob rule, used a lurid language of violence to describe its character, and frequently 
compared Jacksonian America to the French Reign of Terror. Fisher also blamed popular 
disorder for legislative brawls and dysfunction over slavery. 16 When conservatives used 
graphic depictions of violence and disorder, they challenged what they perceived as 
usurpations of, the state monopoly on power. Conservatives blurred the boundaries that 
separated discussions of sectionalism, democracy, and urban order, reading national and 
municipal affairs as part of a common problem rooted in untrammelled power in the people.  
This fitted into a wider elite suspicion that the people were more inclined to 
participate in government through public rioting and political violence than free elections 
and the rule of law. To many antebellum Americans, the mob had a place in a democratic 
polity to the horror of elites who privileged ‘reason’ over violence.17 Anxiety about the links 
between violence and politics shaped the battles of the Early Republic. Federalists saw in 
their ‘Jacobin’ Jeffersonian Republican opponents the same democratic violent threat 
against established hierarchies that the Sans-Culottes posed, and their descendants raised the 
threat of violent anarchy through the civil war era.18 Local assumption of state power that 
rightfully belonged in national institutions raised the spectre of what James Madison19 
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described as a ‘pure democracy’, where the people held power directly. And like Madison, 
who believed that ‘such Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and 
contention’ when extended over wide and diverse countries like the United States, these 
conservatives feared the consequences of devolving too much authority from governors to 
the governed. When Jacksonian Democrats rode roughshod over legal and procedural 
niceties in the name of popular government, National Republicans and Whigs charged 
Jacksonian Democrats with embracing mob rule through popular government, political 
machines, and corrupt patronage.20 The urban setting of this aspect of the growing sectional 
crisis linked the sectional question to existing concerns about power, democracy, and urban 
violence. 
The dramatic rescue of the alleged fugitive slave Shadrach Minkins in Boson in the 
spring of 1851 gave northern supporters of the Compromise of 1850 in a number of northern 
cities the opportunity to demonstrate how concentrating power in the people – not the rights 
and wrongs of slavery – created sectionalism. In the Spring of 1851, United States marshals 
arrested Minkins in the Boston restaurant where he worked. When he was brought before 
the commissioners authorised to decide his fate under the terms of the Fugitive Slave Act, a 
group of abolitionists broke into the courtroom and spirited him to Canada beyond the reach 
of federal law. President Fillmore ordered civilian and military officials to catch and 
prosecute all involved as local police and law enforcement seemed unable and unwilling to 
enforce the law.21 
Conservative newspapers in Boston – a centre of moral opposition to slavery – saw 
the failure of enforcement as a problem of state weakness. The sectional crisis came to the 
streets of northern cities rather than remaining an abstract debate about the morality of 
slavery in far-flung southern states and western territories. Before the American Civil War, 
many Americans drew links between strengthening the national government and 
strengthening city government. 22  Conservatives did the same to bolster the legitimacy of the 
federal government in fugitive cases. Editorials moved easily between local and national law 
enforcement, asking rhetorically if the reader would ‘feel secure at his own fireside’ if 
important laws went unenforced. This reconfigured the Fugitive Slave Act by seeing it not 
as part of the sectional question but as a local question of whether the law stood above the 
crowd. Enforcing the measure, one paper put it, was about the ‘power…of the city police’ 
as much as protecting the Union.23 When describing the Minkins case, other conservatives 
linked local ‘resistance’ to the law to ‘disunion, anarchy, and ruin’ on a national scale.24 The 
Boston Courier raised the ‘spectre of the chaos of the old [pre-1787] confederation’ in charting 
what would happen without ‘the laws duly enacted’ on the streets of Boston.25 The sectional 
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crisis did not just exist in Congress, Kansas, and the offices of the New York Tribune: it shaped 
– and was shaped by – the towns and cities that were already experimenting with new 
geographic and institutional concentrations of power to challenge the threat of urban 
disorder to republican government.   
Minkins’ rescue therefore allowed conservatives to show how, in their opinion, the 
mob had usurped legitimate government in Boston. They described the affair as a ‘riot’ and 
its participants as a ‘mob’, framing this aspect of the sectional crisis as another example of 
the urban disorder that appeared on both sides of the Atlantic.26 Opponents of the Fugitive 
Slave Act, conservative papers argued, were ‘taking the matter into their own hands’ and 
ensuring ‘MOB LAW take the place of legal authority in Boston’.27 The fact that these 
abolitionists had protected Minkins ‘within a stone’s throw of City Hall, the Marshal’s office, 
and the headquarters of the Police’ only highlighted that the people – like urban rioters and 
the Paris mob – had assumed power that legitimately belonged to the state.28 Newspapers in 
Boston and elsewhere hysterically raised the threat of the city under complete mob rule, 
governed by ‘that spirit of lawless violence that would have filled our streets with violence 
and bloodshed’. Only obedience to the Fugitive Slave Act, they argued, would protect 
Boston from these ‘ultras’ and ‘fanatics’.29 Conservative appeals to the constitution framed 
the question of the morality of the Fugitive Slave Act in terms of popular opinion 
overturning lawful government – and made it clear this was something they stridently 
opposed. Indeed, the fact that Bostonian US Marshals declined to intervene outraged 
conservatives precisely because, by failing to enforce the law, they had acquiesced in 
inverting the proper power relationship between the people and the state. 30  These 
conservatives described resistance to the fugitive law as a process of centralization of power 
in the hands of the people and the formation of a state within a state in northern cities.  
From cities it was easy to extrapolate to the wider North. Later, one conservative 
Whig journal in New York compared the Wisconsin Supreme Court and Ohio Legislature’s 
nullifications of the Fugitive Slave Act and South Carolina’s nullification of the ‘tariff of 
abominations’ to the rebellions of the Early Republic, again showing how the federal 
government no longer governed where it was supposed to, and suggesting how lawless 
popular sentiment had usurped bulwarks of order like judiciaries and states.31 In place of the 
rule of law, Curtis bemoaned, America had become a ‘mere democracy, enacting, 
expounding, and executing laws by the direct action of the people.’32 The idea that a riotous, 
violent democracy had laid siege to the institutions of government – capturing some and 
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prostrating others – and could, unchecked, assume the state monopoly on violence for itself, 
lay implicit in these conservatives’ attempts to force northerners to abide by the Compromise 
of 1850. 
To some conservatives, then, the people, rather than the federal government and the 
Fugitive Slave Act, had become the centralizing threat in national politics, and this could 
apply when the people acted individually as well as collectively. Conservatives often 
criticised both southern secessionists and northern abolitionists for relying on a supposed 
‘higher law’ doctrine to justify opposition to the Fugitive Slave Act or the Constitution.33 To 
such unionists, the idea that the people could follow a ‘higher law’ than the Constitution 
represented more than just a theological dispute. It also involved the creation of multiple 
competing sources of state authority to rival the federal government. Indeed, the Baltimore 
American used William Seward’s famous formulation of ‘higher law’ doctrine to describe 
how northern abolitionists and southern ‘disorganizers’ believed the individual had the right 
to subvert the government and the law, based on an ‘assumption he knows better than the 
state’.34 In other words, the consequences of an individualist politics of conscience – like a 
collective politics of mob law – were strikingly similar, with citizens redistributing legitimate 
power from state institutions to disorderly people. Individuals like antislavery agitators, 
institutions (real or imagined) like ‘the President and Directors of the Underground 
Railroad’, and ‘secret associations’ – akin to ‘monarchies which rely on physical force’ – had 
effectively become states within a state because of their ability to usurp violent power.35 The 
concept of a higher law, more than just representing a process of power centralizing in the 
hands of the people that belonged to government, helped conservatives to use centralization 
in a manner that challenged both the individualistic and collective strands of Jacksonian 
political practice. Many Americans would argue that the federal government and the power 
it could wield over states and citizens was the most dangerous source of violent authority – 
this indeed became a major claim of opponents of the Fugitive Slave Law – but these 
conservatives used the idea of a process of centralization to emphasise that the people 
claiming a mandate over the institutions of the state was the most dangerous threat to liberty 
instead.  
Resistance, sometimes violent, to the Fugitive Slave Act brought together two issues 
important to conservatives in the early 1850s: the possibility that citizens in northern cities 
could assume for themselves violent power that conservatives wanted to reserve for 
themselves and the issue of preserving the Union between the North and the South. When 
explaining early resistance to the Fugitive Slave Law, conservatives often defined the people 
themselves – not slaveholders, corporations, or the federal government – as centralizing 
power by subjecting cities to the unrestrained rule of mobs, rioters, and protestors. The 
national sectional crisis therefore also spoke to conservative fears about the potential for a 
supposed pure, unrestrained, or direct democracy in cities and states, where the assemblage 
of the people, not the state, held violent power. Dissent from the Fugitive Slave Act did not 
just threaten the Union in Washington; it also threatened to concentrate power at the 
expense of the balanced structure of American republican government on their own 
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doorsteps. This allowed conservatives to use the threat of centralization they had described 
in Paris, Philadelphia, and elsewhere as a political weapon against those who they believed 
put the Union in jeopardy. Moreover, this understanding of northern antislavery as a 
problem of weak government, democratic activism, and urban disorder, would strongly 
inform how conservatives would come to try and curb sectionalism by strengthening 
government.  
Centralization, Sovereignty, and Democracy 
Many conservatives used this threat of centralization as a pretext to monopolise political 
decision-masking for themselves, just as they had when confronted with other perceived 
challenges to elite rule. America had a long history of trying to depoliticise slavery, through 
mechanisms like the Gag Rule, the judiciary, and third parties. Conservatives, who often 
blamed democracy for northern sectionalism, hoped to do the same. Many conservative 
observers of resistance to the Fugitive Slave Act indeed blamed formal democracy the 
situation they observed on the streets of Boston. Drawing from similar arguments that 
democracy weakened city governments and their ability to combat violent disorder, they 
argued that popular elections incentivised officeholders to permit abolitionists and 
antislavery men to assume violent power and rule northern cities themselves. ‘Agitation’ in 
the public sphere, they warned, was thus responsible for sectionalism, not a fundamental 
conflict between freedom and slavery. In response, conservatives sought to centralize 
decision-making power over slavery in institutions insulated from popular control. This 
included the judiciary, political elites, and a less competitive party system. The connection 
conservatives drew between disobedience to the law, northern sectionalism, and electoral 
democracy led them to conclude that only centralizing power in their hands could hold the 
Union together. 
When it came to the sectional question conservatives often hoped to depoliticise 
slavery. This was a tactic that stretched back to the early days of the Republic. The 
Constitution made slavery a matter for state regulation, and when the issue of territorial 
expansion brought it into national politics, skilled politicians like Martin Van Buren looked 
to creating bi-sectional parties to contain antagonism. For a few years in the 1830s and 1840, 
Congress’s gag rule also prevented abolitionists from being heard in Washington. But by the 
1840s, slavery had forced its way back into national politics, and issues like enforcing the 
Fugitive Slave Act made the matter all the more relevant. The years from 1848 onwards 
were marked by several attempts – many backed by conservative voices – to depoliticise the 
issue of slavery extension by putting sectional questions beyond the reach of Congress, 
parties, and voters. This included handing power to territorial legislatures and voters, or 
leaving the decision to the Federal court system. Both approaches failed, as popular 
sovereignty led to guerrilla warfare in Kansas, while the Dred Scott decision in 1857 only 
strengthened northern opposition to a ‘slave power’.  
Union parties, which sprung up after the crisis of 1850, represented a less explored 
third option. Conservatives here used antipartisan populism, not just because they were 
critical of individual political parties but also because they were critical of the principle of 
popular government that parties encapsulated. These Union Parties and movements 
appeared at public meetings held in northern and southern cities in 1850 and 1851. Once 
Congress had passed the Compromise of 1850, supporters of compromise in northern cities 
held public meetings to publicly display their section’s fidelity to compromise and Union – 
and the Fugitive Slave Act the South had demanded. Delegates and calls for these 
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conventions emphasised their bipartisan nature but often called for substantial reform of the 
second party system to deny abolitionist and secessionist sympathisers any place in the 
public sphere.36 In the South, particularly Georgia, a number of Whigs and some Democrats 
opposed to secession formed union parties to contest elections against various southern 
rights coalitions.37 Many of the organizers and attendees of northern meetings hoped for 
something similar, and in New York a union meeting organised a Union Party ticket for 
elections in 1850 and 1851, and in Massachusetts and Georgia Union Party activists drafted 
Daniel Webster as their candidate in 1852, who died a week before the election.38 Meetings 
in other cities gave support to the idea of forming a single party to surpass the Whigs and 
Democrats, despite never formally organising as extensively as elsewhere. These movements 
therefore all hoped – but failed – to supplant the second party system, replacing party 
competition with consensus on the Compromise of 1850. But a broader number of 
mainstream conservatives – like Henry Clay, James Buchanan, and Daniel Webster – spoke 
of an informal Union Party consisting of Whigs and Democrats who opposed keeping 
abolitionist and proslavery sympathisers within their ranks.39 These parties might compete 
on the tariff, immigration, or inflation – but could conspire to deny northern voters the 
option of voting for antislavery candidates. While Union Party activists hoped to form a 
formal national political party, the movement also included a larger movement that hoped 
to substantially reform the second party system and curb democracy to challenge 
sectionalism. 
Those who ventured into the Union Party movement around midcentury drew on 
old ideas. As far back as Early Republic, Americans had considered the relationship between 
the people exercising their authority through elections and through mob violence. 
Constitution-makers in 1776 had distinguished between democracies like Greek city-states 
and New England towns where the people themselves directly administered state authority 
and mixed republics where propertied officeholders and the people shared the power of the 
state.40 Such models may have worked in classical city states or among Puritan property 
owners, they reasoned, but would fail in a larger continental republic. In framing what was 
sometimes referred to as ‘representative democracy’ instead, they hoped that indirectly 
elected bodies like the Senate, gubernatorial and presidential vetoes, and the judiciary would 
help restrain excesses of popular power.41  It did not seem apparent to such theorists that 
democratic debate was any more rational or orderly than actual mob violence. In their 
opinion, both the silver-tonged demagogue and the frenzied mob relied on emotional 
passion rather than reasoned debate: each fed off the other. 42  This interpretation of a 
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demagogic democracy strongly influenced how many conservatives understood the origins 
of antislavery violence. 
Conservative unionists blamed democracy and demagoguery – not slavery – for 
allowing the people to usurp federal authority on the streets of Boston. Conservative 
supporters of the Fugitive Slave Act like George Ticknor Curtis cited Madison’s fear of 
democratic majorities attacking property to make the case for stronger federal government.43 
Conservative unionists often blamed the public debate on slavery for the supposed violence 
in Boston. The ‘inflammatory language’ that marked discussion of the Fugitive Slave Act, 
warned the Boston Courier, created the ‘spirit of resistance to law’ that led to the rescue of 
Shadrach Minkins.44 Indeed, the northern public sphere seemed a particularly unsuitable 
forum to determine the future of slavery in America. Editorials and speakers told their 
audiences that venal presses and politicians made ‘inflammatory appeals to the base passions 
and blind prejudices of the multitude’ and stirred up mob violence and contempt for law, 
authority, and Union. 45  Union Party supporters and activists described northern and 
southern pro and anti-slavery activists as ‘nullifiers’, ‘disloyal’, and ‘fanatics’ for their part 
in this public debate. 46 Political debate seemed like threat to government rather than a 
rational forum for the settlement of the sectional crisis. Such concerns about public opinion 
shaped the sectional politics of other conservatives too. Despite not directly writing about 
the Compromise, Sidney George Fisher sympathised with the plight of slaves depicted in 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Yet the fact American democracy allowed the book to inflame passions, 
inform party politics, and subject the southern aristocratic minority to the power of the 
northern democratic majority tempered his support for antislavery. 47  To conservatives 
inclined to see rioting as an outlet of the popular will, debate, democracy, and disorder all 
seemed to tend towards the centralization of power in a turbulent – and unrestrained – 
people. 
Political parties and partisanship carried this potentially violent debate from the 
sphere of democratic discourse into government itself. The Baltimore American blamed the 
‘turmoil’ and ‘passion’ in New York public debate over slavery (led by the Tribune and other 
papers) and the ‘squabbles, and the prominence of the sergeant-at-arms’ in the House of 
Representatives.48 Others warned against allowing opponents of the Fugitive Slave Law to 
throw ‘firebrands’ into elections and congressional debates, showing how they 
conceptualised the slavery debate in civil society as an external threat to an orderly 
government.49 And supporting the Union Party movement in Boston, the Courier too warned 
that the ‘sport of agitation’ on slavery would lead to a ‘political convulsion’, describing in 
lured terms the violence that would follow the fall of government at the hands of a violent 
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democracy. 50 Public debate on slavery – not slavery itself – seemed to weaken government 
and its ability to contain violence. In Europe and America, conservatives had demanded 
that governments impose order on disorderly subjects, but public debate on slavery seemed 
to be doing the opposite. And to some Union party activists who wanted to further scale 
back party competition, it was obvious that the ‘old parties’, ‘demagogues’, and ‘ale-house 
politicians’ carried this dysfunction from public debate into federal government.51 Direct 
democratic government, conservatives sometimes warned, could never maintain order, as it 
handed power to the very people that conservatives argued needed to be subject to 
government authority. This allowed conservatives to make the case for reversing the 
supposedly centralizing tendencies of American democracy. 
Believing that democracy created northern sectionalism, conservatives turned to 
limiting the ability of the people to determine the future of slavery for themselves. Union 
Party activists’ programme was perhaps the most notable, as they argued that only a one-
party state could successfully contain popular debate on slavery and hold the Union 
together. Reforming the party system gave conservatives an opportunity to prevent debate. 
Unionist speakers and papers called for both political parties to drop references to slavery, 
predicted a reorganisation of parties along lines that separated legitimate ‘conservatives’ 
from the ‘agitation’ and ‘fanaticism’ of ‘ultras’.52 These activists therefore hoped to reform 
the party system so that American voters would no longer have the option of deciding 
between legitimate pro and anti-slavery candidates at the ballot box as they had under the 
second party system. Instead, a legitimate conservative party of compromise would enjoy a 
privileged position in public discussion and political office against its abolitionist opponents. 
Conservative unionists therefore tried to police political debate to the point of trying to curb 
party conflict on slavery altogether and leave decision-making in the hands of the federal 
government. Taking the power to control how the federal government dealt with slavery out 
of a supposedly dysfunctional democratic arena of competing parties, democratic elections, 
and platforms, though, curbed the decision-making power of the people and put it in 
independent legal institutions and offices that conservatives could more easily supervise and 
control.  By curbing party competition, these conservatives hoped to leave legal institutions 
free to enforce the Compromise of 1850 free of any mandate from voters to decide the future 
of slavery on either northern or southern terms. 
Despite not using the term, these conservatives recognised that they were implicitly 
centralizing power. It is striking just how hegemonic unionists recognised their vision was. 
The Bangor Daily Whig & Courier, for instance, confidently predicted that a Union Party 
would ‘swallow up all others’.53 Rather than giving decision-making power to the people 
who would enact it through free and fair elections, conservatives turned instead to 
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strengthening the sovereignty of the state. At a Philadelphia Union meeting, the Clay Whig 
Joseph Ingersoll, engaging with the antiparty movement, reminded his audience that ‘the 
sovereignty of the law’ formed ‘a still higher authority’ over citizens,54 while the Baltimore 
Sun demanded public ‘suppression’ of opponents of the Compromise of 1850.55 While they 
did not use the pejorative term, conservatives here understood that the consequence of 
curbing party competition on slavery was to centralize political decision-making power in 
fewer hands.  
Union meetings were another tool conservative elites hoped to use to monopolise 
the debate over slavery and ensure it remained under the strict supervision of a bisectional 
coalition of conservative elites. Supporters urged candidates for local, state, and federal 
offices to abstain from discussing slavery and support the compromise in an attempted to 
limit the boundaries of public debate. At a meeting held just after the passage of the 
Compromise of 1850 at Boston’s Faneuil Hall, resolutions and speakers argued that the 
compromise had finally ‘adjusted’ the territorial question, and that self-proclaimed unionists 
needed to ‘check’ those that ‘vilify’ the compromise measures.56  Protecting the Union, the 
Boston Courier argued, meant attendees needed to show ‘constant vigilance and discreet 
foresight’.57 Their desire to eradicate discussion shows how they sought to put boundaries 
on what the people could debate in public. Rather than using state regulation, they sought 
to use pressure and influence to control what the people could and could not legitimately 
discuss in public. Curbing public debate in this way also helped conservatives centralize 
decision-making power by taking slavery out of the public sphere.  
The judiciary also offered conservatives an attractive and relatively nondemocratic 
institution that could take responsibility for slavery without popular influence. After all, 
conservatives had historically supported an appointed judiciary as a check on democratic 
authority, and urban reformers opposed plans to make judges elective around midcentury.58  
Conservative senators had also had precedent for handing slavery to the courts as a solution 
to the inability of elected government to reach a binding decision.  In 1848, the Senate passed 
the ‘Clayton Compromise’, which handed authority to determine the legality of slavery in 
the territories to the Supreme Court, only for the House to reject it, though similar provisions 
did appear in the Compromise of 1850.59 Both before and after the Dred Scott decision, 
where Chief Justice Taney sought to impose a settlement through judicial fiat, conservative 
unionists demanded that ‘local interests have had to submit’ to the only ‘tribunal whose legal 
province’ included the power ‘to decide these points’. 60  When George Ticknor Curtis 
published his history of the Philadelphia Convention in 1854, he stridently defended the 
necessity of a supreme national judiciary to enforce the law over disobedient states, no doubt 
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with antislavery Massachusetts and disunionist South Carolina in mind. 61  These 
conservatives imagined removing the power to determine the future of slavery from 
democratic debates and the electorate to the insulated forum of the courts. Indeed, appointed 
judges and life tenures made the judiciary particularly suited for sovereignty on the slavery 
question. Fisher privately and newspapers and speakers publicly argued that the 
‘independent’ judiciary allowed it to adjudicate on slavery where a disorderly Congress and 
‘demagogues’ could not.62 The judiciary, too, allowed conservatives to build a unionist 
government that subjected he people to its decision-making authority rather than reflected 
the will of the majority. 
Beneath conservative opposition to partisanship, politicians, and parties lay a 
critique of voters and their ability to address the slavery question. Allegations that politicians 
intentionally inflamed sectional divisions implied that the people were unable to rationally 
evaluate competing positions.63 Indeed, conservatives sometimes assumed that the people 
lacked the capacity to participate in a democratic polity without falling under the control of 
demagogues. One pro-Union Party newspaper did argue that a National Union Party would 
spring from ‘the people’. Yet it revered the statesmen who had authored the Compromise of 
1850, comparing men like Lewis Cass, Daniel Webster and Henry Clay to Roman Senators, 
and excluding ‘fanatics’ and ‘incendiaries’ who could mislead the electorate from their 
proposed movement. 64  Far from unquestioningly embracing popular sovereignty, they 
defined ‘the people’ of the union movement by deference to the political elites who they 
believed were real agents of historical and political change. Even defending popular 
sovereignty in the territories, as the Baltimore American did, seemed less about decentring 
democratic control, and more about setting a precedent that bisectional statesmen 
unconnected to the ‘abolition’ or ‘slave interest’ in the North and South dealt with the 
territorial question. Despite giving the impression of devolving power from Washington to 
territorial voters, what seemed important to the American was not that it opened democratic 
promise to the western territories. The paper defended the measure on the grounds that it 
would deny the northern people and southern slaveholders power to determine the future of 
slavery in the territories.65 Despite using the language of antipartyism, these unionists used 
it as a form of exclusion defining ‘the people’ as a crowd susceptible to extremist appeals, 
when they ought to defer to statesmen.  
In place passionate and potentially centralized democracy, conservatives looked to 
non-partisan deference to elites. Vesting decision-making power in nondemocratic national 
institutions like the federal judiciary meant giving control to those with the restraint and 
dispassion conservatives believed were better traits for solving the sectional crisis.  Union 
Party activists defended their designs to replace the bipartisan second party system with a 
single bisectional party on the grounds that it would return ‘harmony, faith, justice and 
order’ to the American government; like Henry Carey, they used the idea of harmony as a 
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tool to encourage deference. Such ideas chimed with the ideal of rule by conservative ‘best 
men’ that appeared repeatedly in midcentury discussions of statecraft.66 Sidney George 
Fisher, for example, routinely demanded that American ‘statesmen’ manage the sectional 
question, not the ‘demagogues’ who courted the northern electorate, and in doing so, 
wistfully contrasted democracy to monarchies and aristocracies where independent 
sovereigns respected the ‘common good’ rather than popular passion.67 Fisher’s views were 
unusually forthright but he was no outlier. Criticising the Whig nomination of Winfield 
Scott over compromise supporter Millard Fillmore in 1852, George Ticknor Curtis won 
acclaim for arguing that an electoral college of ‘moderate and sound judgement’ should 
choose the President without regard to political parties or the popular will.68 He, like Fisher, 
linked preserving the union to the restoration of elite authority. To Ticknor and Fisher, 
centralizing decision-making power in government institutions that were sheltered from the 
democratic storms that threatened to centralize power in a demagogue fitted with a wider 
principle that America’s political and propertied elite should govern America. 
This conservative take on the sectional crisis as a consequence of democratic 
disorder fits alongside their more direct, and sceptical, responses to democracy in the 1850s.  
The New York Herald, for example, drew an explicit link between centralizing decision-
making power over slavery and centralizing decision-making power over municipal law and 
order. It argued that rowdies and roughs controlled corrupt partisan city and state 
nominating conventions at the expense of the ‘intelligent people of the city’. Instead, it 
supported giving Union Committees of propertied citizens power to nominate municipal 
officers to maintain order as well as national candidates to prevent disunion. 69  Sidney 
George Fisher argued that universal suffrage required parties to court the violent mobs he 
feared on the streets of Philadelphia and so limited the city’s power to keep order and 
suppress disorder; his support for the 1857 coup by prosperous vigilantes in San Francisco, 
an act he argued might soon need to be copied by best men in Philadelphia and New York, 
bore similarities to the case he made for a conservative takeover of national politics. Maurice 
Richter also called for a concentration of local decision-making in nonpartisan state and 
local executives.70 
Some conservatives called for even more dramatic extensions of state power as an 
antidote to democracy. Stephen Colwell, a close friend of Henry Carey in Philadelphia and 
man who warned after 1848 of a coming American socialism, led calls for replacing violent 
volunteer fire companies – which he too described as states within a state – with a 
professional city run system around the time of Consolidation, and also argued an 
authoritarian federal government, under a benevolent Protestant elite, needed to intervene 
far more vigorously in the nation’s social life to prevent disorder. Although Colwell would 
become in time a strong Republican, he was a native of slaveholding Virginia, and prior to 
the late 1850s believed ardently in bisectional rule under the stewardship of propertied elites. 
‘Popular elections,’ he argued, ‘do not ensure a selection of representatives worthy to be 
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governors or legislators; not only so, they render the choice of such improbable and very 
rare.’ 71  Indeed there was, he claimed. ‘no subject on which the friends of democratic 
institutions choose to remain under greater delusion and mystification than that of popular 
elections.’72 
In other words, they applied on a local level the assumption that electoral democracy 
weakened government, and shaped their approach to local and national problems. When 
Governor Enoch Lowe proposed repudiating state debts and hosting a constitutional 
convention in Maryland, indeed, the Baltimore American challenged his assumption that ‘the 
arbitrary will of the majority’ of the people had ‘a sort of superior sovereignty’ over the 
government.73 To the American, some political questions – in this instance, repudiation and 
constitution-forming – ought to remain vested in the institutions of the state rather than being 
opened to the people.74 Such conservative voices feared that, as in Second Republic France, 
unworthy voters would centralize power in their own hands at the expense of law, order, 
and government. It was a view they held of abolitionists violating the Fugitive Slave Act as 
much as urban rioters and mobs. Saving the Union was an opportunity to ensure control 
over state power nationally and locally remained outside of democratic control rather than 
fall under the influence of the disorderly electorate. 
Conservatives often interpreted sectional conflict as another example of how 
democracy allowed the people – and the demagogues who exploited their passions – to usurp 
legal government. Whether looking abroad or at American cities, they showed power 
concentrating in the hands of the mob or licentiousness individuals, and saw such a process 
as a warning about the consequences of democratisation. Disobedience to the Fugitive Slave 
Act, like periodic rioting and disorder, seemed like a problem that party competition, 
officeholders, and elections allowed in return for votes rather than an example of the 
divisiveness of the slavery question to northern citizens. Believing that democracy permitted 
and encouraged sectionalism, they argued that informally limiting popular rule could 
prevent secession. They particularly hoped that curbing party competition by eliminating 
the second party system would stop candidates being elected on proslavery or antislavery 
platforms and leave the political establishment free to settle sectional divides on amicable 
terms to the south and northern elites. In this regard, they were centralizers who supported 
putting cities and people under the rule of a small number of propertied men and 
establishment politicians. But rather than describing it as a dangerous centralization, they 
claimed that this could help heal the sectional divide. Opposition to the consolidation of 
strong government may have been a staple of political rhetoric across antebellum America, 
but in practice conservatives used opposition to the centralization of power in the people 
and the growth of the sectional crisis to claim greater authority for themselves.  
Centralization of Executive Power 
In addition to taking political decision-making power out of the hands of the people, 
conservatives hoped to strengthen the federal government. Just as sectionalism was a pretext 
for centralization of political decision-making in the hands of elites, it was also a pretext for 
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centralizing executive power in the hands of the federal government. Drawing parallels with 
local city-building, to prevent what conservatives described as power centralizing in the 
hands of the people, northern conservative looked to the federal government in Washington 
to impose power over the entire Union. Unlike southerners, who frequently claimed the 
federal government violated the rights of the states, northern unionists often opposed federal 
retrenchment. Some had also used Old World rioting to justify more centralized 
governments across the Atlantic, whether in the form of Louis-Philippe, Louis-Eugène 
Cavaignac, or occasionally even Louis-Napoleon himself. Northern supporters of the 
Compromise of 1850 similarly used violent opposition to the so-called ‘peace measures’ as 
the pretext for a state-building programme of their own. Despite the limits of the Tenth 
Amendment, they eagerly anticipated the idea that the national government could exercise 
police power in northern cities, and impose authority over local states too beholden to the 
popular will. Far from believing in small government, when given a government under the 
authority of the ‘best men’, conservatives could enthusiastically embrace state power. 
Some southern opponents of enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act in northern cities 
recognised an implicit threat in allowing the federal government to enforce the law over 
Boston. States’ rights activists in the Senate felt that giving the federal government the power 
to enforce law over disorderly states and cities would set a precedent for ‘consolidation’. ‘A 
determined front of Federal power, vindicating its own authority’ would give the federal 
government sovereignty over southern states too. 75  But to northern and Border state 
supporters of enforcement, this was the point. Thus when opponents of the Fugitive Slave 
Act accused its supporters of an intolerable federal intervention in municipal government, 
the Washington National Intelligencer suggested the matter was about law enforcement rather 
than sectional conflict, arguing the federal government should not show ‘pitiable weakness’ 
in dealing with southern disunionists either,76 This was no exception. The Baltimore American 
made explicit its desire for a centralization of power in the federal government. Rioting that 
opened sectional wounds and challenged the authority of the national government, it 
argued, justified the President directly intervening in local law enforcement.77 Describing not 
the 1787 compact, but, rather, the Constitution and Union as he wanted it to be in the mid-
1850s, Curtis routinely cited the requirement to guarantee the states a republican form of 
government and suppress domestic insurrection as evidence that Washington could 
intervene. 78  Strengthening the power of the federal government – something many 
Americans had long derided as a dangerous centralization of power – often paralleled 
programs of local consolidation. 
Northern conservative unionists therefore explicitly demanded a consolidated 
federal government as a check on local states perhaps more susceptible to direct popular 
control. As soon as they heard about the rescue of Shadrach Minkins, critics demanded the 
government at Washington apply power outwards over its territory and fill the vacuum left 
by Boston’s inaction. Conservative unionists enthusiastically used a language of strong 
governance to justify enforcement, emphasising the ‘duties of the Executive’, and praising 
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‘compulsion’  and ‘energetic measures’.79 They repeatedly demanded that federal authorities 
bring about ‘order’, for example, and in meetings and editorials campaigned for the 
‘preservation of the peace’, and ‘enforcement of the law’. 80  So enthralled were some 
conservatives with state power that the New York Courier and Enquirer demanded ‘that every 
life in Boston should be sacrificed and the city itself wiped from the face of the land, than 
that any law of the General Government should be resisted, and proclamation made that it 
cannot be enforced in Boston!’ 81  The Courier, like many in the conservative unionist 
movement and the city reformers they often overlapped with, seemed enthralled at the 
prospect of state power imposing the law on a disorderly people. These Americans seemed 
happy with a government capable of intervening on the streets of northern cities and 
southern states in order to enforce its will. It is hard to imagine that such voices did not have 
the challenges both the Union and France had faced from 1848-1850 in mind in framing 
their defence of centralized executive power. New York’s Courier and Enquirer directly 
compared the necessity of enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act in Boston to the need to ‘whip’ 
South Carolina should it attempt disunion: the constitution and federal government was its 
own ‘higher law’ with and ‘a stronger arm and a more potential authority, than any mob a 
city or State can organize.’82 To solve the sectional crisis, northern conservatives looked to 
expand the physical presence of the national government in northern capitals by ensuring 
that a government more remote from popular control held sway. 
Conservative unionists saw enforcing adherence to the law as a way to centralize 
power in the hands of the state at the expense of urban mobs and southern secessionists. As 
far back as 1845, Rufus Choate, who would later become an ardent unionist in Boston, told 
an audience that the legal system existed to prevent ‘the assembly of the people’ holding 
‘every power of the state - executive, legal judicial’ and creating the kind of ‘unmitigated 
democracy’ that had destroyed Athens. Attacks on the Madisonian system, he argued, 
threatened to bring this to Massachusetts: lawyers were a conservative restraint on 
democracy.83 Later, when discussing the sectional crisis the Boston Courier argued that the 
people had the ‘right of private judgement on public affairs’ but ‘obedience to the law...is the 
duty of a good citizen’. 84 However, they were by no means the only unionists to urge 
Americans to ‘respect and obey the law of the land’.85 As William Novack has suggested, 
the law could be in practice an extensive tool of state power.86 These conservative unionists 
seemed to make a similar argument: that ‘local interest’ violating the ‘general law’, as they 
understood it, as determined by elites in legal ‘tribunals’ allowed the people themselves to 
become  the sole sovereign power. Support for the rule of law could in practice reverse the 
power relationship.87  
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The link between sectional crisis and local disorder allowed northern conservatives 
to redefine a strong federal government not as the centralizing threat that many Americans 
had long seem as, but instead to root the danger in ineffective (or overly democratic) local 
law enforcement. After Shadrach Minkins’s rescue, Kentucky Senator Henry Clay 
introduced a Senate resolution questioning President Fillmore on measures he intended to 
take to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act in Boston. 88 Ordinarily, municipal disorder in New 
England would not require a Kentucky Senator to take such action, but conservatives 
believed the Fugitive Slave Act linked local lawlessness to the national sectional crisis. 
Conservative papers therefore publicly supported Fillmore’s threat of national force in terms 
that would be recognisable to any municipal reformer: a need to ensure the prompt 
‘execution of the law and maintenance of the public peace’, to prevent ‘riot in Boston’, and 
to defend ‘law and order’.89 The connection between local disorder that conservatives feared 
on the streets of northern cities and the sectionalism they stridently disliked meant that they 
could cast strengthening the presence of Washington on northern cities as an act of local law 
enforcement of a police with municipal consolidations and professional policing, rather than 
a dangerous centralization of power. Strikingly, indeed, the leader of Philadelphia’s 
Consolidation movement Eli Kirk Price proved one of the most steadfast defenders in the 
city of the Fugitive Slave Act right up the 1861, despite his Quaker background and personal 
distaste for slavery.90 Comparisons between opposition to that Act, Shay’s Rebellion and 
other examples of ‘domestic violence’ that the federal government could, under the 
Constitution, suppress, further defined the issue in terms that legitimised national power. 
Just as South Carolinian nullifiers, Daniel Shays and Whiskey Rebels warranted federal 
marshals and troops to suppress, so did Boston rioters and the personal liberty laws. 91 
Suppressing disorder in Boston would not just preserve the Union by persuading southerners 
that the North could protect southern slavery. Northern conservatives would also protect the 
Union by concentrating power in the federal government at the expense of any rival 
sovereignty: setting the stage, as some planters feared, for the war effort in 1861. They did 
so in the 1850s by packaging a more centralized government in the honeyed language of 
constitutionality and local law and order. 
Both secession and the nullification of federal law by the mob violated conservatives’ 
sense that a government of propertied elites ought to rule America, and not the people 
directly. This linked the issues of local disorder to that of national Union, and allowed them 
to present a national centralization of power in the hands of Congress and the federal 
government in palatable terms that did not suggest the coming of an American Second 
Empire. Northern conservative unionists were adamant that they needed to concentrate 
power in the hands of the federal government to thwart the dangers posed by centralized 
democracy. Without a central government to suppress disorderly sectionalists, conservatives 
feared North and South too risked another Daniel Shay’s Massachusetts, Louis Blanc’s 
Paris, or Shadrach Minkins’s Boston, a democracy centralized insofar as the mob held power 
rather than the state.  They were happy to see the federal government take a more active role 
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in policing the North, something normally that lay in the province of state and local 
government, and argued it must become a visible force in big cities. Northern unionist state-
building therefore often amounted to designs for a centralization of power in the federal 
government, something that opponents of the Fugitive Slave Act and southern opponents of 
a stronger federal government recognised. Rather than seeing states’ rights and a small 
federal government as the solution to the slavery question, they saw the sectional crisis as 
an opportunity to enforce deference to federal authority. Conservative state building during 
the sectional crisis therefore occurred while they attempted to redefine centralization as a 
democratic problem that only state authority could solve. 
Elite Rule and Geographic Decentralization 
As well as centralizing executive power in the federal government, conservative unionists 
hoped to centralize political decision-making back into the hands of bisectional federal 
authorities, where men like themselves could access it. Warning against centralization as a 
geographic phenomenon helped them legitimise centralization of political authority into 
government institutions that they claimed would share power geographically. The northern 
majority in Congress and the Electoral College meant that they could conceptualise power 
in geographic terms like those many Americans conceptualised urban imperialism: as power 
concentrating inwards from the nation to a smaller area. Handing power to northern voters 
centralized power geographically. Conversely, they argued, centralizing power in 
institutions would share power geographically between the two sections. Northerners who 
called for power-sharing between North and South were therefore neither self-abnegating 
nor supplicant to southerners. Discussing the geographic patterns of democracy allowed 
them to present government by conservative elites as a geographic decentralization of power, 
by reinterpreting the northern people rather than a bisectional elite-controlled federal 
government as the greatest centralizing threat. Again, this helped conservatives legitimise 
curbing democracy as part of their response to the sectional crisis. 
In the 1850s, the northern states outstripped the South in population (see Illustration 
11 below) and, consequently, Congress, and it became possible that a solely northern party 
could control an empowered stronger federal government, much as large propertyless 
populations had seemingly come to control municipalities. With the free states enjoying a 
majority in both houses of Congress and the Electoral College following the 1850 United 
States census, simply dividing government between different institutions no longer seemed 
like enough to prevent the centralization of power in the northern electorate (See Illustration 
12 below).   
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Illustration 11: Map Showing the Population Density of the United States in 1850.  
 
 
In 1850, a substantial 
portion of the American 
people lived on the 
eastern seaboard in the 
northeast and mid-
Atlantic states. Despite 
their smaller size, the 
northeastern states had a 
far denser population, 
entitling them to an 
increased representation 
in the House of 
Representatives and the 
Electoral College. 
Source: ‘United States: Distribution of Population & Principal Railways in 1850’, University of 
Texas Libraries, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/ward_1912.html [Accessed 
September 15, 2016]. 
Illustration 12: Cartogram of the United States Presidential Election Results by County (1860).  
 
This cartogram illustates how the North’s population increased its influence in national elections: 
the large numbers of voters in northern cities outweighed the South – although the three-fifiths 
clause mitigated this somewhat in practice.  
Source: ‘Cartogram of presidential election results by county (1860)’, Wikimedia Commons, 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CartogramPresidentialCounty1860Colorbrewer.gif, 
[Accessed September 15, 2016]/ 
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When conservatives talked of national consolidation to fight disunion, they couched 
it in terms that generally avoided inferences of a French-style unitary state. Unionists used 
a language of empire to link expansion outwards to national unity, describing loyalism and 
communications consolidating a northern, western, and southern periphery.92 However, 
conservative approaches to processes of centralization and decentralization across space 
could seem contradictory and complicated. Rufus Choate, for example, eagerly supported 
what he called the ‘grand incorporation’ of America. But he believed that only ‘tolerance’ 
and ‘careful withdrawal’ would achieve his desired end, with unity coming from 
decentralization.93 Choate strongly supported a state-building programme, but rejected the 
kind of centralized dependence on a single metropolis like New York that he would come 
to defend on a local scale when opposing the Massachusetts Constitution of 1854. 94 
Strengthening the Union under the aegis of a more powerful central government capable of 
organizing expansion meant avoiding French-style dependency on a single central city. 
George Ticknor Curtis too wanted the federal government to have the authority to impose 
order, but also feared the supposed centralization of power in the federal government and 
the possibility of an explicitly French-style American republic.95 They spoke enthusiastically 
of consolidating distant states into a single nation but shied away from outright majority rule 
when doing so. 
As the likes of Carey had done with economic relationships, conservatives warned 
of power spreading outwards from a metropole to a periphery, though this time the driving 
force was the weight of votes rather than the pull of railroads and free trade. A Union 
meeting at New York’s Castle Garden  cautioned against the North turning its ‘wealth and 
numbers’ into ‘strength and power’ to employ against the states of the South.96 Indeed, the 
president of the gathering, George Wood, raised the idea of a threat to ‘our institutions 
which are free and liberal’, and the need for a permanent standing army, if the North was 
able to impose its will over southern states and western territories.97 Conservative unionists 
even interpreted the sectional crisis in this regard as the result of a small northern ‘clique’ – 
sustained by majority votes – extending power beyond its sectional border. 98  This 
centralization would only get worse over time, speakers at New York’s major Union meeting 
argued, and would culminate in the North having to use force to compel an unwilling South 
to remain in the Union.99 A national government of conservative elites imposing its will over 
the North might be a legitimate exercise of law enforcement. But in some conservative 
discussion, the North’s capacity to impose its majority will over the South and West became 
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a dangerous centralization of power. Federal expansion to maintain law and order was 
contingent on making sure that power was not misused by sectional majorities. It marked a 
national manifestation of the dilemma conservatives had faced when debating the merits of 
urban consolidations, whether centralized power could fall into the wrong hands. 
Unionists who feared that northern majority control of the federal government might 
lead to disunion presented this as a centralization of decision-making power away from the 
nation and towards a smaller geographic – but demographically dominant – section. They 
often claimed to oppose abolitionists who wanted to see the federal government move 
against slavery by warning against power concentrated inwards from the nation as a whole 
to the northeastern quadrant. Union Party supporters referred to their designs for 
restructuring the party system as pitting ‘provincials’ against ‘nationals’100, talked of the 
election of ‘men of national views’101, and argued that they were citizens of the Union rather 
than of their states.102 Their nationalism turned battles between slavery and freedom into one 
that pitted local, geographically defined centres of political power against the nation as a 
whole. Conversely, local decision-making, rather than being the basis of American self-
government, seemed to raise the possibility of creating powerful rival sovereignties that, if 
they became preponderant, could dismantle the Union. The New York Herald argued that 
Union Parties would decentralise power nationally, contrasting the ‘national portion of our 
citizens’ to the conspiracies and fanatical ‘midnight councils’ who sought to usurp power.103 
When the Baltimore American – like many conservatives – argued that ‘agitators’ North and 
South used ‘sectional prejudice’ to gain political power at the expense of ‘nationality’ and 
‘the constitution’, they imagined two contrasting definitions of space where politicians could 
gain legitimacy to wield state power: either from the nation as a whole or from a smaller 
section.104 People like Rufus Choate, Union Party activists, and conservative papers saw 
‘sectional prejudice’ and ‘local attachments’ as a threat not because they opposed local self-
government, but because these localities threatened to become majorities which could 
dominate the nation. 105  Loyalty to any other territory within the United States, these 
nationalists warned, could create a powerful state within a state, which in turn could come 
to dominate the Union that had incubated it. 
It is unsurprising that conservatives sometimes stated that the logic of majority rule 
– not slavery – accounted for the geographic centralization of power in a single section. 
Antislavery voices might have condemned a ‘slave power’ conspiracy to centralize authority 
from the 1840s onwards, but Union Party backers saw a greater danger in the weight of 
votes. When the Whig Party nominated Winfield Scott over unionist candidates Daniel 
Webster and Millard Fillmore in 1852, George Ticknor Curtis blamed ‘unconstitutional’ 
partisan nominating conventions gathering ‘in a central city’ for this unsatisfactory outcome. 
The machinery of democracy, he argued centralized power over space, where the indirectly 
chosen electoral college of the early republic had intended to distribute it more evenly.106 
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The founders, it seemed, had failed to anticipate the rise of big cities like New York, Boston, 
and Philadelphia, whose size alone menaced the checks of a federal system. Sidney George 
Fisher too blamed democratic campaigning for allowing a majority North to become a 
political force in the Union and allow sectional politicians with a solely northern 
constituency to obtain power.107 And like attendees at the Union meetings in New York, he 
argued that the North had to restrain itself from using its majority status in dealing with the 
South, lest it force its neighbour into colonial status.108 Handing too much power to the 
American electorate, he argued, moved the imagined centre of political power inwards and 
northwards, and meant only restrained statesmen – which a two party system was unlikely 
to produce – could act with the restraint to save the Union. This, to many conservatives, was 
the sectional crisis in a nutshell: democracy had centred power in the North. 
States’ rights nonetheless seemed an unsuitable response to the sectional question. 
Rather than strengthening the union, states’ rights as they understood them helped create a 
riotous democracy, through allowing local passions to trump national interests. As much as 
conservatives appeared to believe in decentralizing power, they were reluctant to support a 
polycentric polity of multiple sovereignties: diffusing the state monopoly on violence 
between different territories weakened government’s capacity to maintain order. Indeed, 
some unionists used similar arguments to those that conservatives had employed to warn 
against divided municipal government. Rufus Choate recalled how disorderly and 
conflicting Greek and Italian city-states had become harmonious and orderly unions, and 
the Baltimore American warned against unequal weak confederations like the former 
Netherlands or Switzerland.109 When describing the consequences of disunion, unionists 
predicted that the resulting ‘separate, weak, discordant communities’, and ‘rival 
neighbouring republics’ would be in a permanent state of war.110 George Ticknor Curtis also 
cited the old Articles of Confederation as evidence of the dangers of decentralizing too much 
power from the federal government to the states and to the people.111 Only consolidating the 
law-enforcing authority of institutions at the centre for such voices seemed to cure the 
problem of disorder. The supposedly American solution of devolving power locally would 
not work alone. In its most extreme formulation, like that put forward in the early days of 
the war in a pamphlet that Henry Carey helped prepare, envisaged abandoning state 
sovereignty entirely. 112 Few went this far, preferring instead to emphasise the importance of 
a strong relationship between federal and local governments. Nonetheless, conservative 
scepticism at the capacity of local governments to diffuse tension distinguishes these 
northern commentators from their southern counterparts, and may suggest why so many of 
them rallied to the Union course after the attack on Fort Sumter. The weak government of 
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states’ rights and the riotous democracy of abolitionism both seemed part of the same 
problem of allowing power to concentrate in smaller part of the country at the expense of 
the whole.  
Democracy at a local level seemed to encourage sectionalism rather than prevent it. 
Instead they saw conservativism as a national force rather than a provincial one, much as 
city reformers argued their views were metropolitan rather than local. Thus when two 
Maryland Whigs defected to the Democrats in 1856, they claimed that ‘national 
conservative citizens’ should follow them, seeing conservatism itself as transcending 
locality.113 Handing power to local government, it seemed to some, only abetted the process 
of centralization in a democratic polity: a reason many remained wary of popular 
sovereignty as a suitably Jacksonian answer to the slavery question. Union Party movements 
demanded instead that city and state politicians and voters defer to the decision of national 
statesmen and state institutions rather than follow local leaders.114 Attempts to form Union 
Party tickets for local and state races and exclude abolitionists and proslavery men from such 
offices reflects their belief that only those with national perspectives should share power 
across the entire nation. When conservative unionists spoke of the need to decentralize 
power, then, they did not want to vest sectional questions in the likes of northern majorities. 
Ideas about the ideal relationship between local and national government were indeed for 
more complex than simply devolving power to local government, especially when those 
governments seemed susceptible to demagogic control.  
Conservative unionists could therefore sometimes sound like avid centralizers, but 
they instead hoped to centralize power beyond the reach of either section and into the hands 
of those best placed to share power between both sections. As so often after 1848, 
conservatives looked to the kind of state power that monarchical and undemocratic 
European regimes offered, but shied away from openly advocating similar structures. 
Centralization of power over national geography could play a role in this process. 
Conservative newspapers happily imagined ‘the government at Washington’ exerting itself 
over disorderly distant northern cities and southern states, while George Ticknor Curtis 
linked the absence of a national capital to the weakness of the pre-1788 confederation, which 
‘impaired its dignity and efficiency’. Indeed, in his history of the Constitution, published in 
1854, he argued that American liberty required a ‘central and prepondering power’, as 
‘impending anarchy’ seemed more of a threat than federal aggrandizement, an argument 
conservative commentators sometimes used as an apology for Louis-Napoleon’s coup.115  
Despite claiming to oppose dependency on a smaller region, they did not seem to believe 
this precluded a strong government capable of preventing disorder and preventing disunion. 
In other words, conservatives redefined geographic dependency as the centralizing threat, 
which allowed them to suggest that centralizing power in the federal government could 
distribute power between North and South and ensure sectional peace. 
This sense of centralization as a geographic problem that, ironically, centralizing 
power in national institutions resolved, appeared in unionist appeals to the Constitution of 
                                                     
113 Pratt, Pearce, James Clay, Appeal for the Union. 
114 ‘The Compromise and New York Union Safety Committee’, Pensacola Gazette, October 25, 1851; ‘Union 
Safety Committee’, Milwaukee Daily Sentinel, October 14, 1851; ‘Correspondence of the Baltimore Sun’, The Sun, 
October 25, 1850; Chinese Museum Proceedings, p. 32; ‘A New Party Test’, Vermont Watchman and State Journal, 
January 30, 1852. 
115 Curtis, Constitution of the United States, vol. 1, pp. 200-230; Curtis, Constitution of the United States, vol. 2, pp. 
268-277. Wright, ‘Extract from the Message of Governor Wright’, pp. 50-53. 
Chapter 4: Conservative Opponents of ‘Centralization’ Confront the Slavery Crisis  175 
1787. Union Party activists and conservative unionists retold the history of the Philadelphia 
convention by arguing the founders wrote an antidemocratic document designed to 
concentrate power in a national government at the expense of a disorderly people, yet 
simultaneously, they tried to argue that the Constitution had been designed to decentralise 
power geographically. The founding fathers, they claimed, sought to prevent ‘possession of 
the government by a dominant, geographical majority’ and set out to encourage 
officeholders with ‘official tenure above the region of party passions and temporary 
excitements’.116 George Ticknor Curtis illustrated how conservatives saw the balance of 
power between the democratic sphere and the state in geographic terms. Writing in 1854, he 
argued that the three-fifths clause, the electoral college, and the Senate existed as part of a 
plan to prevent the ‘democratic power’ of the North from taking ‘control as against the 
Southern states’. Where handing control of the federal government to a majority of voters 
would permanently concentrate power in highly populated areas north of the Mason-Dixon 
Line, balanced power in republican institutions would spread it out to the nation as a 
whole.117 In other words, these conservatives suggested the centralization of power that the 
founders had sought to prevent was in the hands of a populous North, and not a strong and 
undemocratic federal government. 
Conflating majority rule with centralized power across geography allowed them to 
claim that centralizing power back into the hands of independent institutions and political 
elites could share power. Union Party activists, for example, argued that uniting Whigs and 
Democrats into a single bisectional party would share power between both north and south. 
They urged northern voters to defer to their bisectional coalition of conservative elites rather 
than govern based on majority rule. At a speech to a Philadelphia Union Meeting, the Clay 
Whig Joseph Ingersoll grappled with the consequences of concentrating decision-making 
power in the federal government. While Congress – not the people or the states – had the 
ultimate power to determine the future of slavery, only ‘mutual concession and forbearance’ 
between the sections gave it the power to do so.118 These commentators defended their 
proposed organisations’ fitness for office and participation in political life based on their 
supposed supposedly bisectional programme of support for the Compromise of 1850. 
President Fillmore, in a letter supporting the New York Union Committee of Safety, cited 
the warning in Washington’s farewell address against parties concentrating in a single 
geographic section.119 Others too supported the idea of a new ‘Union party, founded on 
broad and national principles’, giving themselves the geographic inclusivity and legitimacy 
to exercise government power independent of majority rule. 120  Union Party activists 
therefore warned against the geographic centralization into the North to delegitimise 
majority rule and, in practice, legitimise centralizing political decision-making into a smaller 
minority of conservative unionists rather than northern voters themselves. 
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Conservatives loyal to the Whigs and Democrats sometimes drew from a language 
of monarchy, aristocracy, and strong government to accuse Union Movements of trying to 
monopolise the power of the federal government for themselves. The charge, though 
exaggerated, was not necessarily misleading given the Union Party movement so obviously 
opposed partisan competition. 121  However, many Whig and Democratic unionists also 
believed that denying the northern majority the right to choose antislavery candidates at the 
ballot box was a suitable response to the sectional crisis. A bisectional two party system with 
consensus on the finality of the Compromise of 1850, they argued, could give the 
government power hold the union together without ‘the sword and despotism’ of federal 
authority.122 Again, conflating northern majority rule with a geographic centralization of 
political authority helped legitimise curbing democracy. Union Party activists and partisan 
conservatives disagreed on whether they needed to abolish the second party system entirely, 
but they agreed that a strong central government, which did not derive legitimacy from 
sectional majorities, was needed to prevent disunionist agitation. But like the formal Union 
Party movements, these reformers hoped the threat of geographic centralization in the north 
could reform the party system so that the sectional question lay in the hands of a bisectional 
elite rather than the northern majority. 
The Compromise of 1850 showed how bisectional strong government could work in 
practice. Conservatives presented it as a political success rather than a territorial armistice, 
and argued its legitimacy derived from its dependence on cross-sectional support, despite the 
individual measures in reality passing on sectional votes. The agonizing process of 
compromise, they argued, had answered a political question too ‘dangerous’ for a 
democratic majority to determine for themselves, and in doing so, they had avoided a 
sectional ‘union by force’ in favour of a ‘union by compromise’.123 They described in some 
detail a process of congressional reconciliation and compromise, somewhat bending the 
truth to argue that both sections had sanctioned the outcome, passing through Congress, the 
presidency and the courts to become law.124 Therefore, rather than seeing the Compromise 
of 1850, and the Fugitive Slave act in particular, as a centralizing measure that overrode the 
prerogatives of free state legislatures and voters, conservatives presented the process that 
made it as productive of legitimacy in itself. Sectional compromise, then, was not a means 
to an end but a legitimate end in itself: it was how unionists expected the American 
government to function.  It showed how a decentralized basis of support and geographic 
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coalition building could legitimise a centralized government with power to intervene on the 
streets of northern cities. 
Altering economic geography could also be a national centralization capable of 
combating the growing power of the northern majority. Indeed, the New York Herald cited 
Manhattan’s near monopoly on European steamship trade as an example of how the South 
paid tribute to a dominant North. Solving the problem of the centralized geography of 
capital, then, could help ease the sectional crisis, with an end to New York’s ‘monopoly’ on 
steamships promising to help tie the South and the West into the Union.125 The Herald, much 
like Henry Carey and other city promoters, imagined a polycentric polity where economic 
ties would allow each section to grow without becoming dependent on distant sites. A wide 
range of American conservatives from both parties claimed that economic development 
could tie the Union together, replacing apparent northern domination with sectional 
balance. ‘Intercourse’ through canals, railroads, and telegraphs could help create horizontal 
ties and bind the Union together.126 This thinking, that public works could obliterate local 
identity in favour of national feeling and incorporation into the body politic, spoke to 
unionists’ desire to create a unitary national political culture. To many Whigs happier with 
federal sponsorship of internal improvements to bind the nation together, the American 
System Henry Clay had spent decades proposing was indistinguishable from maintaining 
the Union.127 For conservatives sceptical of northern dominance, this was an opportunity to 
rebalance the seemingly colonial centralization of power in northern cities. Where national 
elections threatened to vest power in populous regions, decentred economic development 
could spread control outwards, while bringing together a divided union. Changing economic 
geography gave these conservatives another way to pursue national consolidation. 
Conservative city and state boosterism was therefore sometimes tied to sectional 
questions, as promoters argued their metropolis or region was best placed to preserve the 
Union. Few were as willing to sacrifice the likes of steamship monopolies as some New 
Yorkers. Indeed, many conservative unionists legitimised their own programmes for 
expanding hinterlands by suggesting that their central place could balance North and South. 
One correspondent to the New York Union Party meeting explained Indiana’s position as a 
‘central state’ for its ‘high conservative position’ that opposed northern and southern 
sectionalism. 128  Mid-Atlantic unionists drew from this assumption that border regions 
avoided sectionalism to argue that their ambitions for economic empire would subordinate 
northern and southern extremes to a neutral centre. The Baltimore American, for example, 
described a project to bring international steamships to Baltimore as a plan that could unite 
trade separately destined to New Orleans and New York and, in so doing, prevent a strictly 
‘Northern centralization’ in Manhattan. 129 But New York’s unionists also claimed their 
city’s dependence on northern and southern trade tied the city to a bisectional hinterland.130 
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This dependency, they argued, blurred the distinction between the city and the Union at 
large.131 They redefined their commercial interest in northern and southern trade as an 
argument for Manhattan’s unionist political leadership, claiming their city’s commercial 
growth would eliminate sectionalism, with support for Union and Compromise following 
expanding ties of trade. 132  Indeed, Castle Garden speaker James Gerard reminded his 
audience that New York’s unionist message would be ‘carried by steam and lightning to every 
city, town, and village.’133 Despite looking to promote different cities, such urban unionists 
legitimised their own designs to centre economic power by suggesting they could mediate 
between North and South.  
Some conservative reformers argued too that their city-building programs had 
unionist implications. 134  On the shores of Lake Erie, one paper celebrated the ‘the 
obliteration of all lines of discord or disunion’ between consolidated Cleveland and Ohio 
City with a picture of the flag of the United States and ‘100 guns for the Union’, linking 
national union to urban consolidation.135 When describing city consolidation movements, 
such voices often used the same language they applied to the crisis of the Union. In New 
Orleans, the Picayune spoke of the dangers of ‘sectional feelings and sectional legislation’ on 
municipal issues. 136  Their nationalistic discourse implied that the disorderly city was a 
microcosm of a wider polity at risk of dissolution. Consolidators, moreover, drew linked the 
principle of centralizing local and national governments. Eli Kirk Price was not the only 
reformer to have compared the process of city-building to creating the national government 
in 1787. The Brooklyn Eagle argued unifying the city and the nation were symmetrical.137 
Surprisingly, though, even southern papers saw consolidating power in urban seats of 
government positively. Arguing that the city’s decentralised government created local 
‘sectional feelings and rivalries’,138 the New Orleans Picayune argued that the division of the 
city along Canal Street between two French and Anglo-American municipalities reflected 
national divisions and prevented the metropolis from competing with its national and 
international rivals.139 The kind of amalgamation that cities offered urban conservatives, it 
seemed to argue, could give them power to impose order on the nation in the same way it 
allowed them to reorder the urban hinterland. City-building sometimes gave these 
conservatives the opportunity to think wider programs for stronger government.  
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When conservatives claimed that they needed to avoid centralizing power in 
northern majorities, they were not, as they seemingly implied, interested in denying 
themselves power. Their warnings that majority rule centralized power and that power 
needed to be shared between north and south helped them legitimise government by a 
coalition of northern and southern conservatives insulated from the pressures of majority 
rule. If the logic democracy centralized power by excluding the South from Congress and 
the Electoral College, they argued, then curbing democracy could decentralize power and 
share it between the two sections. Opposition to centralization could therefore become an 
argument for concentrating decision-making power in fewer hands. Union Party activists 
and even city-builders argued that their leadership, as an alternative to the mandates of 
majority rule, could share power geographically. In practice, this meant disregarding 
northern majorities if northern votes were all cast to an antislavery candidate. Conservatives 
therefore used warnings against centralization to think about how to build governments less 
beholden to the popular will.  
Conservatives drew on warnings about majority rule and applied them to what might 
happen if, as would occur in 1860, the North swung the electoral college in favour of a 
sectional candidate. 140 But unlike slaveowners themselves, who (with the exception of their 
support for measures like the Fugitive Slave Act or a slave code in the territories) tended to 
take refuge in the ideology of states’ rights, these conservatives used centralization to defend 
a powerful, independent federal government rather than to undermine it. Drawing on ideas 
about the geographic distribution of power between North and South allowed them to 
defend the ideal of a more powerful federal government with authority over the states and 
territories, albeit one that neither resembled a European-style state nor the kind of machine 
that would threaten slave property. Conservative unionists, in emphasising the national 
authority of their post-Compromise federal order, therefore sought an alternative to the 
visions of Old World despots, northern antislavery radicals, and southern disunionists, and 
European despots. They upheld instead an authoritative state relatively shielded from 
majority control.  
1856, 1860, and the Threat of Centralization 
In 1854, the Kansas-Nebraska Act showed that the Compromise of 1850 had not succeeded 
in bringing finality to the sectional question, and over the coming years the question of 
whether slaveholders had a right to take the peculiar institution into the West gave new life 
to debates about centralization. When Anti-Nebraska Democrats, abolitionists, and former 
northern Whigs began to build a strong Republican Party, the possibility of a purely sectional 
antislavery party winning national political power – the very thing that northern unionists 
had claimed they wanted to avoid after 1850 – became very real. A number of conservatives 
formed new movements to encourage northern voters to act with restraint and convince 
southerners to defer to the authority of pro-compromise politicians. In 1856, this included 
the rump Whig and Know Nothing presidential ticket of Millard Fillmore, the former 
President who had himself enacted the Compromise of 1850. Four years later, many turned 
to the Constitutional Union Party ticket of John Bell and Edward Everett, which drew plenty 
of old Whigs as well as some Democrats. Both these tickets had some support in the North 
and Border States, coming second to the Democrats in major Northeastern cities in 1856, 
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and second (occasionally in coalition with Democrats) to the Republicans in 1860.141 Each 
movement had reasonable claims to inherit the unionist mantle proponents of a new party 
had urged on the country around 1850.  
Some conservatives, though, embraced the very sectional party that they had once 
claimed to oppose. A number moved into a conservative wing of the Republican Party itself. 
Historians like Mark Lause and James Oakes, who have recently pointed to the Republican 
Party’s roots in radicalism and antislavery, have tended to deflect attention from the 
movement’s more conservative wing.142 The conservatives who came to support this new 
sectional party claimed that slavery had become a ‘despotic interest in the administration of 
the government’. 143  Lincoln’s Attorney-General, Edward Bates, as one example of a 
conservative who wholeheartedly supported compromise before himself seeking the 
Republican nomination in 1860.144 Unlike many of their new abolitionist allies, then, these 
new conservative Republicans did not embrace radical democratisation of the American 
government, or even necessarily oppose slavery on the grounds of the moral or economic 
superiority of ‘free labor’. Instead, they often grounded their antislavery in very similar terms 
they had used to oppose abolitionists after 1850, criticising southern disunionists and their 
northern allies for succouring a rival sovereignty to challenge the supremacy of the federal 
government. Unionists who turned to the Republican Party may well have pivoted on the 
need for a sectional party and the extent that southern, not northern, sectionalism threatened 
the Union. But they nonetheless remained wedded to their support for strong government, 
scepticism of democracy, and prioritisation of compromise over conflict. 
As they had after 1850, many conservatives saw the possibility of a Republican 
victory in 1856 or 1860 with only northern votes as akin to a geographic centralization of 
the federal government in one region.  Constitutional Unionists told the northern people that 
uniting their votes against slavery created a sectional state within a state. Rufus Choate, for 
example, warned against northern ‘combinations of states…possessing the government’.145 
Bell and Everett newspapers (such as the Boston Courier and Baltimore American), as well as 
meetings in support of the ticket, warned that the Constitution did not intend for there to be 
a division between ‘governing’ and ‘governed’ states, and a Republican ‘government of the 
whole Union by one geographical section’ was no less treasonous than secession. They 
argued that voters and politicians who embraced the Republican cause through the logic of 
majority rule, and abandoned bisectional political coalitions, monopolised political 
authority in one section rather than shared it across the nation at large. And centralising this 
control over the federal government inwards would lead to the North wielding the executive 
power of the federal government outward. A sectional government would ‘seize the 
government and make laws for their own purposes’, they contended, ‘overbearing’ the other 
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section. 146 These politicians still used the threat of centralizing power in a preponderant 
section to caution against outright majority rule. And when confronted with the challenge 
of a majority using the government for its own ends, these Constitutional Unionists and 
Fillmore supporters urged Americans to see bisectional power sharing among elites as a 
more legitimate basis for authority than democratic majorities. 
As well as sensing a growing centralizing threat in northern voters, these unionists 
continued to draw upon the same arguments the danger of extra-legal mob rule that 
supporters of the Fugitive Slave Act had used in 1850-51. Supporters of the Bell and Everett 
ticket raised the spectre of John Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry, depicted Republican 
conventions as violent and disorderly, and cited examples of supposedly incendiary 
abolitionist language to argue that abolitionists eagerly used violence to wield power if given 
the opportunity.147 Conservative unionists therefore continued to draw from the idea that 
disunion, sectionalism, and antislavery violence were examples of an out of control 
democracy that allowed popular violence to weaken the state and the people to usurp violent 
power that ought to rest in government institutions. In response, they once more proposed 
strengthening the independent power of the federal government. New York Governor 
Washington Hunt, for instance, told the 1856 rump Whig convention that Republicans and 
southern Democrats were a ‘violent and reckless’ threat to what speaker George Lunt 
described as an ‘orderly and decent’ antebellum republic. These politicians presented their 
failed attempt to resurrect the Whig Party in 1856 as a tool to give the federal government 
power over an increasingly disorderly United States.148 And at a Union meeting in 1860, one 
Pennsylvania judge told delegates that the sectional crisis showed that the United States had 
outgrown an overly weak federal government, just as they had outgrown the Articles of 
Confederation in 1787; the state again needed strengthening to deal with the threat of 
secessionists and seditious northern writers, editors, and politicians.149 Rather than being a 
battle between slavery and freedom, they continued the argument that the elections of 1856 
and 1860 were part of a wider choice between state fragility, democracy, and disorder on the 
one side, and republican government, union, and order on the other. 
Conservative unionists often continued to blame democracy – not the existence of 
southern slavery – for this centralization of power from the nation as a whole inward to a 
single majority section. Rufus Choate, along with unionist newspapers and meetings, 
blamed partisan conflict, party platforms, and power-hungry ‘demagogues’ for bringing 
about a sectional election that would lead to disunion.150 The slavery dispute seemed like a 
problem that politicians, voters, and political parties manufactured for votes rather than an 
irrepressible conflict rooted in competing moral, economic, or social systems. Conservative 
unionist antipartyism, moreover, continued to draw from suspicion of electors as much as 
the elected. George Ticknor Curtis argued that a people too easily manipulated by ‘baser 
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and lower passions’ were vulnerable to ‘popular agitation’ on slavery and, he argued, would 
have ‘this country turned upside down’ rather than defer to the ‘decided’ Dred Scott 
decision. Even though Curtis had been one of Scott’s lawyers, he linked fitness to participate 
in the polity to deference to the decision-making power of national institutions 
unencumbered by majority rule.151 Similar ideas appear among delegates to the rump Whig 
convention in 1856, including New York Governor Washington Hunt and Lincoln’s future 
Attorney General Edward Bates, as well as Constitutional Unionist newspapers in 1860. 
Such commentators blamed a ‘bewildered’ people and the ‘susceptibility of the popular 
mind’ for the growing political divide between North and South.152 These conservatives 
defined fitness to participate in the polity based on deference to the independent decision-
making authority of state institutions. 
The process of Italian unification underway in 1860, much like the French 
Revolution of 1848, also allowed them to show that sectionalism was a problem of the 
people monopolising power.153 Conservative newspapers compared the Republicans to the 
supposed violent tendencies of Mazzini and Victor Hugo154 - and argued they would bring 
the ‘Revolutions of France’ and the ‘broken Confederacies of South America’ to the United 
States.155 These comparisons to Italy, France, and South America enabled critics to visualise 
the consequences of allowing party conflict on sectional issues to weaken central 
government authority. They foresaw permanent instability as violent factions held state 
power nationally. Comparisons to supposedly failed regimes abroad gave conservatives an 
opportunity to explore domestic instability during Reconstruction, and these countries filled 
the same function in the 1850s. 156  The Boston Courier, for example, argued that Italian 
unification taught them that America would inevitably produce a Napoleon, a Cromwell, 
or another Andrew Jackson if citizens allowed their governments to become as disorderly 
and 'licentious' as the early modern Italian city states.157 Not just did the Courier again raise 
the spectre of a distended government without a central authority to suppress corruption and 
disorder, it looked to a monarchical regime under Victor Emmanuel II and the Count of 
Cavour as an example of good government, in a similar manner to the way its midcentury 
counterparts had sometimes praised the supposedly carefully calibrated constitution of King 
Louis Phillippe to the centralized power of a Second Republic dependent on the Paris crowd. 
Europe here provided a warning of what would happen if slavery was not taken out of the 
democratic sphere. Embracing majority rule and disunion, they argued, risked opening a 
Pandora’s Box of popular violence in the cities and states of the North.  
After the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the Lecompton Constitution, and the Dred Scott 
decision, though, it was less obvious to conservatives that a northern antislavery majority 
was the principal centralizing threat. Instead of following the Union Party movement into 
the Fillmore and Bell-Everett campaigns, many turned to the very sectional party they 
warned about after 1850. Secessionists in the South often accused Republicans of 
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‘consolidationist’ or centralizing designs, but for some northern voters it seemed that the 
South had already monopolised the federal government in the 1850s. In New York, William 
Evarts and the Courier and Enquirer both concluded that southern slaveholders, not the 
northern people, controlled the once independent and balanced institutions of the federal 
government. 158  The ‘slave power’ conspiracy, as it was often known, allowed these 
conservatives to argue that slaveowners had centralized federal power in their own hands. 
Ironically, given their scepticism of democratic rule, northern conservatives in the early 
1850s had often criticised the ‘slave power’159 for controlling all branches of the federal 
government and forming an ‘aristocracy.’ Both too argued that this centralized power would 
lead to a government like the French Ancien Régime or the Reign of Terror: one that wielded 
power through violence rather than consent.160 Their conceptualisation of the sectional crisis 
bears similarity to the way they saw Louis-Napoleon’s coup d’état: as an example of how 
illegitimately acquired concentrations of power – whether they amassed in the South and 
Paris, or an Emperor and cabal – led to the abuse of state authority against the nation as a 
whole. It also helped link southern sectionalism to threats against the integrity of the federal 
government – and by extension to the threat of disorder that conservatives feared on the 
streets of northern cities. 
Turning against slavery, though, did not always mean that these new Republicans 
rejected the conservative assumption that democracy invited challenges to republican 
government. Conservatives who had turned against slavery also drew from concerns about 
popular violence when campaigning in 1856 and 1860. One former compromise Whig 
blamed the South for threatening ‘anarchy’, ‘disorder’ and ‘bowie knife’ violence: 
slaveholders seemed to ferment violent subversion to the law from below.161 Despite his 
opposition to slavery, Sidney George Fisher still shared the conservative assumption that a 
violent democracy threatened republican deference to the law. As the slavery dispute 
paralysed Congress and sparked legislative violence, Fisher blamed ‘popular passion’ for 
turning the legislature into a disorderly ‘mob’.162 Conservatives in the early 1850s associated 
antislavery with popular lawlessness and disorder; by the latter part of the decade, Fisher 
also associated disregard for the law with the slave power. When southern medical students 
and local policemen attacked an 1859 abolitionist meeting in Philadelphia, Fisher cited it as 
evidence that the South had allied with the violent tendencies of northern democracy rather 
than northern conservatives, and demanded that consolidated Philadelphia use its police to 
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maintain law and order on city streets.163 The New York Courier and Enquirer, no ardent ally 
of the antislavery cause, nevertheless described northerners who threatened William Lloyd 
Garrison, Wendell Phillips, and Henry Ward Beecher as the ‘worst of despots’ who ‘had no 
right to usurp the power of the laws’.164 The threat to the rule of law, this Republican paper 
now argued, came from proslavery public violence, not abolitionists. The fusion of sectional 
questions with the people on the streets once more presented a problem. 
Criticism of the slave power conspiracy also suggested that conservatives did not see 
sectional questions as a simple choice between southern slavery and a northern-dominated 
democracy.  Some conservatives emphasised that the ‘slave power’ usurped authority that 
ought to rest in unelected institutions like the judiciary.165 Planters had either captured or 
bypassed what ought to have been independent sources of legitimacy. Attacking southern 
elites, though, did not mean endorsing democratic rule. Sidney George Fisher still defended 
southern plantation owners as a necessary aristocratic check on the majority monopolising 
the power of the state, even though he opposed these slaveowners controlling the three 
branches of the Madisonian system of government.166 He, like Republicans who had once 
supported antiparty union and compromise movements, therefore saw slaveholders in a 
similar way to northern majorities. In wielding disproportionate power, they constituted an 
illegitimate, centralized hold over the federal government, and their rule rested on – and 
threatened to perpetuate – violence and anarchy.  
Both conservative Republicans and Fillmore and Constitutional Union supporters 
seemed attracted to centralizing power on their own terms as a solution to the sectional 
crisis, even if they rarely risked using the pejorative term. The supposedly natural authority 
of disinterested best men was an important element of their appeal. Thus opponents of 
sectional parties continued to defend antipartyism as a tool to concentrate political decision-
making over slavery in the state rather than in demagogic or conspiratorial partisans. 
Constitutional Union Party propaganda emphasised that the movement had nominated 
candidates based on their character and reputation in a manner based on the virtuous 
practices of the Early Republic. One address declared its support for tickets that ‘fifteen 
gentlemen’ in New York had put together as superior to the kind of men put forward at a 
nominating convention. It claimed that ‘agitation’ and ‘passions’ led to elite withdrawal 
from politics and prevented Congress from legislating ‘calmly, judiciously, dispassionately, 
for the common good’. 167  Believing that northern democracy still formed the greatest 
centralizing threat to the Union, these conservatives followed the 1850-51 Union Party plan 
of concentrating decision-making power in the hands of a smaller number of propertied men, 
changing the machinery of the party process to secure better nominations. When the 
elections of 1856 and 1860 had shown that the northern people did not accept deference to 
conservative opinion, though, constitutional unionist and conservative newspapers 
sometimes suggested the Supreme Court could again serve as an alternative to the decision-
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making power of the people. This apolitical institution, they argued, could legitimately 
impose order and sectional unity.168 Like the Union Party movement in the early 1850s, 
conservative unionists saw antipartyism as a way to way to prevent disunion and disorder, 
but they were not necessarily hostile to an active federal government.  
Also like the previous Union Party movements, conservative unionists in the late 
1850s also supported centralizing decision-making authority because they believed a 
stronger government could impose order on the nation’s disorderly periphery. As municipal 
reformers had done on a citywide level, they used a discourse of opposition to riot and 
disorder to justify a state-building programme. For example, the rump Whig Party at the 
1856 Baltimore Convention defended Millard Fillmore’s record of enforcing the Fugitive 
Slave Act in terms of suppressing ‘disturbance’ and punishing ‘rebellion and mutiny’. 169 
Fillmore’s Whig supporters in 1856 insisted that their party sought a following either side of 
the Mason-Dixon line, and emphasised that their candidate would enforce the law across 
the whole nation, combating southern disunionism and northern resistance to the Fugitive 
Slave Act. 170  Eli Kirk Price, who had led the municipal Consolidation movement in 
Philadelphia in 1853-4, became a Bell supporter by 1860, and argued at meetings and in the 
press for far more vigorous enforcement of the Fugitive law, on the grounds that respect for 
the legitimate authority granted by the Constitution superseded moral qualms over 
slavery.171 When the Republicans insisted that the Dred Scott decision was nonbinding, the 
unionist Boston Courier denounced them as ‘radical’ and ‘Jacobin’, a term often reserved for 
abolitionists and rioters in the 1830s and 1840s.172 These conservatives clearly hoped that 
taking slavery out of the public sphere through unionist political parties and unelected 
supreme courts could allow a strong government to exercise power over these rival 
sovereignties and in so doing challenge sectionalism. Like their predecessor Union 
Movements in 1850 and 1851, northern conservative unionists in the later 1850s were also 
ardent centralizers who believed that the bisectional solution to the sectional crisis was 
strengthening the federal government rather than retrenchment. 
The conservatives who turned to the Republican Party in the late 1850s also seemed 
attracted to the state-building aspects of the Republican programme, even if they believed 
the federal government should wield its power against southern slavery rather than northern 
sectionalism. Fisher criticised southern congressmen for creating ‘disorganization’ in 
Congress, proof that American democratic government could never maintain respect for law 
and order in the long term.173 The 1860 Republican leadership candidate Edward Bates 
returned to the same criticism of the ‘higher law of the Democracy’ that conservatives had 
used to justify federal enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act in Boston: popular sovereignty 
over legal institutions, he argued, allowed the people to contemplate sectionalism, 
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radicalism, and disunion.174 Just like the conservatives who denied the threat posed by a 
slave power, these individuals feared government’s inability to wield executive power to 
prevent disorder. Opponents of Reconstruction would come to use anxiety about 
‘Mexicanization’ to articulate fears about state weakness, instability, and dissolution unless 
America abandoned its democratic experiments in the South. 175 William Evarts used a 
similar idea to argue that, by 1860, slaveholders who constantly threatened secession 
provided the ‘Mexicanization’ threat. But he assured his audience that the eventual 
‘submission’ of the South to the national government would only strengthen federal 
institutions, the law, and the Constitution. 176 To such conservatives, the election of an 
antislavery government with a mandate to prevent disunion and curb the expansion of 
slavery in the territories could reassert the power of the Union over rival sources of power. 
This sharply contrasted to Fillmore and Constitutional Union party supporters who thought 
northern rule would result in the disunion that would permanently weaken the American 
government’s ability to preserve order, suppress violence, or counteract majority rule. But 
these Republicans shared with these unionists – and the 1850 and 1851 Union Party 
movements they had once supported – an interpretation of the sectional crisis as a problem 
of weak government that their own centralization could solve.  
These conservative Republicans strongly supported a powerful federal government 
in Washington exercising power outwards across the nation. In the same speech in which 
he warned against Mexicanization, Evarts asked what kind of government could legislate 
on any issue that effected free men, but not slaveowners. ‘If you have got a government’, he 
suggested, ‘it can govern’.177 Slaveowners’ challenges to federal authority seemed to set 
themselves up as a rival to the federal sovereignty that conservatives prized, and asserting 
the sovereignty of Congress over the territories seemed a legitimate use of this indivisible 
national government. Amid these fears of state weakness, Fisher too saw Congress’s inability 
to properly govern its own territories as a cause for concern. 178  As the sectional crisis 
escalated he, as well as the New York Courier, spoke positively of the supposedly 
enlightened, if sometimes despotic, monarchical governments of Cavour and Napoleon III. 
Directly comparing Europe and America, they positively contrasted the monarchical 
governments of Europe to the American government that allowed the people to dismember 
it.179 The regimes that had concentrated sovereignty in fewer hands seemed to show how 
America too could concentrate state power in a central government and reassert its authority 
over a disorderly society – if only it were prepared to scale back the perceived democratic 
excesses of the Jacksonian period. Evarts and Fisher both suggested that, as the demands of 
slaveholders on the North grew, antislavery too could fit into the conservative agenda for a 
less democratic but more active federal government. However, rather than building their 
case for powerful government in opposition to the northern people, these conservatives 
began to build it against the disunionist, subversive, and violent tendencies of southern 
slavery. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, Fisher would call during the Civil War for an 
American Cromwell to wield the latent powers of the Constitution, in a pamphlet that by 
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1867 was being used to justify Military Reconstruction.180 The logic of antebellum northern 
conservatism, in war and Reconstruction, could serve as the basis for creating a more 
centralized American national state. 
The events of the later 1850s, such as the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the Dred Scott 
decision, and the caning of Charles Sumner might have turned many conservatives away 
from compromise with the South, and divided the unionists who had come together at 
midcentury. These events might have helped redefine southern slavery rather than the 
northern people as a centralizing menace to the Union. Conservative Republicans might 
have reversed their earlier position on the sectional question, though, but the terms they used 
to critique slavery and the tools they wanted to prevent southern sectionalism bore many 
similarities to their counterparts who refused to enlist in an antislavery party. They shared 
with Constitutional Unionist supporters and former Union Party men a relatively common 
understanding of the sectional crisis as a problem of where power came from and how it was 
distributed. Where abolitionists saw the sectional conflict as a problem that only abolishing 
slavery could solve, these conservatives all saw slavery as a politically-manufactured 
problem that unfit voters, politicians, and interests used to transfer power from a truly 
national government to sectional interests. In other words, it seemed like a process of 
centralization. And rather than seeing democracy or states’ rights as the solution to 
sectionalism, these conservatives still believed on the verge of the American Civil War that 
they could hold the Union together with a stronger federal government that could respond 
to violent challenges to its integrity and sovereignty. To do so, they drew on ideas about the 
geographic and institutional processes of centralization that both small-d democrats and 
states’ rights’ advocates had warned against in both Europe and the United States, and that 
Union Party movements themselves had advocated in the early 1850s. Conservatives who 
opposed slavery or supported compromise continued to use the idea of democratic 
centralization to challenge emerging of sources of power to rival an imagined elite-run 
federal government but continued to challenge this with a centralizing process of their own.  
Conclusion 
In 1860, vice-presidential candidate Edward Everett spoke in Boston. He argued that 
opposition to the ‘lawlessness, venality, fraud, and violence’ that had characterised the 
‘unbalanced democracy’ of ancient Greece, Rome, Revolutionary France, and the English 
Civil War explained American prosperity. While an unelected judiciary, the division of 
America into ‘local centres of political influence’, and the Madisonian system guarded 
America from such a pure democracy, he warned that a growing threat from ‘party’ and 
from ‘laws sometimes violated by the mob’ – a thinly veiled reference to the Fugitive Slave 
Act – threatened the American republic. 181  Everett’s speech neatly encapsulated how 
conservative unionists understood the sectional crisis. Where slaveowners and abolitionists 
saw it as about the morality of slavery, northern conservative unionists situated it within a 
wider violent and popular challenge to a government that, to avoid the excesses of Paris in 
1848, needed to resist partisanship and curb popular influence. The 1860 Constitutional 
Union ‘motto, “The Union, the Constitution, and the Laws”…not knowing North, South, East 
or West’ drew from this conservative reading of the sectional crisis. 182  By linking 
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strengthening federal institutions and deference to the Compromise of 1850 to a bisectional 
government, it implied sectionalism, democracy, and weak government went hand in hand. 
Centralization of law-enforcing authority in government institutions could lead to the 
decentralisation of political influence over national geography, in much the same way the 
Carey’s supporters assumed that national tariffs overseen by a strong government would 
decentre economic power. Just as the threat of the Paris mob represented a geographic as 
well as an institutional centralization – power would extend over all France as well as all 
parts of the French state, – unionist movements in 1850-51 and 1860 the threat of a northern 
sectional victory in 1860 threatened to concentrate all power in a seemingly violent northern 
democracy. Even supporters who turned against slavery in the latter part of the 1850s 
reinterpreted the ‘peculiar institution’ as a similar external threat to government integrity. 
Northern conservatives therefore did not support the Union just for its own sake. They 
championed it because they also saw it as the only alternative to a European-style 
democracy.  
In the elections of 1850 and 1860, Conservative Unionists read the sectional crisis as 
a problem of democracy and government power rather than the result of an irrepressible 
conflict between freedom and slavery. Firstly, antislavery in the North seemed a product of 
politicians encouraging the people to subvert the law through a riotous democracy or the 
politics of individual conscience epitomized in the higher law doctrine and Garrisonian 
abolitionism. Northern antislavery seemed little different to the southern secessionists or 
urban rioters who claimed the right to appropriate the authority of government for 
themselves. Secondly, they warned that the logic of democracy in a country where a majority 
lived in a single quadrant of the country threatened to concentrate power geographically. 
Describing the geographic and democratic aspects of the sectional crisis in similar terms to 
centralization allowed them to describe the growth of new sources of political authority in a 
negative light, suggesting that a peripheral South was in danger of becoming subject to a 
majority North. Drawing from a conservative reading of the foundation of the United States 
Constitution in response to the likes of Shays Rebellion, weak overly democratic state 
governments, and populist measures against propertyowners, they argued that the national 
government existed to suppress disorder. Disunion therefore seemed to open in the North 
as well as the South the possibility of state weakness and permanent disorder. For 
conservative unionists, the sectional crisis was an opportunity to think about democracy 
rather than slavery, and they saw in the North the threat of an American Reign of Terror, a 
kind of Paris writ large, centralizing the power of the state in a violent democracy with 
absolute power over its own section and the nation at large. 
In 1850 and 1860, conservatives confronted the real possibility of the southern states 
seceding. Their diagnosis of sectionalism as a democratic problem exacerbated by a federal 
state that lacked independent power to enforce the law helped guide their response. They 
hoped to prevent what they described as a dangerous centralization of power with a 
centralization of their own. To combat disunion and suppress disorder – slavery-related or 
otherwise – conservatives often supported strengthening the executive power of the federal 
government, though they strongly backed keeping control in the hands of a bisectional 
conservative elite. These conservatives therefore endorsed centralization insofar as it 
involved building a federal law-enforcing capacity accountable to the President and capable 
of intervening in disunionist enclaves, whether that be in the South or northern cities like 
New York. The conservatives’ Union therefore encapsulated a necessary centralization of 
violent power to suppress disorder at a national and local level. Saving the Union, just like 
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city reform, economic development, and observations of European revolution, was an 
opportunity to advance what can be seen as a conservative antidemocratic agenda. 
In addition to strengthening the federal government, the conservative unionist 
programme of centralization also embraced taking the authority to determine the future from 
voters and keeping it in the hands of Congress and the country’s political establishment. As 
Philadelphia’s consolidator Eli Kirk Price put it, a coming antislavery majority in the North 
meant ‘a minority of the whole country will rule’ the South ‘by reason of their war upon a 
subject forbidden them by the Constitution.’183 To avoid the people from acquiring too much 
authority, conservatives hoped to depoliticise slavery (as Price indicated) or hand power 
over the subject to non-democratic institutions. Union Party activists sought to abolish party 
conflict entirely where Whig and Democratic Unionists tried to force both parties to take 
slavery out of public debate. Arguments for sharing power between North and South might 
have sounded self-denying among northern conservatives who often stood to benefit from 
Republican rule. But this chapter has tried to argue that conservatives seemed more 
interested in centralizing power than sharing it. Their proposals were stridently 
antimajoritatian and sought to take the people out of the decision-making process. 
Conservatives instead sought to concentrate decision-making power in a far smaller elite to 
whom they expected the electorate to defer. Yet redefining centralization as a geographic 
problem of power in a single section rather than one rooted in a consolidationist federal 
government allowed them to suggest that building the institutional capacity in Washington 
D.C. would actually decentralize power over space. Proponents of such measures in 1850-
51 and 1860 believed a bisectional coalition of elite leaders, freed from dependence of local 
passions, would share control of the country’s destiny. They proposed to rebalance control 
over the federal government and slavery policy away from the tumultuous realm of civil 
society – which they saw as predisposed to violence as a form of dispute resolution – and 
into the often unelected realm of state institutions.  
Events did not transpire as Whig, Democratic, and Union Part supporters of the 
Compromise of 1850 had intended, as abolitionists still challenged the Fugitive Slave Act 
and southerners still took opportunities to expand slavery. A number of conservatives who 
had once supported Union Party proposals turned, ironically, to the Republican Party itself 
in the later 1850s. This might seem contradictory to their previous beliefs, but in practice did 
not require them to abandon their conservative interpretation of sectionalism. These new 
Republicans described southern slaveholders and proslavery activists in similar terms to 
those they had once used to describe northern opponents of the Compromise of 1850, casting 
them as a hostile sectional state within a state that threatened to seize power over the federal 
government. Some even described proslavery rioting and elections as an example of how 
slavery, not free labour, was the democratic threat. Many of them did dislike slavery itself. 
But these conservatives downplayed the abolitionist and antislavery positions of the 
Republican Party and instead were attracted to its programme of strengthening the federal 
government against what they now saw as a southern, rather than a northern, threat. This 
shared understanding of the sectional crisis as a problem of sectional centralization rather 
than an irrepressible conflict, together with the common heritage in Union Party 
movements, suggests why they both came to rally to the Union flag once South Carolina 
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fired on Fort Sumter: it showed, once and for all, that southern slavery, not northern 
democracy, threatened republican government.  
In some ways, northern conservative unionists’ conceptualization of the sectional 
question and the constitution seemed more in line with some southern thinkers than those 
of the North. In the early 1850s, many northerners often derisively referred to northern 
conservative unionists as ‘doughfaces’ for accepting a Union built on slavery, not expanding 
democracy and human rights over time. 184  After all, conservative unionists stridently 
defended the rights of the South and virulently opposed northern abolitionism. And many 
mercantile traders in New York had a financial stake in maintaining trade links with the 
South. Their desire for a powerful government that derived its legitimacy – and extended its 
authority – across sectional divisions can seem similar to John C. Calhoun’s scheme of 
‘concurrent majorities’, whereby both North and South would have a mutual veto on the 
decision-making power of the federal government. Both too shared an understanding that 
majority rule led to tyranny over the minority excluded from power, that partisanship 
exacerbated this process, and that an ‘absolute’ democracy was a threat to avoid.185 The 
Virginian proslavery ideologue George Fitzhugh, for instance, despite supporting the 
‘federative system’ as opposed to a ‘centralization of power’ in Washington, too, cited 
London and Parisian rule over Great Britain and France to argue that a ‘conservative’ DC 
could have a ‘centripetal’ influence on the USA. 186  Here it seemed that northern 
conservatives did surrender to southern visions of a slaveholders’ republic. 
But northern conservative unionists saw more choices on offer than northern 
majority rule or southern compact theory when trying to define the future relationship 
between the people, the states, and the federal government. They were comfortable instead 
with the idea of an expansive government capable of suppressing opposition to its rule. 
However, this was often indistinguishable from curbing the supposed excesses of 
democracy, which they saw as a threat to national integrity. For these northerners, progress 
meant building a government capable of withstanding the growing challenges to law, order, 
and property. Preserving the Union gave them the opportunity to check the assumption that 
the majority of white men should rule, even in the North. It seemed perfectly plausible to 
conservatives that they could strengthen the institutions of the federal government, while 
ensuring that control over these institutions remained in the hands a geographically balanced 
propertied elite rather than falling into the hands of sectional partisans. Their vision for the 
Union therefore challenged assumptions that equated decentralization with democracy and 
nation building with centralization.  
Northern conservatives often seemed to look like southern aristocrats when they 
discussed state building, centralization, and the distribution of power in the federal 
government. Yet they held to fundamental differences that may help explain why they so 
quickly turned to federal use of force to meet the secession crisis. In 1850 Rufus Choate, 
along with states’ rights democrats, might have warned that democracy threatened the rule 
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of law, but in 1861 northerners of almost all political stripes warned that secession, not 
democracy, threatened all law and order.187 And where many southerners held to a belief 
that the United States was not a single nation, that the Constitutional Convention had 
rejected the consolidation of the states into a single sovereignty, and that sovereignty 
remained decentralized among many state governments that had the power to reclaim it, 
northerners concerned about local disorder and violence had no use for legitimate challenges 
to the legal establishment. Southern states-rights Democrats and northern conservative 
unionists therefore both used a language of decentralization to set out their ideal Union, and 
agreed that the federal government needed something akin to a concurrent majority to 
operate. However, the fact that centralization had many different meanings meant that they 
understood the term and the power relations it could describe very differently. Where 
northern conservatives were often open to a large role for the federal government in 
suppressing local disorder, their southern brethren claimed to oppose a centralization of 
power in Washington – unless it returned fugitive slaves – and sought to divide this power 
among the state capitals of a polycentric union. Where northerners looked to executive 
power emanating from Washington and reining in disorder, southerners no doubt saw a 
threat to the authority of slaveholders. Where northerners believed balanced government 
could reconcile decentralization with a big federal government, southerners, with the 
exception of the Fugitive Slave Act and a slave code for the territories, believed progress 
tended to require a smaller federal government, not a larger one. 
Given northern conservative divisions over many other issues of political economy, 
party, and even the morality of slavery itself, it is unsurprising that the growing divisiveness 
of slavery in the later 1850s divided conservatives who had once agreed that a northern 
antislavery democracy threatened a Parisian-style centralization of power in the hands of 
voters in a single section. However, both before and after the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the 
formation of the Republican Party, many conservatives saw the sectional crisis as part of a 
wider debate over democracy and the changing power relationships of majority rule. 
Centralization allowed conservatives to warn against nation building when it appeared to 
hand power to voters or slaveowners, a process they did not separate from the emergence of 
sectionalism as much they did not separate it from the problem of urban rioting. The 
possibility of preserving the Union in 1850 and 1860 represented to conservatives the 
fulfilment of their own programme that, ironically, embraced all the centralizing process 
they used centralization to delegitimise when it benefited an empowered electorate. To 
many Americans, preventing the triumph of sectional majority rule or even proslavery 
violence in these years was part of their own counterrevolution against the violent Parisian 
democracy of 1848. 
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Conclusion 
In January 1848, when Sidney George Fisher first heard news of an attempted revolution in 
Ireland and reflected upon the Mexican-American War for ‘plunder’, he remarked that these 
events showed that the main political divide in America lay not necessarily between Whigs 
and Democrats, North or South, or pro-bank or anti-bank, but between ‘Jacobins’ and 
‘conservatives’. 1  The conservatives considered in this thesis often shared Fisher’s 
conclusion. For these men, 1848 and its aftermath in Europe and the United States marked 
a critical moment. Rather than seeing the 1850s as a prelude to civil war over slavery or an 
extension of Jackson-era battles over political economy, they often believed that the decade 
involved a struggle for power between the people and the state, and framed many of the 
political disputes of the era in these terms. 
It is perhaps surprising that a populist Democratic newspaper like the Herald and a 
Whig-leaning aristocrat like Fisher could share a similar political platform. Yet they reacted 
similarly, in some ways, to the crises of 1848, using the threat of centralization to warn 
against revolutionary French republicanism and free state majority rule. Most Americans 
would probably have agreed that the greatest threat of centralization came from ambitious 
demagogues, corrupt officeholders, and an overbearing government, one either in danger of 
falling into the hands of fanatical antislavery agitators (to many white southerners) or a 
conspiratorial ‘slave power’ (to plenty of northerners). But some Americans reacted to the 
transformation of the Second French Republic to the Second Empire as proof that the people 
of Paris had centralized power inward both from the government to the people and from the 
country to the city. A number of observers across the partisan divide in the Northeastern 
United States shared Fisher’s and the Herald’s views. They did not share a political party and 
their attempts to build one during the sectional crisis never met with electoral success, but 
instead, they tended to organise within different movements and parties to meet their 
objectives. And while conservative leaders often overlapped in the institutions of the urban 
upper class, conservatism in the penny press too suggested that conservative ideas reached a 
wider audience. However much they might have disagreed on the likes of free trade, the 
wisdom of municipal reform, and the morality of slavery, a common set of ideas – linked by 
concerns over democracy and centralization – make them worth of attention. 
Centralization was a useful language for conservatives to use when wading into these 
debates over political economy and the boundaries of democracy. The negative connotations 
of the term allowed them to challenge emerging rival sources of political and economic 
authority. By implying that rivals would pull wealth or democratic capacity inwards and 
wield government power or mob violence outwards they could delegitimise opponents.  
Conservatives, of course, were not the only Americans to warn against 
centralization, but the evidence submitted here suggests that they employed it in particular 
ways. If anything, the term was most common in the 1830s and 1840s in the discourse of 
Jacksonian Democrats, who made hostility to concentrated power in institutions like the 
Second National Bank a major part of their appeal. But any American could use this term 
as a political weapon to attack their rivals. Whigs, indeed, employed it against Jackson 
himself. What appeared as one centralization in the eyes of one person could be perfectly 
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legitimate in the eyes of another. What made the term useful for conservatives in particular, 
though, was that they could try to redefine the term by using it against many of the democrats 
who used centralization to warn against autocratic regimes and corporate power. They 
therefore frequently used the negative connotations of centralization to describe and 
delegitimise the power of the people in what passed for a democratic polity in nineteenth-
century America. More Americans than historians have tended to assume were yet to 
reconcile themselves to white male democracy and party competition. Describing the formal 
politics of voting and the informal politics of street rioting as centralization therefore implied 
that the democratic advances of the Jacksonian years – at least in terms in white male 
suffrage – might have been a mistake. But it did so in a language seemingly more in step 
with a republic that had ostensibly embraced white male democracy. 
This thesis also sets out how conservatives also found the idea of centralization as a 
process particularly useful, as well as using it as a term to warn against democracy and rival 
cities’ urban growth. Centralization, shorn of the negative value judgements that 
contemporaries associated with the term, also referred more broadly to giving institutions 
and places more authority and/or expanding the territory over which they exercised power. 
Despite using centralization as a political weapon, conservatives assumed that power could 
centralize in institutions and places over time. Rather than necessarily presenting a threat, 
these process were useful for a group of men interested in preserving law and order, 
preventing disunion, and directing economic growth in their own favour. Conservatives thus 
often embraced centralization when it suited their goals. Conservatives therefore used 
centralization as a political weapon selectively to delegitimise and implicitly legitimise 
different aspects of processes taking place around them – like state-strengthening, 
industrialisation, and urban reform – and instead design their own model for modernising 
the United States.  
Historians often describe the 1850s as an era where America’s popular institutions 
focused increasingly on the rights and wrongs of slavery, having settled the question over 
universal white male suffrage in the battles of the Jacksonian era. Having determined that 
the people should rule, it was now time for the people to end human bondage.2 Slavery 
unsurprisingly dominates histories of the period, especially as the conclusion of the Mexican-
American War forced the question of its territorial expansion more prominently into public 
debate and sparked the descent towards the American Civil War. Historians have tended to 
treat state power and political economy in the period on a more local level. 3 Studies of 
projects to reform city governments and expand urban economies often seemed 
disconnected from national debates over sectionalism. But centralization as a political term 
and a process shaped conservatives’ understanding of both local and national affairs, and in 
keeping with recent research that shows how Americans drew parallels between local and 
national state-building and political economy, allows us to connect events usually treated 
discretely. Here the connections between events in Europe, political economy, city building, 
and nation building become more apparent. 
The Revolutions of 1848 in France and their ultimate failure with the accession of 
the Second Empire in 1852 gave conservatives the opportunity to explore their fears for the 
                                                     
2 Keyssar, Right to Vote, pp. 22-42; Schlesinger, Age of Jackson, pp. 159-209, 267-282, 401-421; Watson, Liberty and 
Power, pp. 210-224; Wilentz, American Democracy, pp. 181-520. 
3 See in particular Holt, 1850s. 
194 Conclusion 
future of democratisation in America. Most conservatives agreed that the creation of the 
semi-authoritarian Second Empire was a centralizing moment. Even if they did not always 
use the term to describe Louis-Napoleon’s coup d’état, they, like most Americans, 
graphically described France as straining under a single source of political authority, one 
that took form both institutionally in the office of the Emperor and geographically in the city 
of Paris. However, many conservatives agreed that centralization predated the Second 
Empire: the outward form of government mattered less than the centralized principle itself. 
They defined the democracy established in 1848 as an even more dangerous example of 
centralization, one that occurred not through the bayonets of an emperor, but at the hands 
of the Paris mob. Both Louis-Napoleon and the Parisian people, conservative observers 
warned, had usurped power that belonged to the French state, and, by implication, a similar 
class of French propertied elites that were best placed to fill the offices of government. 
Moreover, when defining democracy as centralization in this way, these conservatives 
sometimes referred back to rioting and universal white male suffrage in their own cities, 
suggesting how their assumptions about France were shaped by fears that unpropertied 
voters in big American cities could seize power too. In other words, their impulse to define 
French democracy as a centralizing threat reflected fears of democracy on their side of the 
Atlantic too. 
Democracy was one of many possible centralizations, and defining this as the single 
centralizing threat in France and the United States implicitly legitimised other 
consolidations. Consequently, conservatives could define their own programmes of 
centralization as sharing power. This assumption about the state of French democracy 
contrasted to the often professed American ideal of power divided vertically among county, 
state, and federal government and horizontally among legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches. But this hid conservatives’ hopes to centralize power in the hands of the 
government. Despite at times advocating federalism and the Madisonian system for France, 
conservatives at times supported General Cavaignac’s temporary dictatorship, constitutional 
monarchy, and even Napoleon III himself as examples of governments suitable for a country 
unfit for self-government. Delegitimising democratic government as centralization allowed 
them to suggest that less democratic government could share it.  However, rather than 
sharing power among millions of individual voters, conservatives hoped to share power only 
among a smaller number of propertied officeholders, aristocrats, and political institutions. 
Conservatives might have opposed centralization, but in France they clearly had a very 
different definition of what constituted a decentralised republic. 
Changing economic geography also showed the possibility that power could 
concentrate particular places – a tendency observers had seen in Paris. As well as confronting 
the possibility of power relationships between institutions, then, conservatives also 
confronted changing power relationships over space, and for thinkers like Henry Carey at a 
national level and urban boosters more locally, centralization played a major role in allowing 
them to frame a critique of long distance dependency. Conservatives, like many Americans, 
observed railroad, canal, and steamship lines spreading outwards from major cities and 
assumed they too allowed the centre to exercise power over a surrounding hinterland. 
Drawing again from the image of France, conservatives in American cities warned that New 
York’s mercantile supremacy threatened to create a Paris in the United States on account of 
its ability to pull surrounding territory into its commercial orbit. They used centralization to 
warn against allowing these trading rivals – often New York, London, or nearby railroad 
hubs – to expand their commercial hinterland outward and threaten propertied and 
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mercantile interests in their own cities. In place of a territory dependant on the interests of a 
single city, conservatives described a polycentric economy where cities, towns, and states 
each cultivated their own hinterland and balanced regional economic power. Warning 
against centralization therefore allowed conservatives in different cities to compete with 
each other for material wealth as well as compete for political authority with the people. 
Yet conservatives used centralization as a political weapon only to choose which 
city and city inhabitants would benefit from it, rather than as a democratic language of 
opposition to monopoly, inequality, and corporate power. They redefined centralization as 
a remote threat across geography to legitimise imposing power themselves much closer to 
home. Defining their larger rivals as the sole centralizing threat in the sphere of political 
economy implicitly justified a smaller-scale centralization of their own. Claiming that 
infrastructure in Boston, Baltimore, or Philadelphia would share wealth mong multiple cities 
in place of New York gave the impression of decentralization on a national scale. But on a 
local scale, conservatives still supported the process of centralization of economic activity in 
growing mercantile cities. It was not the principle of economic centralization that 
conservatives warned against, but the scale of it – as they believed a large-scale centralization 
in New York or London came at the expense of their own cities and property. They therefore 
embraced, for their own purposes, building the very geographic ties of dependency that they 
used the language of centralization to caution against. Opposing centralization therefore 
allowed them to pursue their own economic goals. Moreover, building the infrastructure of 
economic centralization often relied on government power to issue charters, grant subsidies, 
and regulate the economy. As well as allowing conservatives to pursue state-building 
through economic power relationships between places, economic centralization also spurred 
stronger government and even offered democratic retrenchment by shielding power over 
property and corporations from democratic control. Conservatives in different cities 
therefore pursued different forms of political centralization to ensure that they could use 
government power to shape the economy for their own ends and impose their will on their 
own cities. The political language of opposition to centralization served, as it did when 
applied to France, its conservative users by allowing them to choose between multiple 
possible centralizations, economic as well as political. 
The imperative to build institutional and geographic bonds of dependency on 
conservative terms came together in conservative attempts to reform city governments and 
even hold the Union together. In response to the French-style democratic threat that they 
feared on the streets of American cities, conservatives joined movements to consolidate city 
governments – replacing the patchworks of multiple municipal governments with larger city 
governments – and substitute outdated watches and sheriffs with modern police forces. In 
these contexts, conservatives often embraced the language of centralization, calling for 
‘union’ or to rally support for stronger government.  They openly argued that they needed 
to remove geographic and institutional barriers to government authority so that they could 
impose order on a disorderly city. Within the municipality they therefore embraced the tools 
and processes of centralization they supported on a national scale in France and in economic 
development: using street railroads and planning to subdue suburbs to the city centre and 
strengthen the police and telegraph so government could impose its will over dangerous 
citizens. As well as allowing government to exercise power outwards over people and places, 
consolidation also had the advantage of centralizing political decision-making power away 
from neighbourhoods, where it was more susceptible to democratic control. It therefore 
helped conservatives curb municipal democracy, centralizing power in a smaller number of 
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propertied officeholders. Centralization gave urban conservatives the opportunity to scale 
back the formal democracy of elections and voting as well as the informal democracy of 
violent street politics. 
Embracing centralization and strong government did not mean that conservative city 
reformers supported it when they threatened to give the people power over government and 
property. Conservatives supporting consolidation still drew from the imagery of a 
polycentric polity to defend their own centralization. To justify their own city-building 
programme, they sometimes raised the threat of a larger scale centralization at the hands of 
another larger city that would have power over them. Again, they used the possibility of a 
large regional or national centralization to justify a more local one, and packaged their 
programs to unite cities in federalist language. Conservatives also used centralization as a 
political weapon to delegitimise creating new sources of political authority over property 
and democratic authority over city government. Within their cities, they often looked to 
devolve fiscal powers to wards, districts, and vestigial municipalities, weakening and 
decentralizing government in the sphere of property taxes, improvements, and assessments. 
This allowed conservative reformers to clothe their proposals in the language of 
decentralization while removing barriers to government power to enforce the law and 
protect property. It also reflected how conservatives continued to use centralization as a 
political weapon to pick and choose between emerging and potential sources of strong 
government power and ensure that these powers served their own propertied interests. 
Conservatives also warned against centralization during the sectional crisis. Rather 
than seeing the sectional crisis as a dilemma over the morality of slavery, they assumed that 
northern antislavery was responsible for supposedly forcing the South to consider disunion 
– a situation that would negatively affect their business interests. In the early 1850s, 
conservative unionists used centralization to attack northern antislavery, defining northern 
urban resistance to the Fugitive Slave Act and the possibility of a northern antislavery voting 
bloc in Congress as a geographic centralization of power in the North and an institutional 
centralization of power in the people at the expense of the federal government. By 
appropriating for themselves the power to govern slavery from the entire Union, they 
warned, the northern people had become an uncontrolled sovereignty with power to impose 
their will from the North over the South and West. In other words, they fell back on the 
assumption that democracy and majority rule – not officeholders and corporations – created 
dangerous concentrations of power. They described the Union under the northern people in 
similar terms to the way they described France under Paris because both seemed like 
examples of a concentrated mass subjecting the surrounding country surrounding to their 
authority. Some conservatives joined the Republicans, using the slave power conspiracy to 
argue that slavery had become the policy around which the people rallied to usurp lawful 
government, but for conservatives, sectionalism was closely tied to geographical imbalances. 
Defining centralization as an external threat to constitutional government (whether 
it was antislavery or proslavery) allowed conservatives to redefine centralizing power in the 
federal government as power-sharing. Suggesting centralization was a geographic threat 
allowed them to claim that a strong federal government – one with the ability to enforce its 
law across the nation – would be far better placed to share power than the people with their 
northern majority. In other words, conservatives again used use the rhetoric of centralization 
to legitimise their own nation-building proposals. Despite claiming to share power, 
conservatives hoped to centralize power in the federal government, both in the sense that 
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they wanted a strong government in Washington that could enforce the law over disorderly 
states and cities, and also in the sense that they wanted to ensure that political decision-
making authority lay in Congress and the federal institutions rather than people at the ballot 
box. In the early 1850s, adherence to the Compromise of 1850 took centre stage in 
conservative efforts to reform the union. As a piece of legislation, it strengthened federal 
law-enforcing authority. As a rallying point around which they could reform the second 
party system, it allowed them to try and ensure that all candidates and parties supported 
‘finality’ and did not compete on slavery at the polls. Perhaps unlike the South, conservatives 
responded to the problem of sectionalism and slavery by sharing power between politicians 
and propertied citizens in federal institutions, rather than sharing power with states and 
citizens that might challenge the ultimate sovereignty of the federal government. 
Redefining centralization as a popular threat allowed them to give their own 
attempts to impose power and build a more hierarchical society the illusion of decentralizing 
measures. Their attempts to reform city governments were perhaps the most obvious way in 
which conservatives sought a top-down solution to imposing order on society. However, 
revolutions in France, the growth of mercantile cities, and sectionalism also gave 
conservatives opportunities to work towards this goal. When observing urban disorder in 
their own cities and in France, they interpreted the power of mobs, criminals, and rioters, 
and the potential of the people to overthrow legal government as a sovereign challenge to 
their own authority. In response, they supported removing geographic and institutional 
barriers so that the governments at the centre could wield power outwards over disorderly 
suburbs and citizens. Additionally, they supported concentrating inward control over 
government authority inwards into the hands of the propertied elites who were closest to 
these stronger sources of state power. Even redefining class conflict in industrial cities as the 
consequence of economic dependency on a distant central metropolis helped propertied 
conservatives argue there was no fundamental conflict between capital and labour. A 
number of conservatives consistently chose to use such rhetoric to challenge moves towards 
liberalisation, democratisation, and reform. Instead, they used centralization to pursue what 
often amounted to an antiradical and antidemocratic form of modern state-building. Despite 
sounding like a democratic language of opposition to monopolies, state power, and remote 
government, conservatives were able to appropriate this language and use it to build 
something very different to what the Jacksonian Democrats envisioned while using it in the 
1820s and 1830s. 
This also meant that conservatives were, in fact, avid modernisers, in spite of using 
a language inherited from classical republicanism. Their opposition to centralization usually 
implied a choice between which sources of political or economic authority should strengthen 
over time rather than opposition to all change per se. These conservatives did not seek to 
return to an eighteenth-century ideal of an agrarian republic free of big cities and big 
government. They in fact embraced many of the social changes of the nineteenth century, 
including urbanisation, industrialisation and the rise of national states, and believed that this 
nineteenth-century society had outgrown its eighteenth-century political institutions. Instead 
of trying to reverse these changes to prevent them from corrupting good republican 
government, they turned to the kinds of constitutional reforms they had advocated at the 
national and local level: state strengthening and democratic retrenchment. In other words, 
they wanted to build a strong government to cope with and encourage the growing economy, 
cities, and population that they believed would bring them prosperity. For these 
conservatives, their own programme of centralization allowed them to modernise 
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government on their own terms rather than on the terms of urban workers, street rioters, or 
seditious abolitionists. 
Nor were conservatives simply proslavery ‘doughfaces’ who did the bidding of the 
southern planter class. New York merchants had an obvious pecuniary interest in 
maintaining trade with the South and it makes sense that other conservatives who owned 
property would fear the consequences disunion and civil war might have for the value of 
their own property and investments. However, they also had other reasons to support the 
continuation of the Union as they suggested that a strong federal government and a southern 
landed aristocracy were an important counterbalance to the emerging democracy within the 
North itself. In other words, the federal government could help prevent the northern people 
from centralizing power that belonged to the government while southern landowners and 
their participation in Congress prevented the political centre of gravity moving too far North. 
But their use of centralization also hinted at an important ideological distinction from 
southern states-rights advocates, despite both using the same language to warn against 
northern rule. Where southerners often warned against centralization to challenge an 
overbearing federal government (unless it returned fugitive slaves or suppressed servile 
insurrection), northern conservatives used it to legitimise a stronger federal government, 
albeit one with a northern and southern basis of support. It is perhaps possible that using a 
similar language but with different implications helped convince southerners that they had 
a northern basis of support for their proslavery agenda and hid northern conservative support 
for the integrity of the federal government over the North and South.    
Also important to conservative state-building movements was the role of place in 
creating the kinds of power relationships that could tie the United States together and impose 
order. This was most obviously apparent when conservatives gave their support to city 
consolidation movements and projects for mercantile growth. As well as helping 
conservatives improve the value of their property, they were attracted to the idea of a 
centralized economic geography between cities and their hinterlands, and between 
downtowns and their immediate suburbs. Indeed, conservatives often linked extending these 
centralized power relationships with creating new political power relationships too, 
unsurprising given that these improvements needed political charters, subsidies, and surveys 
to get off the ground. Extending railroads outwards into the hinterland implicitly went hand 
in hand with making the hinterland governable by controlling state legislatures, demanding 
rural deference to urban commercial interests, and keeping state power in institutions 
geographically remote from dangerous suburbs and western interests. Even when seeking to 
preserve the Union, conservative unionists drew from the geographic definition of 
centralization and sought to foster dependency on place to tie the South into the Union and 
prevent what they claimed was a dangerous geographic concentration of power in the North. 
This could mean building creating a more polycentric union with a southern counterbalance 
to the North or fostering dependency on Washington or a self-proclaimed unionist border 
city that could impose Union on the North and the South. Conservative use of centralization 
to delegitimise power relationships over space and build alternatives shows the extent that 
altering perceptions of geography, as much as strengthening institutions, also formed part of 
how Americans believed their republic should operate. 
Conservative organisation for mercantile infrastructure also hinted at how these 
conservatives tended to organise within other movements and only occasionally formed a 
united conservative political movement. Rather than forming a united upper class, 
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conservatives in different east coast cities tended to see themselves as rivals in the contest to 
profit from economic centralization. Instead of working together to form a single economic 
programme, they worked within the city booster movements of their individual cities. Other 
aspects of these conservatives’ programmes also allowed them to work within single-issue 
political movements, such as consolidation movements, police reform, and Union parties. 
Their divisions on other issues like free trade, the morality of slavery, and the extent to which 
they were prepared to accept mass democracy may also have made it difficult for them to 
organise within a single organisation and encouraged them to organise within the two main 
political parties. The Union Party movements that entered into political competition might 
have come closest to an independent movement that could embrace a larger number of these 
self-defining conservatives, as it fully embraced the idea of a strong government and public 
deference to bisectional government power. But given the success of the Compromise of 
1850 in keeping slavery off the table until 1854 while other issues on which conservatives 
had interests continued, it is perhaps unsurprising that they never coalesced into a single 
political organisation.  
Despite not helping conservatives form a single political party, except when sectional 
tensions were perhaps at their highest, centralization was an important term in their political 
lexicon. It was a vital tool in how they contested the direction of changes underway in the 
United States. What distinguished these conservatives from other Americans was not that 
they opposed change or even opposed centralization, even if they only occasionally 
embraced this usually pejorative language to describe their own programmes. This thesis 
argues that what marked out these northerners from other Americans was what they used 
centralization to shape: the changes underway in the 1850s in both Europe and the United 
States, including democratisation, industrialisation, and the growing sectional crisis. But 
rather than opposing the emergence of new geographic and institutional sources of wealth 
and political power, conservatives sought to take advantage of them for their own purposes: 
curbing democracy, protecting property, and preserving the Union. Redefining 
centralization in order to suit their own purposes, they embraced the idea of imposing 
political decision-making and executive power from remote seats of government onto the 
people. They embraced extending bonds of economic dependency from growing cities over 
their hinterlands. And they embraced extending all forms of power over southern states and 
northern democracy from the federal government in Washington. Directing the rhetoric of 
centralization at their opponents allowed them to embrace a more controversial 
centralization of power of their own. Ironically, as supporters of an indissoluble state, an 
undemocratic government, and economic modernisation, these northern conservatives 
might have had more in common with the centralized regime of the Second Empire than 
they cared to admit.  
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